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Abstract
This thesis studies the efficient organisation of economic institutions. In the 
first chapter we analyse how foreign direct investment projects can generate 
spillovers through backward linkages. An investment project can generate such 
spillovers if local competitors in the project’s own industry can benefit from the 
upstream efficiency improvements that were induced by the entry of the foreign 
firm. The existence of the spillover effect depends crucially on the supplier 
arrangement that is chosen by the foreign firm. The foreign firm could avoid 
the spillover effect by producing the input itself or by contracting with only a 
small number of local suppliers. We use an incomplete contract framework to 
study the conditions under which the foreign firm optimally chooses a supplier 
arrangement that generates spillovers to the local industry.
In the second chapter we study an incomplete contract model in which a 
buyer and a seller first agree on an efficient ownership structure and then bar­
gain over the price of an input. We allow for asymmetric information at the 
ex post bargaining stage. The ownership structure that the agents agree on ex 
ante determines the payoff that each of them can realise before reaching agree­
ment ex post. We show that an ownership structure that lowers the parties’ 
joint pre-agreement payoffs accelerates ex post decision making but also makes 
delay in decision making more costly. We derive the ownership distribution that 
minimises the ex post bargaining inefficiencies.
In the third chapter we compare the efficiency of private and public provi­
sion of contract enforcement services. We show that self-interested agents with 
coercive power may have an incentive to use this power to enforce contracts be­
tween third parties. However, such agents also engage in extortion. We analyse 
how social welfare depends on the number of self-interested agents with coercive 
power and whether such agents face democratic elections.
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Introduction
This thesis studies the efficient organisation of economic institutions. The 
importance of economic institutions in market economies is evident to even the 
most casual observer of economic developments. Institutions, both private 
and public, axe the outcome of the interaction between privately optimising 
agents, and are thus an integral part of a market economy. The analysis of the 
emergence, development, and functioning of institutions is therefore not only 
of interest in itself, but also fundamentally important for our understanding of 
market interactions more generally. The analysis of institutions was somewhat 
neglected in the early economics literature, not because of a lack of interest, 
but because of a lack of appropriate formal techniques. Developments in game 
and contract theory have since allowed economists to make vast progress in 
our understanding of institutions. In this thesis we aim to contribute to the 
existing literature on the foundations of economic institutions. In chapters 1 and 
2 we analyse the efficient organisation of probably the most important private 
institution, namely the firm. In chapter 3 we develop a political economy model 
to study contract enforcement agencies.
For the remainder of this introduction we describe the broad development 
of the existing literature and put our analysis into its context. We start by 
discussing the theory of the firm and then turn to political economy.
In the standard neoclassical theory the firm is treated as a black box. In 
this literature the firm is simply a technology that turns inputs into outputs 
according to a given production function. This view of firms has proven to be 
a useful simplification that has allowed economists to address a large number of 
important economic problems. It is less useful, however, in explaining why firms 
exist in the first place, and in analysing the determinants of their boundaries. 
Given the central role that firms play in real world economies, these questions 
are of great importance for our understanding of the functioning of economic 
activity.
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Coase (1937) was the first to open this black box by posing and addressing 
the basic questions of what defines firms, what determines their boundaries, 
and what are the costs and benefits of merging firms. Coase argues that the 
consequence of one firm buying another is that the owner-manager of the former 
obtains the right to give orders to the manager of the latter. When the firms 
are separately owned, neither manager has the right to give orders to the other. 
Instead, both have to agree on contracts to achieve efficient outcomes. Coase 
argues that, in many situations, transaction costs make contracting in the market 
costly. Independent firms may then decide to avoid these transaction costs by 
merging. While the potential reduction of transaction costs is identified as the 
benefit of merging firms, increased bureaucracy is seen as its primary cost. In 
this view it is more difficult for managers to run large rather than small firms. 
The optimal size of firms is then determined by the trade-off between transaction 
and bureaucratic costs.
Coase’s analysis has been very influential. He has been credited, especially, 
for bringing the questions about the nature of firms to the forefront of the 
economic research agenda. Nevertheless, it took many years before substantial 
further progress was made. About 40 years after the publication of Coase’s 
original article, Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 
(1978) argued that relationship specific investments play an important role in 
explaining the boundaries of firms. To understand their argument, consider 
two firms that can only trade with each other after making initial investments. 
Suppose further that these investments are ‘relationship specific’, in the sense 
that their value is larger when the two firms trade with each other than when 
each trades with a third party. Ex post, after the investments have been sunk, 
the two firms then depend on each other to realise the gains from trade. This 
lock-in gives rise to opportunistic behaviour with each firm trying to increase 
its share of the gains from trade at the expense of the other. Klein, Crawford, 
and Alchian argue that, while the firms will always agree to trade and thereby 
realise the full gains from trade, ex post opportunistic behaviour can nevertheless
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distort the firms’ ex ante investment incentives. This is the case since a firm 
which is in a weak bargaining position ex post can only realise a small fraction 
of the gains from trade and therefore only has a limited incentive to generate 
the surplus by investing ex ante. Klein, Crawford, and Alchian argue that by 
merging, firms can reduce the scope for ex post opportunistic behaviour and thus 
improve ex ante investment incentives. In contrast, Williamson argues that ex 
post haggling over the sharing of the gains from trade can itself be wasteful. In 
his view integration reduces opportunistic behaviour and ex post asymmetric 
information, thereby reducing haggling costs. While Williamson and Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian elaborate on the benefits of integration, they are much 
less specific about its costs. Williamson follows Coase (1937) in arguing that 
increased bureaucracy represent the costs of integration. Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian do not discuss the costs of integration in detail.
The property rights approach, which was initiated by Grossman and Hart 
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), provides a coherent theory of the firm in 
which both the costs and the benefits of integration are derived from the same 
basic principles. The central assumption in the property rights literature is 
that contracts are incomplete, in the sense that an initial contract between 
two parties cannot specify each party’s obligations in all possible states of the 
world. Consider, for instance, two parties who contract over the use of a 
physical asset. It is assumed that these parties cannot costlessly anticipate 
all future contingencies, so that an initial contract between them is necessarily 
incomplete. The parties can, however, specify who has the right to decide 
how the asset should be used in any contingency that is not specified in the 
initial contract. This person is said to have the residual control rights over the 
asset and is identified as its owner. Hence, in the property rights literature, 
ownership is defined as a residual control right. Furthermore, firms are defined 
as a collection of productive physical assets which are jointly owned by one 
or more agents. When the owner-manager of one firm buys another firm she 
therefore simply becomes the owner of the second firm’s physical assets and can
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decide how these assets should be used in any contingency that is not specified 
in a contract between the parties.
The previous paragraph outlined the property rights literature’s answer to 
Coase’s first question about the definition of a firm. We now turn to the an­
swers that the property rights literature provides for Coase’s second question 
about what determines the boundaries of firms. Note that, in the property 
rights framework, this question is equivalent to asking what determines the op­
timal ownership distribution of physical assets. Consider again a situation in 
which two parties can only trade with each other after having made relation­
ship specific investments. Assume, furthermore, that the parties require some 
physical assets to engage in trade and that any ex ante contract between them 
is incomplete. Due to the incompleteness of the initial contract, the parties 
must bargain over the details of the transaction ex post. When one firm, call 
it firm A, buys another firm, say firm B, the owner-manager of firm A obtains 
the right to decide how to use firm B’s physical assets in any situation that is 
not contractually specified. In particular, at the ex post bargaining stage, the 
owner-manager of the merged firm can decide how to use all the physical assets 
without having to agree with firm B’s manager. This change in the owner­
ship distribution of the physical assets improves the ex post bargaining position 
of firm A’s owner-manager and worsens that of firm B’s manager. When the 
owner-manager of firm A buys firm B she therefore obtains a larger share of 
the ex post surplus and has a stronger incentive to invest ex ante. This im­
provement in the investment incentives of firm A’s owner-manager constitutes 
the benefit of integration. It comes, however, at the cost of reduced investment 
incentives for the manager of firm B who, after the merger, obtains a smaller 
fraction of the overall surplus. The efficient ownership distribution optimises 
both parties’ investment incentives to maximise the overall surplus.
The property rights literature is related to the work of Williamson and Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian in emphasising the importance of ex ante relationship 
specific investments. Importantly, however, it differs from their contributions
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by focusing on the role of residual control rights over physical assets and by 
using this concept to explain both the benefits and the costs of integration. 
The analysis of the property rights literature is closer to Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian, who also identified potentially inefficient ex ante investments as a key 
determinant of the boundaries of firms, than to Williamson, who stressed the 
importance of ex post haggling costs in explaining the emergence of firms.
The property rights approach has been very influential and its basic frame­
work has been extended and applied to a number of economic problems. For 
instance, Hart and Tirole (1990) and Bolton and Whinston (1991, 1993) use 
property rights models to study vertical integration and market foreclosure. 
Also, Raj an and Zingales (1998) extend the basic property rights framework 
and distinguish between residual control rights and the right to give access to 
an asset. They show how the right to control access can be used to influence 
relationship specific investments.
In chapter 1 of this thesis we develop an application of the basic property 
rights framework that is related to the incomplete contract literature on market 
foreclosure and to Raj an and Zingales (1998). In particular, we develop a prop­
erty rights model to rationalise a frequently observed phenomenon of foreign 
direct investment projects. Multinational corporations (MNCs) which invest in 
less developed countries often cooperate directly with local suppliers. For in­
stance, MNCs often transfer know-how and provide training for the work force of 
local suppliers. Also, some MNCs encourage upstream investments by agreeing 
to long term contracts or indeed by providing direct financial assistance. It is 
well documented (see, for instance, Matouschek and Venables (1999b)) that the 
upstream improvements that are induced by the entry of an MNC can spill over 
to local downstream firms. This can be the case if the local suppliers do not only 
sell to the MNC but also serve other local downstream firms. While the local 
industry, and local consumers, can benefit from the spillover effect, the MNC 
might be adversely affected by it. This will be the case if the spillover effect 
leads to the creation of more efficient local firms which compete with the MNC.
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We argue that the creation of this kind of spillover depends on the supplier 
arrangement that is chosen by the MNC. The MNC could, for instance, avoid 
the spillover by producing the input itself. Alternatively, the MNC could con­
tract with only a small number of suppliers and just generate enough upstream 
production to cover its own demand. There can only be a spillover effect if 
the MNC chooses a supplier arrangement that generates a net increase in the 
local production of inputs. We argue that the MNC may have an incentive to  
generate a net increase in upstream production, in spite of the spillover effect, 
since such an increase improves its bargaining position relative to the local sup­
pliers. This improved bargaining position can then lead to a more efficient level 
of foreign investment. We characterise the economic environment under which 
the MNC finds it optimal to use a supplier arrangement that generates this kind 
of spillover effect.
Having applied the existing property rights literature to the specific prob­
lems of foreign direct investment projects, we proceed in chapter 2 to develop 
a property rights theory of the firm which focuses exclusively on ex post bar­
gaining inefficiencies. This chapter is therefore in the spirit of Williamson who, 
as was noted above, stresses the importance of ex post bargaining inefficiencies 
in determining the boundaries of firms. The model is based on the conceptual 
framework of the property rights literature in that we assume that contracts 
are incomplete, define ownership as a residual control right, and characterise 
firms by the assets they own. Importantly, however, we differ from the existing 
literature by allowing for ex post asymmetric information. The existence of ex 
post private information can lead to bargaining inefficiencies which depend on 
the ownership distribution of physical assets.
To illustrate our basic arguments, consider a situation in which two parties, 
who are locked-in, can first decide on the ownership distribution of physical as­
sets and then bargain over the gains from trade. Suppose now that there is 
asymmetric information ex post because, for instance, the upstream firm is bet­
ter informed about the cost of producing an input or because the downstream
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firm knows more about the profitability of selling its product to final consumers. 
In the model we argue that, in the presence of private information, the parties 
may spend some time haggling before realising the gains from trade. The size 
of the resulting bargaining inefficiencies depend on the ownership distribution of 
physical assets. In particular, we argue that, while the two managers bargain 
over the input price, and before they reach an agreement with each other, each 
can trade with third parties on the spot market. We refer to the per period 
payoff that each manager can obtain during the bargaining process (and before 
reaching agreement with each other) as each manager’s ‘inside option’ and argue 
that it depends on the ownership distribution of assets. To see how the bar­
gaining inefficiencies depend on the ownership distribution, consider a change in 
the ownership distribution that lowers the managers’ joint inside option, i.e. the 
sum of their individual inside options. On the one hand, for a given duration 
of the delay period, a reduction in the joint inside option constitutes a direct 
resource cost. On the other hand, however, the duration of the delay period 
itself depends on the ownership distribution. In particular, the managers will 
spend less time haggling over the input price the more dependent they are on 
each other, i.e. the lower their joint inside options. This acceleration effect 
constitutes an efficiency gain. The optimal ownership distribution, on which 
the risk neutral and financially unconstrained parties agree ex ante, minimises 
the bargaining inefficiencies by trading off these two effects. We believe that 
our model complements the existing property rights literature and can help us 
to understand a number of ownership patterns such as joint ventures, exclusive 
supplier arrangements, and the exchange of ‘ugly princess hostages’.
To our knowledge the model in chapter 2 provides the first analysis of bar­
gaining inefficiencies in a property rights framework. In a technical sense chap­
ter 2 is related to Lockwood and de Meza (1998) and Chiu (1998) who study 
property rights models with strategic bargaining games. While we also apply 
strategic bargaining games, we differ fundamentally from their analyses by al­
lowing for asymmetric information and by focusing on ex post rather than ex
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ante inefficiencies.
In chapter 3 we move away from the analysis of firms and instead turn to con­
tract enforcement agencies. In most democracies the state uses its monopolised 
coercive powers to enforce private contracts. There axe, however, numerous 
instances in which states either give up some of their monopoly powers or at 
least refrain from using them for contract enforcement purposes. Private organ­
isations with coercive powers may then have an incentive to enter the market 
and satisfy the demand for contract enforcement. In chapter 3 we analyse the 
welfare implications of different contract enforcement regimes.
An understanding of contract enforcement agencies may at first seem to 
be of largely historical interest, applicable for instance to the development of 
autocracies and feudal systems or to the emergence of the Sicilian Mafia. Indeed, 
Gambetta (1993) argues informally that the emergence of the Sicilian Mafia 
was closely related to the failure of the state to provide contract enforcement 
services. However, recent developments in transition economies, especially in 
Russia, show that an understanding of private contract enforcement agencies 
is also of considerable current interest. A number of papers, including Greif 
and Kandel (1995), Hay, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996), Pistor (1996) and Hay and 
Shleifer (1998), have described the weaknesses of the Russian legal system in the 
1990s and discussed how private agents respond to the lack of public contract 
enforcement. One particular response that can be observed is the emergence of 
private organisations with coercive powers which provide contract enforcement 
services. In chapter 3 we analyse this phenomenon. We start by defining 
‘coercive power’ as the ability to influence the distribution of physical assets 
across agents. We then analyse the behaviour of agents who have ‘some’ coercive 
power. In the absence of democratic governments these agents have an incentive 
to engage in distortionary extortion. However, we show that under certain 
conditions the powerful agents also provide contract enforcement services. We 
then analyse the effect of competition between powerful agents on social welfare 
and study the welfare implications of controlling such agents through democratic
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elections. The analysis in this chapter identifies some of the trade-offs that are 
relevant in a discussion about the provision of contract enforcement services and 
that are absent from the existing literature on contract enforcement in transition 
economies.
Here we do not provide a comprehensive survey of the political economy 
literature (see Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a thorough introduction to the 
subject) and instead discuss those strands of the literature that are directly re­
lated to the analysis in chapter 3. Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) 
propose a theory of the public sector in which the government aims to exploit 
the citizens through the maximisation of the tax revenues that it extracts from 
the economy. This view of the public sector as a Leviathan has received consid­
erable attention in the literature. A key argument and empirical implication of 
their analysis is that, due to interjurisdictional mobility of citizens, competition 
between governments can limit excessive taxation. This hypothesis has been 
tested and rejected in a number of papers, including Oates (1985) and Forbes 
and Zampelli (1989). Such empirical findings, together with theoretical con­
siderations, may lead one to be sceptical about the suitability of the Leviathan 
theory in describing current democratic governments. It may still, however, pro­
vide a reasonable benchmark in describing less democratic and more authotarian 
regimes which, across time and countries, still form the majority of governments. 
In our analysis we take this point of view and assume that powerful agents sim­
ply aim to maximise their life-time consumption utility. We show that, in spite 
of being purely self-interested, these agents have an incentive to provide socially 
valuable contract enforcement services.
Next to allowing for non-democratic rulers, we differ from the Leviathan lit­
erature in assuming that citizens do not have the option of leaving an economy 
for one with a more favourable governmental system. In our model the rulers 
are then ‘competing’ in so far as each is trying to extract as much surplus as pos­
sible from the same fixed group of private agents. Clearly, the decision whether 
or not to allow for interjurisdictional mobility in a formal model depends on the
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economic situation one aims to analyse. We believe that the assumption of lim­
ited interjurisdictional mobility is the appropriate one to make when analysing 
the welfare implications of the private provision of contract enforcement ser­
vices. To our knowledge the only other paper studying political competition 
with interjurisdictional immobility is Konrad and Skaperdas (1999). In par­
ticular, they study different governmental regimes in which powerful agents use 
their coercive power to extort citizens but also to protect them against bandits 
and competing lords. In one regime “peasants are tied to their land and at the 
mercy of the lords who compete over how to divide them up1”. They stress 
the importance of this type of competition and state: “From Mesopotamia to 
China, Egypt, Mesoamerica, or feudal Europe, serfs were tied to the land and 
free peasants typically had no outside options, with rulers coming and going 
but without any change in their incentives for production. Even in the past 
two centuries, with the rise of the rights of man, the most liberal of states have 
sequestered their citizens with barbed-wire borders and passport controls2”.
As was mentioned above, we show in our analysis that self-interested private 
agents with coercive power have an incentive to engage in the seemingly benevo­
lent activity of providing contract enforcement services. Similarly, Olson (1993) 
and McGuire and Olson (1996) argue that a revenue maximising autocrat does 
not only engage in extortion but also provides public goods. They argue that 
the autocrat has an incentive to provide public goods since it increases his tax 
base. While our paper is similar in spirit, the models differ in several dimen­
sions. In particular, they discuss public goods in general, while we focus on the 
special public good of contract enforcement. We believe that this public good 
has particular characteristics which need to be model explicitly. Also, these pa­
pers do not address the reputation mechanisms which are central in our analysis. 
Moreover, they focus on autocracies and democracies while we allow for other 
government systems.
1 Konrad and Skaperdas (1999).
2 Konrad and Skaperdas (1999), p. 17.
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In our analysis we compare social welfare in an economy in which private 
agents can enforce contracts to two benchmarks: an anarchy, in which no agent 
has enough power to influence the payoff distribution, and a democracy, in which 
coercive power is concentrated and controlled by a democratically elected ruler. 
We model the democratic benchmark as a political agency problem in which 
citizens use elections to discipline self-interested politicians. Thus, our analysis 
is in the spirit of the political agency theory as initiated by Barro (1973). To 
our knowledge, however, the issues of contract enforcement that we focus on 
have so far not been addressed in the political agency literature.
Having outlined the broad strands of the literature that are relevant for the 
discussion in chapters 1, 2, and 3 we can now turn to the formal analysis.
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Chapter 1
Foreign Direct Investment and Spillovers through 
Backward Linkages
The impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) projects on host economies has 
been a controversial issue among academics and policy makers for some time. 
In the 1970s the majority opinion was largely critical of the presence of multina­
tional corporations (MNCs) in developing countries. This opinion was mainly 
based on the argument that the competitive advantage of an MNC can lead to 
the monopolisation of the local industry, thereby generating negative welfare 
effects in the host economy. In the last few years the prevailing view of multi­
national activity has become more optimistic. This shift in opinion is partly 
due to a large number of empirical studies that have identified various channels 
through which FDI can be beneficial for the host economy1. These empirical 
findings have been complemented by a number of papers2 that provide a theo­
retical framework to rigorously analyse the costs and benefits of multinational 
activity.
The aim of this chapter is to provide microfoundations for a particular 
channel that has received attention in the literature, namely the generation 
of spillovers through backward linkages. It is well understood that the entry of 
an MNC can lead to quality and efficiency improvements in the local upstream 
industry. If there are increasing returns in the upstream industry, the efficiency 
improvements may simply be due to the increased demand for local inputs that 
is generated by the project. The MNC can also encourage upstream invest­
ments by co-operating with the local suppliers more directly, for instance, by
1For a comprehensive survey article see BlomstrQm and Kokko (1996).
2 See, for example, Rodriguez-Clare (1996), Markusen and Venables (1999), and Matouschek 
and Venables (1999a).
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transferring know-how to local suppliers or by providing training for their work 
force. Also, some foreign investors encourage upstream investments by agreeing 
to long term contracts or, indeed, by providing direct financial assistance.
The upstream improvements that are induced by the entry of the MNC 
can spill over to local downstream firms, especially if local suppliers do not 
only sell to the MNC but also serve other local downstream firms. While the 
local industry, and local consumers, can benefit from the spillover effect, the 
MNC might be adversely affected by it since it may lead to the creation of more 
efficient local competitors.
In this chapter we argue that the existence of this kind of spillover depends 
crucially on the supplier arrangement that is chosen by the MNC. The MNC 
could, for instance, avoid the spillover by producing the input itself or by con­
tracting with only a small number of suppliers which generate just enough up­
stream production to cover the MNC’s own demand. There can only be a 
spillover effect if the MNC chooses a supplier arrangement that generates a net 
increase in the local production of inputs.
Given that the MNC may be adversely affected by the spillover effect, the 
key question is why it would choose a supplier arrangement that generates such 
a spillover. We argue that the MNC may itself have an interest in a net increase 
of local upstream production, since such an increase improves its bargaining po­
sition relative to its local suppliers. Only when the total supply of inputs is 
larger than the MNC’s demand can it engage in what we call a ‘double procure­
ment policy’. Under such a policy the MNC establishes trading relationships 
with several suppliers although any single supplier would be willing, and able, to 
satisfy the MNC’s demand. The MNC can then threaten to leave one supplier 
and buy more of the input from the other suppliers. Such a threat is not credible 
if the total supply of the input just covers the MNC’s demand since the suppliers 
know that the MNC has no choice but to buy the input from them. The for­
eign firm then faces the standard hold-up problem. The observation that firms 
sometimes solve a hold-up problem, not by integrating with the supplier, but
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by engaging in a double procurement policy has been made by Matouschek and 
Venables (1999b). In their case study of several recent FDI projects in Eastern 
Europe they report cases in which the foreign investor actively encouraged the 
development of an independent local upstream industry. Foreign investors were 
certain that such a development was in their interest since it allowed them to 
engage in a double procurement policy which, in turn, was perceived to reduce 
their hold-up problem.
In this chapter we analyse different supplier arrangements and derive the 
conditions under which the MNC optimally chooses an arrangement that leads 
to a net increase in local upstream production. In this sense we provide micro­
foundations for the type of spillover effect described above.
Our model is closely related to recent literature on market foreclosure in an 
incomplete contract setting. Hart and Tirole (1990) and Bolton and Whinston 
(1991, 1993) analyse how the ownership arrangement between two vertically 
linked firms can affect other upstream and downstream firms. In particular, 
they show that, as long as downstream firms compete in either input or output 
markets, there is “an excessive tendency towards integration”3, since firms may 
use integration to engage in market foreclosure. Thus, firms use changes in the 
ownership distribution to influence the degree of competition in their own and 
related industries. While our analysis is related to this literature, it differs in a 
number of ways. Most importantly, we allow the downstream firm to influence 
the degree of competition in the upstream industry directly by determining the 
equilibrium number of active firms. Chemla (1996) studies how the degree 
of downstream competition affects the investment incentives of a monopolistic 
upstream supplier. In particular, he argues that an increase in downstream 
competition has two opposing effects on the supplier’s investment incentives: on 
the one hand, an increase in downstream competition improves the supplier’s 
bargaining position, on the other hand, however, it also reduces the downstream 
industry’s profits. Our analysis differs from this in that we allow the degree of
3Bolton and Whinston (1991), p.214.
18
competition in the downstream industry to be determined endogenously and to 
be related to the degree of competition in the vertically linked industry.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on second sourcing (see, for 
instance, Farrell and Gallini (1988)) which studies a firm’s private incentive to 
increase competition in its own industry. The key argument in this literature 
is that, by increasing competition in its own industry, a firm can commit to low 
prices in the future, which in turn improves the incentives of customers to make 
product-specific investments. The analysis in this chapter is also related to Ra- 
jan and Zingales (1998). They build on the basic property rights framework and 
show how an agent can use the power to control access to an asset to influence 
the (relationship specific) investments of other agents. By controlling access 
to an asset the agent influences the degree of (ex post) competition between 
‘employees’. We differ from this analysis in that we focus on the spillover effect 
which is absent in their set-up.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: in the next section we
describe the basic model. In section 2 we solve the model and discuss the 
implications. Section 3 summarises and concludes.
1 The M odel
A ‘foreign’ downstream firm can invest in a host country where the local down­
stream industry consists of a large number of potential firms. To produce locally, 
downstream firms must buy inputs that are produced by the local upstream in­
dustry (thus, we assume that inputs cannot be traded on the world market). 
This local upstream industry also consists of a large number of potential firms. 
The downstream industry uses the locally produced inputs to manufacture a 
final good that is demanded by consumers. As will become clear below, coun­
tries other than the host economy play a very passive role and merely provide 
an export market.
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1.1 Dem and
The goods that are produced by the downstream firms are perfect substitutes 
and their price in the local market is given by the inverse demand function
p{q +  q) =  AP(g +  g),
where q is the total quantity sold by local firms, q is the quantity sold by the 
foreign firm, and A is a measure of the size of the local market. We assume 
that P q  < 0 and P q q  <  0, VQ, where Q =  q +  q. Throughout the analysis 
we use subscripts as a shorthand to indicate derivatives. We also assume that 
the foreign firm can sell its product in an export market at price pe, where 
pe =  P e(qe), P®e < 0, and <  0, V<?e. By assumption the local firms cannot 
sell in this market.
1.2 T he U pstream  Technology
Initially there is a large number of identical suppliers. Each supplier is endowed 
with an asset a. The foreign firm can choose which local suppliers to transfer 
know-how to. We assume that transferring know-how does not involve any 
direct costs for the foreign firm. After having received the know-how, a local 
supplier can make an unobservable investment u E {0, u}, where u indicates both 
the level and the cost of the investment. Suppose the supplier invests u =  u. 
Ex post he can then use the asset to produce one unit of the input at zero cost. 
In the absence of the supplier’s human capital the asset can still be used ex post 
to produce the input (at zero cost), however, in this case input production is 
only successful with probability (3 E [0,1]. With probability 1 — (3 it is not 
possible to produce the input in the absence of the supplier’s human capital. 
We interpret f3 as a parameter that captures the degree to which the supplier’s 
ex ante investment is embodied in the physical asset a: the investment is entirely 
specific to the supplier’s human capital if (3 =  0 and it is entirely embodied in
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the asset a if j3 =  l 4. Inputs cannot be produced ex post if the supplier does 
not invest ex ante, i.e. if u — 0.
We follow the recent literature on incomplete contracts and property rights5 
in assuming that the upstream and downstream firms do not know ex ante 
what type of input is appropriate for trade ex post. Furthermore, because of 
the large number of potential input types it is too costly to write contingent 
forward contracts. Instead of writing forward contracts the firms bargain over 
the input price ex post. The bargaining process is described in section 1.4 
below.
1.3 The Downstream  Technology
To engage in production downstream firms need one unit of the input that is 
produced by the local upstream firms. The operational fixed cost of each local 
downstream firm is given by F >  0 and that of the foreign firm is given by 
F  — v, where v  indicates the level of foreign investment. Marginal costs in the 
downstream industry are constant and normalised to zero6.
The foreign firm decides on the level of foreign investment v at the same 
time at which the suppliers choose their investment u. We assume that v is 
unobservable and that the foreign investment costs are given by the function 
c(v) >  0 which satisfies Cy(v) >  0, CyV{v) >  0, cvvv(v) >  0, Cv(0) =  0, and 
cv(F) =  oo. Most of these assumptions are standard and simply ensure that 
the foreign firm’s investment problem has a unique maximum. By assuming 
that Cy(F) =  oo we make sure that the foreign firm’s operational fixed costs are 
always positive. Assuming Ct,(0) = 0  implies that the foreign firm always has 
strictly lower costs than the local firm. The assumption that CyVV(v) >  0 may
4 This way of capturing the asset specificity of investments is similar to Noldeke and Schmidt 
(1998).
5 See, for example, Hart (1995).
6 This assumption implies that investments only affect fixed costs and not marginal costs. 
While relaxing the assumption might make the model more ‘realistic* we believe that it would 
distract from the main points of the paper by making the analysis more cumbersome than 
necessary.
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seem non-standard and we clarify below why we need this assumption7.
Suppose there is at most one active local firm (in the analysis this will always 
be the case). Then the assumptions about the demand for the final good and 
the downstream production costs can be summarised in the profit functions
*■(?» q, qe) =  Pe(qe)qe +  p(q +  q)q — (F — v) 
for the foreign, and
*(< i ,<i ) =  p (q +  q ) q - F
for the local firm.
We assume that the downstream firms engage in Cournot competition. Fi­
nally, we assume that it is always profitable for at least one local downstream 
firm to engage in production, in the sense that 7rc >  u, where 7fc denotes the 
equilibrium profits of a local firm in a downstream duopoly.
1.4 T he Bargaining Process
After the investments have been sunk the downstream firms need to bargain 
with the suppliers over the input price. In this section we specify what form 
the bargaining process takes when there are either one or two suppliers.
Suppose that ex post there is only one supplier who can engage in production. 
We then assume that the supplier Nash-bargains with the foreign firm at t =  0 
and that both parties have equal bargaining powers. If the parties disagree and 
the foreign firm owns the upstream asset, then it can try to engage in upstream 
production at t =  1 after which the bargaining game ends. If the parties disagree 
and the supplier owns the asset, then it can engage in production and make a
7Note that the assumptions cv(v) >  0, cvv(v) >  0 and, in particular, cvvv(v) >  0 are 
satisfied by any function c(v) =  va for a >  1.
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take-it-or-leave-it offer to one of the local downstream firms at t =  1 after which 
the bargaining game ends8.
If there are two suppliers who each own an upstream asset, bargaining takes 
the following form: the bargaining game has an infinite horizon and continues 
until the foreign firm agrees with one supplier on the price of an input. At 
t  =  0 the foreign firm gets matched with one supplier and Nash-bargains with 
that supplier over the input price. If they disagree, the foreign firm gets matched 
with the other supplier at t  =  1 and the two firms Nash-bargain over the input 
price. This process of alternated matching continues until the foreign firm 
agrees with one supplier in period t =  n >  0. Once the foreign firm has agreed 
with a supplier, the other supplier can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to one of 
the local downstream firms. During the bargaining process (i.e. prior to t =  n) 
the foreign firm has to pay a real resource cost to move from one period (or, 
equivalently, one supplier) to the next. We assume that this resource cost is a 
fixed fraction 1 — 5, for 5 E [0,1], of the foreign firm’s net equilibrium operating 
profits, i.e. its equilibrium operating profits minus the input price it has to pay9. 
We interpret the parameter 5 as an indicator of the degree of competition in the 
upstream industry: competition between the suppliers is very strong when 5 =  1 
since, if the foreign firm disagrees with one supplier, it can costlessly move on 
to the other supplier. In contrast, if 5 =  0, it is prohibitively expensive for the 
foreign firm to move from one supplier to the next, so that there is essentially 
no competition between the suppliers.
The bargaining process which we have specified is, of course, entirely ad 
hoc. One could think of many other bargaining solutions that could arise in the 
situations which we consider. For instance, the Shapley value has been used 
extensively in the property rights literature (see, for example, Hart and Moore
8 The supplier is assumed to have all the bargaining power when bargaining with the local 
downstream firms simply because there is a large number of such firms which all value the 
good equally.
9 A bargaining game in which, instead of having to pay a real resource cost that is a fraction 
of its net payoff, the foreign firm discounts its payoffs by a discount rate 6 gives exactly the 
same bargaining solution as the bargaining game presented here.
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(1990)). We do not use the Shapley value for two main reasons: first, while 
the Shapley value would imply some competition between suppliers, it does not 
allow us to vary the degree of competition. Second, we conjecture that it would 
imply a ‘collusive’ outcome in which the two downstream firms and the suppliers 
agree to an anti-competitive arrangement. We have chosen the bargaining game 
specified above since it is fairly straightforward and it enables us to parameterise 
the degree of ex-post competition between the two suppliers.
1.5 The Game
The game is summarised in the time-fine below.
t  =  -  2 t =  - 1  t  =  0 * > 0  t +  1
Supplier Suppliers invest u Bargaining Bargaining Downstream
arrangement Foreign firm invests v starts ends competition
At t  =  t +  1 production of the final output takes place and the downstream 
firms compete in quantities. Between t  =  0 and t =  t the suppliers and the 
downstream firms bargain over the price of the input. At t =  —1 the local 
suppliers and the foreign firm decide on their investment levels and at t =  — 2 
the foreign firm chooses the optimal supplier arrangement.
2 The A nalysis
In this section we solve the game by backward induction. We first describe 
the equilibrium in the downstream competition subgame and then analyse the 
investment incentives under different supplier arrangements. In particular, we 
consider the following three supplier arrangements: the foreign firm contracts 
with only one independent supplier (indicated by ‘s’ or single procurement), the 
foreign firm integrates with one local supplier (‘i’ or integration), and the foreign 
firm uses two independent suppliers (‘d’ or double procurement). In section 2.6
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we finally derive and discuss the conditions under which the different supplier 
arrangements are optimal.
2.1 Downstream  C om petition
Given these supplier arrangements, we only need to consider the cases in which 
there are either one or two downstream firms. Suppose, first, that one local 
downstream firm competes with the foreign firm. The Nash equilibrium of the 
final stage subgame is then given by the simultaneous solution to the following 
maximisation problems:
(1) maxTT (q,q,qe)Q,q*
(2) max7r (q,q).
g
Let the simultaneous solution to (1) and (2) be denoted by q*, q* and qe* 
(see the appendix for details). Also, let the respective operating profits of the 
foreign firm and its local competitor be denoted by 7rc(v) =  n{q*,q*,qe*) and 
7fc =  7r(5W ).
Suppose, now, that only the foreign firm is active, and let qm* denote the 
solution of (1) for q =  0. In this case the foreign firm’s profits are then given by 
7rm(u) =  7r(0, qm*,qe*)- Accordingly, denote by qm* the solution to (2) for q =  0 
and the associated profits for the local downstream firm by 7rm =  7r(qrn*, 0).
2.2 First B est
Before analysing the different supplier arrangements, consider the first best in­
vestment levels that would maximise the foreign firm’s profits. In the absence 
of a local competitor the first best investments solve
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XL
max — u — c(v),
v,u u
while, in the presence of a local competitor, they solve
XL
max —7rc(v) — u — c(v). 
u
Since ttc(v) >  nc >  u and CvV(v) > 0, Vu, it follows that, in either case, the 
first best investments are given by u =  u and v =  vb, where vb is impficitly 
defined by
(3) C y (v b) =  1
2.3 Single Procurem ent
In this case the foreign firm transfers its know-how to only one independent 
supplier. As a result, ex post there is only one independent supplier from which 
the foreign firm can buy the input. Consider the bargaining game that starts 
at t =  0. The foreign firm can make an operating profit of 7rm(u) if it buys 
the input from the supplier. If the firms disagree, then the supplier can sell 
its input to one of the local downstream firms at t =  1 for nm. The foreign 
firm cannot engage in production without using the input so that its outside 
option at t =  0 is zero. Let Rs(v) and W s{v) denote the respective bargaining 
payoffs of the foreign firm and the supplier. Nash-bargaining then results in the 
following payoffs:
-  5fm)
W a{v) =  h v m(v) +  v m). 
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At t  =  — 1 the foreign firm and the local supplier decide how much to invest. 
The equilibrium investment levels simultaneously solve the following maximisa­
tion problems:
u
max - R s(v) — c(v) 
v u
max — W s(v) — u.
uG{0,u} U
The first order conditions are given by
(4)
u-R l{v )  -  cv(v) =  0 
u
(5) u =
u if W 3(v) > u 
0 otherwise.
Let vs denote the level of foreign investment that solves the foreign firm’s first 
order condition for u = u ,  i.e. let vs be implicitly defined by
(6) cv(ws) =
Note that 7rm(v) > n™ > irc >  u, Vv. Thus, W s(v) >  u, Vu. This, in turn, 
imphes that u =  u is a best response for any v. It then follows that the unique 
simultaneous solution to the first order conditions (4) and (5) is given by u =  u 
and v =  v s. Finally, we can confirm that the relevant second order condition 
for maximisation problem is satisfied since CvV(v) >  0, W. Hence, at t =  — 1 the 
firms optimally invest u — u and v =  vs.
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Given the convexity of the cost function c(v), conditions (3) and (6) imply 
that vb > v s. Thus, under single procurement the foreign firm underinvests 
relative to first best. This underinvestment is, of course, due to the standard 
hold-up problem: at t =  — 1 the foreign firm anticipates that it will not receive 
the full return from its investment and, since it bears the entire investment costs, 
it underinvests. Note that, in this model, the supplier does not underinvest since 
it can always cover its investment costs by selling the input to one of the local 
firms.
At t  =  —2 potential suppliers are willing to pay their entire expected surplus 
to learn how to produce the input. Thus, at this stage the foreign firm can 
extract the suppliers’ entire expected surplus. At t =  — 2 the foreign firm’s 
total expected surplus is then given by
(7) T a =7rm(va) - u ~ c ( v s).
2.4 Integration
In this case, just as in the previous one, the foreign firm transfers its know-how 
to only one supplier. However, the foreign firm now owns the asset which the 
supplier needs to use to engage in production. If the supplier disagrees with the 
foreign firm his only option is to withdraw his human capital, thereby realising 
a zero payoff. In the absence of the supplier’s human capital the foreign firm 
can use the asset to produce the input itself but it will only be successful with 
probability (3. Its disagreement payoff is therefore given by p7rm(v). Agreement 
between the foreign firm and the supplier results in a total payoff of 7rm(v) . Thus, 
the respective Nash bargaining payoffs are given by
(8) fT(t») = l ( l  + / J K »
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(9)
At t =  — 1 the foreign firm and the local supplier decide how much to invest. 
The equilibrium investment levels simultaneously solve the following maximisa­
tion problems:
u
max —Rl(v) — c(v) v u
UL T t  r i  /  \max —W  (v) — u.uG{0,u} U
The first order conditions are given by
(10) _  =  0(Jb
(11) U  =  <
u if W l(v) >  u 
0 otherwise.
It immediately follows from the first order conditions that, for W l(0) < u, non­
investment by both firms is an equilibrium.
There can, however, be another equilibrium in which both firms do invest. 
Let vl denote the foreign investment level that solves the foreign firm’s first order 
condition for u =  u, i.e. let v% be implicitly defined by
(12) ct,(Ui) =  i ( l  +  /3).
It then follows that u =  u and v =  v% solve the first order conditions if and only 
if W l(vt) >  u. The convexity of c(v) again ensures that the relevant second
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order condition is satisfied. Hence, the investments u =  u and v =  v% form a 
Nash equilibrium if and only if W*(?/) > u. Note that W l(vl) <  u implies that 
Wl(0) < u. Thus, u =  v =  0 is a unique equilibrium when W %{v%) <  u. Note 
also that Wl(0) <  u does not imply W l(v%) < u. When W %(v%) >  u there can, 
therefore, be two equilibria, one in which u =  v =  0, and one in which u — u 
and v =  v \  For the remainder of this analysis we assume that, whenever both 
equilibria exist, the firms coordinate on the investment equilibrium in which 
u =  u and v =  v%.
We now show that the condition W %{v%) > u is satisfied (i.e. the equilibrium 
u =  u and v =  vl exists) if and only if /? 6 [/3, /3], where p  and j3 are two 
parameters such that 0 < p  <  (3 <  1. To do so we first need to show that 
W l(vl) is concave in /?. Differentiating W x{vx(P)) with respect to [3 gives
(13) =  1[(1 -  P)v},(0) -  » “ (»*)],
and
(14) W & K) =  1(1 -  PrffriP) -
Applying the implicit function theorem to (12) gives
(15)
and
K > 0 ,
(16> ” » « » -  ^  °-
Inspection of (13) shows that the sign of Wp{v*) is indeterminate. This is due 
to the two opposing effects that changes in (3 have on the supplier’s bargaining
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payoff W i(vt): on the one hand, a higher level of (3 increases the foreign firm’s 
outside option, thereby reducing the gains from trade, and hence the supplier’s 
bargaining payoff. On the other hand, however, the foreign firm’s optimal 
investment level is increasing in (3. Thus, increases in (3 lead to larger gains 
from trade and a higher bargaining payoff for the supplier. It follows from (13),
(15), and (16) that Wpp(vl) <  0 as long as CwV{v) >  0. This is the reason why 
we are making an assumption about the third derivative of the cost function
Note next that Wp{v%) <  0 for /? =  1. Hence, there exist at most two 
values of (3 for which W {v%) =  u. Let P denote the smallest value of (3 such 
that W i{vl) <  % V/? >  (3, and let (3_ denote the largest value of p  such that 
W i(vi) <  u, V/9 < p. The concavity of W*(v%) in p  implies that W %(vl) >  u if 
and only if P G [/?, P).
Finally, we need to show that 0 < P <  P <  1. Consider first /?, and note 
that W (v%) =  0 for p  =  1. Hence, p  ^  1. Suppose now that maxpW (v%) >  u. 
Then p  is uniquely defined by the P for which W (vl) = u  and Wp(vl) <  0. Note 
that, in this case, p^ =  W^(v1)-1 < 0. Clearly, p  =  0 when max/? W (v1) <  0. 
Consider now p. Suppose that maxpW (v%) >  w, Wp(vz) >  0 for P =  0, and 
Wl(ul) <  u for p  =  0. Then p  is uniquely defined by the p  for which W (v%) =  u 
and Wp(vl) >  0. Note that in this case /3_ =  Wp(v%)~1 >  0. Finally, (3_ =  0 if 
either maxpW (vl) <  u, Wp(vl) <  0 for p  =  0, or W %(vl) >  u for P =  0. The 
concavity of W t(v%) then impfies that P < P . Hence, 0 <  (3_ < P <  1.
The discussion can be summarised in the following lemma:
Lem m a 1 At t =  — 1 the investment levels u — u and v =  vl form a Nash 
equilibrium if and only if p  G [/?,/?]. For p  £ [P,P\ the unique equilibrium of 
the investment subgame is given by u =  v =  0.
At stage t  =  — 2 the foreign firm can extract the entire surplus from the local 
supplier. Its total payoff is therefore given by
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(17) T  =
irm(vl) — u — c(vl) if f3 €  [/?, /?] 
0 otherwise.
2.5 D ouble Procurem ent
Under double procurement the foreign firm transfers its know-how to two inde­
pendent suppliers. Each supplier can then invest and engage in production.
Let Ui, for i =  1,2, denote supplier z’s investment at t  =  — 1 and suppose 
that u\ =  u2 =  u. At the bargaining stage the foreign firm then bargains with 
two independent suppliers in the way specified in section 1.4. To analyse this 
bargaining game, note first that, if one supplier has sold an input to the foreign 
firm, the other supplier can sell its input to a local downstream firm for nc.
At t =  0 the foreign firm gets randomly matched with one supplier (the ‘first 
supplier’). The two firms then Nash-bargain over the input price x .  Since 
there axe gains from trade to be realised, the firms agree on an input price x *  
at t  =  0, after which the other supplier (the ‘second supplier’) sells its input to 
a local downstream firm at t —  1. Thus, the agreement payoff of the foreign 
firm is t t c ( v )  — x * , the agreement payoff of the first supplier is x * ,  and their joint 
agreement payoff is t t c ( v ) .  To determine x * , we need to consider the outside 
options of the first supplier and the foreign firm. Suppose, therefore, that the 
foreign firm and the first supplier do not agree. The foreign firm then always 
finds it profitable to move on to the next supplier (since it only has to pay a 
fraction of its net payoff to do so). Except for the identity of the supplier, the 
foreign firm’s bargaining problem at t =  1 is identical to its bargaining problem 
at t =  0. Thus, at t  =  1 the foreign firm would pay x *  to the second supplier 
after which the first supplier would sell its input to a local downstream firm. It 
then follows that, if agreement is reached at t  =  0, the gains from trade of the 
foreign firm and the first supplier are respectively given by (1 — 8 ) ( t t c ( v )  — x * )  
and x *  — 7rc. Under Nash-bargaining the gains from trade of the two parties 
must be equalised, so that
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(1 — S)(7TC(v)  — X*) =  X* — 7TC.
Solving for x* gives
x * =  2 T 5 K1 -  s ^ c+ffC]-
Thus, in equilibrium the foreign firm pays the first supplier an input price x* at 
t =  0 and the second supplier sells its input to a local downstream firm at t — 1 
for a price nc. Note that
7f c — 7t c ( v )  
x s =  /2 _  Sy  <  0, for V > 0.
Hence, the stronger the degree of upstream competition, the lower the price the 
foreign firm has to pay for the input. We have already noted that the foreign 
firm’s bargaining payoff is given by nc(v) — x*, so that
R i(S’v ) =  ^
Ex ante each supplier has a chance of one half to be chosen as the first 
supplier, in which case its bargaining payoff is given by x*, or as the second 
supplier, in which case the bargaining payoff is 7rc. Each supplier’s expected 
bargaining payoff is, therefore, given by
Wd{S’V) =  2 (2 ^ 6 ) [(1 “  S)WC{V) +  (3 "  6 ) n
When upstream competition is very strong, i.e. <5=1,  the expected bar­
gaining payoffs are given by Rd(l,i>) =  7rc(u) — 7rc and W d(l,v )  =  7rc. In this
33
case the foreign firm can extract all the gains from trade from the suppliers who 
only realise their ‘outside option’. When there is no upstream competition, i.e. 
<5 =  0, the expected bargaining payoffs are given by Rd(0,u) =  ^(nc(v) — ttc) and
Consider now the investment decisions at t =  — 1. At this stage the foreign 
firm and each supplier can decide how much to invest. Note, first, that it is 
always optimal for supplier i to invest Ui =  u, independent of v and Uj, where 
j  ^  i, since W s(8,v) >  u , Vu, and W d(8,v) > u , Vu. Thus, in any equihbrium 
m  =  v,2 =  u. Consider now the foreign firm’s best response when both suppliers 
invest u. The best response solves
W d( 0,u) =  \ (n c(v) +  37rc).
maxRd(8jv) — c(v).
Let vd be implicitly defined by Rd(8,vd) — (^(v) =  0, i.e.
(18)
The second order condition is satisfied since CyV( v )  >  0. Thus, the foreign firm’s 
best response is given by v  =  v d . It then follows that the unique equihbrium of 
the investment subgame is given by iq =  — u and v  =  v d .
At stage t =  — 2 the foreign firm can again extract the entire surplus from 
the local supplier. Its total expected surplus is, therefore, given by
(19) T d =  7YC( v d ) +  7TC —  2 u  —  c ( v d ) .
2.6 The Optim al Supplier Arrangement
We are interested in the conditions under which the entry of the foreign firm 
generates a spillover effect that can lead to the emergence of a local competitor.
The foreign investment will generate such a spillover effect only if its entry leads 
to a net increase in the local supply of inputs. Since the foreign firm uses 
one unit of the input itself, we therefore need to study the conditions under 
which the local industry is induced to produce at least two units of the critical 
input. The only supplier arrangement that might achieve this outcome is the 
double procurement policy in which the foreign firm enables two local suppliers 
to engage in upstream production. Single procurement does not generate the 
spillover effect because of the assumed capacity constraint10. In this section 
we use the above analysis to derive the conditions under which the foreign firm 
optimally engages in a double procurement policy.
2.6.1 Single Procurem ent versus Integration
It is useful to start the discussion by comparing single procurement and in­
tegration. We have already seen that a single procurement policy leads to 
underinvestment. It is, of course, well known that integration can reduce these 
kind of investment inefficiencies. In this section we study the conditions under 
which this is the case in the current framework.
The foreign firm prefers single procurement to integration if and only if T 3 >  
T \ Recall that, under single procurement, the supplier invests u =  u, and the 
foreign firm invests vs < vb. Thus, integration can only be more profitable 
than single procurement if it increases the level of foreign investment, without 
reducing the supplier’s investment level.
The extent to which integration improves the foreign firm’s investment incen­
tives depends on /?, the degree of asset specificity of the supplier’s investment.
10We conjecture that we could relax the assumption of an exogenously given capacity con­
straint without affecting the results if we replace it with one of the following assumptions: 
firstly, we could allow the foreign firm to sign an exclusive dealing agreement with the single 
independent supplier. Even the supplier has an interest in such an agreement since it reduces 
downstream competition and, therefore, increases the gains from trade at the expense of the 
consumers. Alternatively, we could extend the game to allow suppliers to choose the capacity 
of their plant ex ante. We conjecture that, if the suppliers cannot commit to exclusive deal­
ing agreements (e.g. because of anti-trust legislation), they have an incentive to choose the 
capacity constraint that we assume exogenously, i.e. they optimally choose to build a plant 
that just covers the demand of the foreign firm.
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We have already noted that, for a given upstream investment, the foreign firm’s 
bargaining payoff R s is increasing in p. This is the case since an increase in 
{3 improves the foreign firm’s ability to produce the input in the absence of 
the supplier’s human capital which, in turn, increases the foreign firm’s outside 
option and, thus, its bargaining payoff.
The effect of integration on the supplier’s investment incentives, however, 
is ambiguous. This is due to the two opposing effects that integration has on 
the supplier’s bargaining payoff W s: on the one hand, integration improves the 
foreign firm’s outside option and hence reduces the gains from trade between the 
supplier and the foreign firm. On the other hand, however, the foreign firm’s im­
proved investment incentives lead to an increase in the gains from trade. When 
(3 is very large, i.e. (3 G (/?, 1], the former effect dominates the latter, and the 
supplier cannot be induced to invest under integration. Note that, in this case, 
the foreign firm will also not invest since it cannot engage in production without 
access to locally produced inputs. Hence, for (3 G (/?, 1], integration leads to 
lower investment levels and is therefore less profitable than single procurement.
Suppose now that the supplier’s investment is very human capital specific, 
i.e. (3 G [0,/?). In this case the asset is not very useful for the foreign firm in 
the absence of the supplier’s human capital. As a result, for a given upstream 
investment, integration only leads to a small improvement in the foreign firm’s 
bargaining position and its investment incentives (see (12)). The less the foreign 
firm invests, however, the smaller are the supplier’s investment incentives. When 
(3 is small enough, i.e. /? G [0,/?), the supplier cannot be induced to invest. This 
again implies v  =  0, since the foreign firm cannot produce without access to local 
inputs.
Finally, suppose (3 G \(3,/3\. In this parameter range the supplier invests 
u =  u and the foreign firm invests v — v1. It follows from (7) and (17) that the 
relative profitability of the two supplier arrangements is then given by
A T i>s =  T i _ T s =  y i _ y s _  ^  +  c(v sy
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Note that ATl,s =  0 for (3 =  0 and
dA T 1'3 1
Thus, integration is more profitable than single procurement if the supplier’s 
investment is neither too human capital, nor too asset specific, i.e. /3 €  [/3, 0 \. 
The analysis in this section can be summarised in the following lemma:
Lem m a 2 Integration is weakly more profitable than single procurement, i.e. 
T{ > T S, if p  € [/?, (3}. Otherwise single procurement is more profitable than 
integration, i.e. T s > T l .
2.6.2 D ouble Procurem ent versus Single Procurem ent
The foreign firm prefers double to single procurement if and only if T d > T S. It 
follows from (7) and (19) that this is the case if and only if
(20) 7rc(vd) +  7rc — 2u — c(vd) > 7rm(vs) — u — c(vs).
Condition (20) shows that the relative profitability of single and double pro­
curement depends on three effects: first, the procurement policies differ with 
respect to the number of suppliers who undertake investments. Clearly, a double 
procurement policy requires twice as many suppliers to invest than a single pro­
curement policy. This duplication of investment efforts constitutes a resource 
cost which makes double procurement relatively less profitable.
Second, the relative profitability of the two procurement policies depends on 
the size of the spillover effect: under double procurement suppliers produce two 
units of the input, one of which is then sold to the foreign firm and the other to a 
local downstream firm11. This creates competition in the downstream industry
11 It was already mentioned earlier that, in spite of only requiring one unit of the input, the
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and reduces industry profits. To analyse the size of this spillover effect consider 
condition (20) for v d =  v s =  v .  Note that, in this stylized model, the foreign 
firm is able to extract the entire operating profit from its local downstream 
competitor so that the size of the spillover effect is given by 7rm ( v )  — 7rc ( v )  — 7rc . 
There are two reasons why this spillover effect is always positive: first, in the 
case of perfect substitutes, the revenue of a monopolist must be larger than the 
joint revenue of two duopolists. Second, when there are fixed costs, production 
by a monopolist is more cost efficient than production by two duopolists. The 
size of the spillover effect depends on the extent to which the two downstream 
firms compete in the same market. In terms of the model this can be shown by 
noting that
d(7Tm(v) -  7rc(v) -  ■**) =  p (  m . )  m ,  _  p (  o  +  +  f )  >  0 ,
a  A
i.e. the larger the local market (in which the firms compete) relative to the 
export market (in which only the foreign firm is active), the larger the spillover 
effect.
Finally, the relative profitability of the two supplier arrangements depends 
on the difference in foreign investments. We have already seen that, under 
double procurement, the foreign firm’s investment incentives are increasing in 
8, the degree of competition in the upstream industry (see (18)). Essentially, 
more competition in the upstream industry improves the foreign firm’s ex post 
bargaining position which, in turn, improves its investment incentives. It can 
be seen from (6) and (18) that v d =  v s for 8 =  0. Since v d >  0 and vf =  0, it 
follows that v d > v s if 8 >  0. The first order condition (18) also shows that, 
even under double procurement, the foreign firm’s investment is always weakly
foreign firm and the suppliers would like to agree to an exclusive dealing contract, whereby 
the suppliers sell only to the foreign firm and ‘boycott’ the local competitor. Indeed such 
a contract would increase the joint profit of all firms, including the local downstream firm. 
We rule out such a contract on anti-trust grounds since it only increases joint profits at the 
expense of the consumers by monopolising the downstream industry.
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below the first best level. Hence, double procurement reduces the investment 
inefficiencies relative to single procurement.
Moving from single to double procurement therefore affects the foreign firm’s 
profits in three ways: the duplication of upstream investment efforts and the po­
tential creation of downstream competition have a negative and the improved 
investment incentives have a positive effect on the foreign firm’s profits. Rear­
ranging (20) and substituting for the profit functions gives
(21) vd -  V s +  c{vs) -  c(vd) > u  +  p{qm*)qm* -  p{qc* +  ? *)(qc* +  q°*) +  F.
The LHS of (21) represents the gains and the RHS the costs of moving from 
single to double procurement. Let AB d,3(8) = v d — v3 +  c{v3) — c(vd) and note 
that A B d’s(0) =  0 and
Also let A C d,s =  u +  p(qm*)qm* — p(qc* +  q°*)(qc* +  q°*) +  F  and note that 
it is independent of 8. Thus, there exists a critical 8s above which double 
procurement is more profitable than single procurement, and below which the 
opposite is true. If AHd,s(l) <  ACd,s, then 6* =  1 and if AHd,s(l) >  A Cd,s, 
then 6* is implicitly defined by the unique 8 G [0,1) that solves A B d,3(8) =  
A C d,s. Note that
d(A B d>3 -  A C d's) 
du
and
d (A B d'3 -  A C d'3)
=  - [P {q m*)qm* ~ P(qc* +  +  5")] < 0.dX
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Thus, the parameter region in which double procurement is more profitable 
than single procurement is decreasing in the cost of upstream investments and 
in the relative size of the local market. The analysis can be summarised in the 
following lemma:
Lem m a 3 Double procurement is more profitable than single procurement, i.e. 
T d >  T s, if 8 6 (£S, 1]. Otherwise single procurement is weakly more profitable 
than double procurement, i.e. T s > T d.
2.6 .3  D ouble Procurem ent versus Integration
Finally, we need to consider the relative profitability of double procurement and 
integration. It immediately follows from (7) and (17) that double procurement 
is more profitable than integration if the supplier’s investment is either very 
specific to the supplier’s human capital ({3 € [0,/?)) or to the asset (/3 € (/?, 1]). 
If (3 €E [/?, /?], double procurement is more profitable than integration if and only 
if
(22) 7TC(vd) +  7TC — 2u — c(vd) >  7Tm(vl) ~ U  — c(u*).
Rearranging (22) and substituting for the profit functions gives
(23) v i - v i +  c(F) -  c(v“) > u  +  p{qm*)qm* - p(?c* +  §c*)(gc* +  g°*) +  F.
The LHS of (23) represents the (potential) gains and the RHS the costs of moving 
from integration to a double procurement policy. Just as in the previous section 
the costs are due the duplication of upstream investments and the spillover effect. 
Double procurement can only be more profitable than integration if it leads to 
more efficient investment levels. Whether the level of foreign investment is more 
efficient under double procurement than under integration depends on the degree
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of upstream competition and the asset specificity of the suppliers’ investments. 
Let A B i ’i(S, P ) = v d - v i +  c(v*) -  c(vd) and A Cdd =  u +  p(qmt)qm* -  p{<f* +  
qct)(qc* +  qct) +  F. It then follows from (12) and (18) that A B d,'(^ ^ ,P )  =  0,
d A B ^ iS ,# )  1 - 6
d6 2 - 6 < >  0,
and
d A B ^ fa f i )
dp
=  - - ( 1  -  P ) F 0  <  0.
Thus, if p  G [/?, (3\, the foreign firm’s investment levels are more efficient under 
double procurement than under integration if and only if <5 > i.e. upstream 
competition is strong relative to the degree of asset specificity of the supplier’s 
investment. Since A C d,t is independent of 0  and 6 it then follows that 6 >  
is a necessary condition for double procurement to be more profitable than 
integration.
Let ?  be the critical degree of upstream competition above which double 
procurement is more profitable than integration. Thus, 0* =  1 if A B d,t(l, f3) <  
A C d'%. Otherwise, ?  is imphcitly defined by the unique 8 € [0,1) that solves 
A B d''(6,P) =  A C d’\  Note that d(.ABd'i^ ACd'‘) <  o, atAj;,‘,‘- AO'M> < 0, and 
a(ABd’i-ACd'') <  q -phus, the parameter region in which double procurement 
is more profitable than integration is decreasing in the cost of upstream in­
vestments, in the relative size of the local market, and in the degree of asset 
specificity of the supplier’s investment. The analysis can be summarised in the 
following lemma:
Lem m a 4 Double procurement is more profitable than integration, i.e. T d >
 . --"j
T z, if 8 6  (<5 , 1]. Otherwise integration is weakly more profitable than double 
procurement, i.e. T l > T d.
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2.6 .4  T he O ptim ality o f D ouble Procurem ent
The following proposition follows immediately from the discussion above:
P roposition  1 The foreign firm engages in double procurement if and only if 
either 0  G [0,0\ and 6 G ( ? ,  1] or 0  £ [0,0\ and 6 G (<T, 1].
We have seen that the foreign firm is more likely to engage in double procure­
ment, the lower the upstream investment costs (the lower u) and the smaller the 
spillover effect (the smaller A). Also, if 0  G [0 ,0 ], the foreign firm is more likely 
to engage in double procurement, the more specific the upstream investment is 
to the supplier’s human capital (the smaller 0).
Note also that there may be a difference between the social and the foreign 
firm’s private return from engaging in double procurement. This is the case since 
the foreign firm does not take into account the gain in consumer surplus that 
is generated when there are more firms in the downstream industry. It follows 
that, whenever the foreign firm engages in double procurement, this arrangement 
leads to a higher level of social surplus than the alternative arrangements that 
we allow for. However, the reverse is not true: it can be the case that double 
procurement is socially desirable but the foreign firm chooses a different supplier 
arrangement. Again, this is possible because the foreign firm does not internalise 
changes in consumer surplus.
3 C onclusion
The aim of this chapter was to rationalise the observation that foreign investors 
sometimes use supplier arrangements that generate spillovers to local competi­
tors. We argued that it may be problematic for the foreign firm to contract with 
only one independent supplier since, in this case, it anticipates to be held up ex 
post and therefore underinvests. Integration with the supplier does not improve 
the foreign firm’s investment incentives if the local supplier’s investment is either 
very human capital or very asset specific. In the former case, ownership of the
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asset does not improve the foreign firm’s bargaining position since it still has to 
agree with the supplier to get access to his human capital. In the latter case, 
integration only improves the foreign firm’s bargaining position at a very high 
cost, namely a strong deterioration in the supplier’s own investment incentives.
The effectiveness of a double procurement policy in improving investment 
incentives depends on the degree of competition in the upstream industry: the 
more competitive the upstream industry the stronger the foreign firm’s ex post 
bargaining position in the case of double procurement and the higher its in­
vestment level. The foreign firm only engages in double procurement if the 
benefit of improved investment incentives outweighs the costs of such a policy. 
These costs are given by the duplication of upstream investment efforts and the 
creation of downstream competition.
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4 A ppendix
The first order conditions of (1) and (2) are given by
P\* (qe)qe +  p e(qe) + P q (c[ +  q)q + p { q  +  q) =  0 
pq(q +  q ) q + p ( q  +  q) =  o.
These first order conditions solve for q*t q* and qe*.
Note that the second order conditions
2pQ{q +  q)+PQQ(q  +  q)q +  2peqe(qe) + p eq*q*(qe)qe <  o
2PQ{q +  q) +  qpQQ(q +  q) <  o,
are satisfied, since Pq{Q) <  0, Pqq{Q) <  0, pege{qe) <  0, and peqeq*(qe). 
Also, the stabihty condition is satisfied, since
2p q (Q)  +  qpQQ(Q) p q (Q) +  qpQQ(Q) 
Pq {Q)  +  qPQQ(Q) 2Pq {Q)  4- qpQQiQ)
=  pq (Q)[3p q {Q) + pqq(Q)Q] >  o.
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Chapter 2
A Property Rights Theory of the Firm 
with Private Information
In this chapter we develop a property rights theory of the firm which focuses 
exclusively on the role of asset ownership in determining bargaining inefficiencies. 
We argue that firms at times bargain with their patrons1 in the presence of 
private information. Bargaining between the parties may then be inefficient, 
in the sense that gains from trade are not realised or are only realised after 
some delay. The firm and its patrons anticipate these bargaining inefficiencies 
and take them into account when deciding on the ownership distribution of the 
physical assets. We explicitly model the interdependence between the ownership 
distribution and the ex post bargaining inefficiencies. This allows us to relate the 
economic environment to the ownership distribution that minimises the expected 
bargaining inefficiencies.
To illustrate the structure of the model, consider a situation in which there 
are two managers and two assets. One manager operates the upstream asset, 
for instance a plant that produces inputs, and the other manager operates the 
downstream asset, for instance a plant that produces a final output. Assume 
further that the two managers are locked-in, in the sense that trade between 
them is more profitable than trade between either of them and third parties. In 
the presence of transport costs, the lock-in may, for instance, be due to the close 
proximity of the two assets. The managers first contract over the ownership 
distribution of the assets and then bargain over the price of the input. At the 
ex post bargaining stage only the manager of the downstream firm knows how
1 We adopt Hansmann’s definition of a firm’s patrons as “all persons who transact with a 
firm either as purchasers of the firm’s products or as sellers to the firm of supplies, labor or 
other factors of production” (Hansmann (1996), p.12).
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profitable it is for her to operate in the downstream industry and thus how much 
she values the input. Due to the presence of ex post private information the 
managers may spend some time haggling with each other before agreeing on the 
input price. While the two managers bargain over the input price, and before 
they reach agreement, each can trade with third parties on the spot market. We 
refer to the per period payoff that each manager can obtain during the bargain­
ing process (and before reaching agreement with each other) as each manager’s 
‘inside option’ or ‘pre-agreement payoff’. Each manager’s pre-agreement pay­
off depends on the ownership distribution on which the parties agree ex ante. 
To see how the bargaining inefficiencies depend on the ownership distribution, 
consider a change in the ownership distribution that lowers the managers’ joint 
pre-agreement payoff,‘ i.e. the sum of their individual pre-agreement payoffs. On 
the one hand, for a given duration of the delay period, a reduction in the joint 
pre-agreement payoff constitutes a direct resource cost. On the other hand, 
however, the duration of the delay period itself depends on the ownership dis­
tribution. In particular, the managers will spend less time haggling over the 
input price the more dependent they axe on each other, i.e. the lower their joint 
pre-agreement payoff. This acceleration effect constitutes an efficiency gain. 
Before the managers bargain over the input price, and before the downstream 
manager learns her valuation, they contract over the ownership distribution of 
the physical assets. We assume that both managers are risk neutral and not liq­
uidity constraint. Thus, they agree on the efficient ownership distribution that 
minimises the total expected bargaining costs. In the analysis we show that the 
acceleration effect dominates the direct resource cost when uncertainty is small 
relative to the gains from trade. In this case the efficient ownership distribution 
minimises the managers’ joint pre-agreement payoff. When uncertainty is large 
relative to the gains from trade, the direct resource cost dominates the accel­
eration effect and the efficient ownership distribution maximises the managers’ 
joint pre-agreement payoff.
As a further illustration of the basic effects, it is useful to consider the fol­
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lowing example. Recently, the US car manufacturer Ford was involved in ne­
gotiations about the renewal of a supply contract with its sole supplier of car 
locks2. The firms disagreed about the terms of the contract: while Ford wanted a 
continuation of the previous conditions, the supplier suspected that Ford’s prof­
itability had improved, and therefore insisted on more favorable terms. During 
the negotiations the supplier suddenly stopped delivering locks to Ford which 
forced the latter to suspend production. This interruption was very costly for 
both sides: Ford incurred a production loss of 10,000 cars, costing it turnover 
of DM200 million, and the supplier’s stock price fell sharply. After a few days 
the supplier started to deliver again, and, soon after that, the companies agreed 
on a new contract. This contract guaranteed the lock producer a continued 
position as Ford’s exclusive supplier of locks. At the time commentators ques­
tioned why, after having experienced such a costly dispute, the two firms did 
not agree on an ownership distribution that made them less dependent on each 
other. For instance, it was argued that, if Ford owned the supplier, it could use 
the upstream assets during a dispute to ensure that at least some cars can be 
produced. In this chapter we argue that ownership structures which maximise 
the parties’ pre-agreement payoffs do indeed reduce the cost of disagreement for 
a given disagreement period. However, we also argue that the duration of the 
disagreement period itself is negatively related to the cost of disagreement. In 
terms of our example, this suggest that, while integration might make temporary 
disagreement less costly for a given disagreement period, it might also increase 
the duration of the disagreement period itself. It may, therefore, be optimal for 
Ford and its supplier to make themselves very dependent on each other, since 
this ensure that disputes are settled quickly.
Our analysis is related to the recently developed property rights theory of 
the firm. This literature was initiated by the seminal papers of Grossman and
2 The information about this case is taken from the following articles: “Key Position,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18.6.1998, p. 17; “New Contract Between Ford and Kiekert,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14.10.1998, p.8.
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Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)3, and developed further in a number of 
papers, including Chiu (1998), de Meza and Lockwood (1998) and Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). The property rights literature argues that, in the absence of 
comprehensive contracts, ownership of physical assets is a residual control right. 
That is to say that the owner of an asset has the right to take all those decisions 
concerning the use of the asset that have not been specified in an initial contract. 
The ownership of physical assets is then taken as the defining characteristic of 
firms. We adopt this basic conceptual framework in our analysis. We differ 
from the existing property rights literature, however, by focusing on ex post 
rather than ex ante inefficiencies. In the existing property rights literature 
bargaining is always assumed to be efficient. Thus, once relationship specific 
investments have been undertaken, the ownership distribution does not influence 
the size but only the sharing of the overall surplus. Ownership then affects 
efficiency by determining the agents’ private incentives to undertake relationship 
specific investments prior to the bargaining stage. In contrast, in our approach 
ownership has efficiency implications by determining the bargaining inefficiencies 
that can arise in the presence of private information.
While recent work on the theory of the firm has emphasised the role of ex ante 
investment incentives4, earlier, and largely informal, contributions stressed the 
importance of bargaining inefficiencies in determining the boundaries of firms. 
Coase (1937), for instance, discusses the role of imperfect information and nego­
tiation costs in the emergence of firms and states that: “The most obvious cost 
of “organizing” production through the price mechanism is that of discovering 
what the relevant prices are. [...] The costs of negotiation and concluding a 
separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market 
must also be taken into account.”5 Also, Williamson (1975, 1985) identifies 
imperfect information as one reason why market transactions can be inefficient.
3 For an overview of the literature see Hart (1995).
4 Next to the above mentioned property rights literature see also Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian (1978).
5 Coase (1937), p.336.
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In his view vertical integration allows firms to avoid costly haggling but also 
increases bureaucracy. Our analysis is related to this early literature in that we 
focus on the interdependence of ownership distributions and ex post bargaining 
inefficiencies.
A related literature (see, for instance, Arrow (1975) and Riordan (1990)) 
studies integration in the presence of private information and argues that in­
tegration reduces the degree of asymmetric information. We differ from this 
literature in that we assume that changes in the ownership distribution only 
affect the payoff agents realise during the bargaining process and have no influ­
ence on the degree of the informational asymmetry. We take this approach, not 
because we think that integration can never reduce informational asymmetries, 
but because we believe that the impact of ownership changes on agents’ incen­
tives to transmit information is ambiguous and needs to be model explicitly (see, 
for instance, Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Dessein (1999)). Our analysis shows 
that a model in which the extent of asymmetric information is not affected by 
changes in the ownership structure has implications that axe consistent with 
some observed ownership patterns.
We proceed as follows: in the next section we describe a simple model with 
a static bargaining game. In this model the uninformed party simply makes a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer to the informed party. Because of the static nature of 
the bargaining game we have to adapt our arguments somewhat. In particu­
lar, in the static model, the ownership distribution is assumed to determine the 
disagreement, rather than the pre-agreement payoffs. Also, a change in the own­
ership distribution that lowers the disagreement payoffs increases the probability 
of agreement rather than accelerating agreement. In spite of these differences 
we can use the static model to illustrate our main arguments. We do so in 
section 2 by solving the static model. While the static model is straightforward 
to solve, it has two conceptual problems. First, it does not allow the parties to 
continue bargaining until the gains from trade are realised and simply assumes 
that the bargaining process ends after one offer. Second, by assuming that the
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ownership distribution that is agreed on ex ante determines the disagreement 
payoffs, it restricts the analysis to irreversible ownership changes. While some 
ownership changes are indeed irreversible, a model that allows for more general 
ownership changes is clearly more satisfactory. We present such a model, with a 
dynamic bargaining game, in section 3 and solve it in section 4. We argue that 
the static and the dynamic models have very similar implications for the efficient 
ownership distributions. In section 5 we discuss these implications and show to 
what extent they axe consistent with observed ownership patterns. Section 6 
concludes.
1 T he Static M odel
There are two risk neutral players, a buyer B  and a seller S. Neither the buyer 
nor the seller is liquidity constrained. The seller can produce an input that 
can be used by the buyer to produce the final output. To engage in production 
the buyer and the seller need access to some physical assets. Let A  denote the 
ownership distribution of these physical assets across the agents.
There are two periods, t  =  — 1 and t  — 0. At t =  — 1 (ex ante) the parties 
contract over the ownership distribution A. We make the important assumption 
that the particular type of input required by the buyer ex post is uncertain ex 
ante and cannot be specified in the initial contract6.
At t =  0 (ex post) uncertainty about the required input is realised and 
production can take place. At this stage the buyer and the seller bargain over 
the input price. Once the parties agree on a transfer price the seller produces 
the relevant input and the buyer uses the input to produce the final output. We 
normalise the seller’s production costs to zero. By producing the final product 
the buyer generates a payoff of 7r. Ex ante the value of 7r is uncertain and both 
parties only know that it is uniformly distributed on [7q, 70J, where 71^  =  n +  a  
and 7TZ =  n — a  >  0. At the beginning of the trading period (t =  0) the level of
6 For microfoundations of incomplete contracts see, for instance, Hart and Moore (1999), 
Segal (1999), and, for the case of one-sided asymmetric information, Reiche (1999).
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7r is realised. We assume that only the buyer learns the realization of 7r.
If trade between the buyer and the seller does not take place, the players 
realise their respective disagreement payoffs b(A) and s(A). The joint disagree­
ment payoffs are denoted by j (A)  =  b(A)+s(A). We assume that trade between 
the buyer and the seller is always profitable, i.e.
(1) n i > j ( A ) ,  VA
Note that only the disagreement payoffs are functions of the ownership distri­
bution. When the buyer and the seller do not transact with each other, and 
instead trade with third parties on the spot market, the return that each one 
realises depends on the assets he or she owns. The assumption that disagree­
ment payoffs depend on the ownership distribution that was agreed on ex ante 
implies that changes in the ownership distribution are irreversible.
Note also that no other variable or parameter depends on the ownership 
distribution. In particular, the degree of asymmetric information a  does not 
depend on A.  This captures the idea that the degree of asymmetric information 
between the players is independent of the ownership distribution. Also, the 
buyer’s valuation of the input 7r does not depend on the ownership distribution 
since, when trade between the parties takes place, both players have access to 
all the assets in the relationship, independent of the ownership distribution.
In this simple model bargaining takes the form of a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
by the (uninformed) seller. Hence, after the seller makes an offer p, the buyer 
decides whether to accept or to reject it. If the buyer accepts the offer, she 
realises a payoff of 7r and the seller realises a payoff of p. If, instead, the buyer 
rejects the offer, both parties simply realise their disagreement payoffs.
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2 The A nalysis o f the Static M odel
In this section we analyse the model that was described above. We first solve 
the bargaining game that takes place at t =  0 and then study the optimal 
ownership distribution on which the parties agree at t = — 1.
2.1 The Bargaining Game
At t = 0 the uninformed seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p. The buyer 
accepts p if and only if 7r — p > 6(A). Hence, pc(7rc) =  7rc — 6(A) denotes the 
price that is accepted by all buyers of type n  E [7rc, 7r j .
The seller’s expected return from making an offer pc(7rc) is then given by
(2) R( 7rc) =  Pc(Trc)—— — +  s(A)—— —,
7T/i — 7Ti 7Th ~  7Tj
and his optimal offer solves
(3) max R(nc).
'KcZfru'Kh]
A cutoff point 7r* is a maximum of (3) if and only if it satisfies the following first 
and second order conditions:
0 for 7r* e (irijiTh)
R'(K) =  ^ < 0  for 7T* =  7Ti
> 0 for 7rJ =  7rh,
and
R " ( < )  < 0  for 7r* e  (7Ti,irh).
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Differentiating (2) gives
and
(?T/i “  TTz) ’
Note, first, that n* is unique since R!'{7rc) < 0, V7rc. Note, second, that R'^h) <  
0, so that 7Th is not a maximum. Finally, note that =  0 and
that R! (tv{) <  0 if and only if 7rz > \  {nh+j(A)). Thus, the optimal cutoff type 
7r* that solves (3) is uniquely given by
(4) 7r*=max(i(5rh+j(A)),7ri).
Since 7r* < there is always a positive probability that the buyer accepts 
the seller’s offer. Note that n* is weakly increasing in j {A).  Thus, the higher 
the joint disagreement payoffs j ( A ) , the less likely it is that the buyer accepts 
the seller’s offer. Finally, note that any type of buyer 7r G [7r/,7T/J accepts the 
offer if 7r* =  7q.
The following lemma summarises the agents’ bargaining strategies:
Lem m a 1 At t =  0 the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of pc(irl). The 
offer is accepted if the buyer is of type n G [7r*, 7T/J, and rejected if the buyer is 
of type 7r G [ttz, 7r*).
2.2 T he Optim al Ownership D istribution
At t =  —1 the parties contract over the ownership distribution. Since the agents 
are risk neutral, forward looking, and not wealth constrained, they always agree
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on the jointly efficient ownership distribution. Clearly, the ex ante division of 
surplus depends on the relative bargaining powers of the players. However, 
since the division of the surplus at the ex ante stage does not affect the analysis 
of the optimal ownership structure, we make no explicit assumptions about the 
relative bargaining powers at the ex ante stage.
Trade takes place if the buyer is of type 7r G [7t*(A), 7T/J. In this case the 
players generate a social surplus of 7r. In contrast, trade does not take place 
if the buyer is of type 7r G [nt, tt*(A)). The players then realise their joint 
disagreement payoffs j (A).  Hence, at t  =  — 1, expected social surplus W(A)  is 
given by
1 r^ h r<(A)
(5) W(A)  = ----------- ( /  7rdir +  /  j(A)d7r).
ftfi ft I J ir* (A) J 7Tj
Let A  and A denote the ownership distributions that, respectively, maximise 
and minimise j  (A). To find the optimal ownership distribution, we first analyse 
the efficiency implications of moving from A  to A.  Let A W (A , A) =  W (.A) — 
W{A).  It then follows from (4) and (5) that
_ 1 r « A )  _  r«A ) _
(6) A W(A, A)  = -----------( /  7r — j(A)dir — / j {A)  -  j(A)dn).
f t h  f t  I J  7T* ( A )  J  IT l
This is the key equation in the model. We know from equation (4) that 
the seller’s offer is (weakly) increasing in j (A).  Hence, the lower the joint 
disagreement payoffs, the more likely it is that the buyer accepts the seller’s 
offer. The first integral on the RHS of (6) represents the corresponding efficiency 
gain. Clearly, in the case of disagreement, a reduction in the joint disagreement 
payoff constitutes a direct resource cost. This effect is represented by the second 
integral on the RHS of (6).
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By moving from A to A the parties therefore increase the probability of trade 
but also make disagreement more costly. We now study the conditions under 
which either effect dominates. To do so, we prove the following lemma:
Lem m a 2 In the permissible parameter range the function A W  (A, A) has the 
following properties:
' o  if a €  j(^))]
A W(A,A)  =  l  > 0  if a  e  ( l ( n - j ( A ) ) , l ( » - l ( j ( A ) + j ( A ) ) )  
k < 0  if a  G [ § ( / / - l ( j ( A ) + j ( A ) ) , i j . - j ( A ) ]
and
d A  W (A,A)
(  0 if a  e  [0, ~  j(A)))
=  < > 0  if a  € (|(/x — j(A)),  K f j , -  j(A)))  
[  <  0 if a  €  — j(A)),  fi -  j(A)].
Proof: see appendix.
Lemma 2 is illustrated in figure 1 and its intuition is straightforward. When 
the degree of uncertainty is small relative to the gains from trade, i.e. a  € 
[0, \  {pL — j ( A ))), the seller’s offer is always accepted by the buyer, independent 
of the ownership distribution. This can be seen by noting that n* (A) =  7r* (A) =  
7r/. Thus, for these parameter values, moving from A to A neither increases 
the probability of agreement (since the parties agree immediately even when 
A =  A) nor does it lead to any efficiency losses (since the players never realise 
the disagreement payoffs). As a result, changes in the ownership distribution 
have no efficiency implications.
Consider now the effect of increasing the degree of uncertainty relative to the 
gains from trade so that a  G [| (p — j  (A)), |  (p — j  (A))]. In this case some buyer 
types reject the seller’s offer when the disagreement payoffs are high (7r*(A) >  
71-*), while all buyer types accept the offer when the disagreement payoffs are low 
(tt* (A) — 1r*). Thus, moving from A to A increases the probability of agreement. 
Note that, in equilibrium, the disagreement payoffs are never realised when
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A =  A since, in this case, the buyer always accepts the seller’s offer. As a result, 
there is no efficiency cost to moving from A to A so that, in this parameter range, 
A W  (A, A) is positive.
Finally, consider the effect of further increasing the degree of uncertainty 
relative to the gains from trade so that a  G (|(/x — j (A )) jp  — j(A)\.  In this 
parameter region, some buyer types reject the seller’s offer even when A =  A 
(this can be seen by noting that 7r*(A) > 7r*(A) > 7rj). Moving from A to A 
then still increases the probability of agreement but also makes disagreement 
more costly. The larger a, the stronger is the former effect relative to the 
latter. Hence, in this region, the expected efficiency gain of moving from A 
to A is decreasing in a. It can be shown that, for a  G (^(// — j(A)),  |(/x — 
I (j (A) +  j(A))], moving from A to A reduces expected efficiency, while, for 
a  G ( |( / i  — \ ( j  (A) +  j  (A)), p — j  (A)], it increases expected efficiency. Note that 
| ( / i  — I  (j  (A) +  j  (A)) is increasing in p  and decreasing in j  (A) and j  (A). Thus, 
the parameter space in which it is (weakly) optimal to reduce the disagreement 
payoffs is increasing in the p  and decreasing in j (A)  and j  (A).
So far we have only considered two possible ownership allocations, namely A 
and A. The following lemma extends the analysis to all other possible ownership 
allocations.
Lem m a 3 Consider any A such that j  [A) G \ j(A),j(A)]. It can be shown that
max[W(A), W (A)] > W(A).
Proof: see appendix.
Together lemmas 2 and 3 establish the following proposition.
Proposition  1 For a  G [0, | ( / i  — |(j(A ) +  j(A))] it is weakly optimal for the 
buyer and the seller to minimise their disagreement payoffs by choosing the own­
ership distribution A. For a  G ( |  (/i — |(j(A ) +  jf(A)), p — j(A)\ it is optimal 
for the parties to maximise their disagreement payoffs by choosing the ownership 
distribution A.
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Proposition 1 shows that the efficient ownership distribution maximises the 
joint disagreement payoffs if the gains from trade are small relative to the de­
gree of uncertainty. If the gains from trade are large relative to the degree of 
uncertainty, the efficient ownership allocation minimises the joint disagreement 
payoffs.
3 The D ynam ic M odel
The static model that was presented in the previous section is very simple and 
tractable. There are, however, two conceptual problems with this model: first, 
it assumes that the seller can only make one offer. If that offer is not accepted, 
trade does not take place. However, it is not clear why the parties cannot 
continue to bargain over the price of the input after the initial offer has been 
rejected. After all, there are still gains from trade that the parties could re­
alise. Second, even if the parties have to stop bargaining over the input price 
after only one offer, it is not evident why, in the case of disagreement over the 
input price, they do not renegotiate the ownership distribution (since all rel­
evant information is common knowledge we would expect such renegotiations 
to be efficient). Only if changes in the ownership distribution are irreversible 
would the parties not be able to engage in such renegotiations. While some 
ownership changes may indeed be irreversible (see section 5 for an example), a 
model that allows for reversible ownership changes is clearly more satisfactory. 
In this section we present a version of the model which addresses both of these 
issues. In particular, we now allow for a dynamic bargaining game in which the 
parties continue to bargain until agreement is reached and the gains from trade 
are realised. We will argue that the dynamic model leads to results that are 
very similar to those presented above.
The bargaining game that we consider here is related to Admati and Perry 
(1987). They study a Rubinstein infinite-horizon, alternating-offers model with 
one-sided asymmetric information in which players can delay making offers. We 
adopt their basic framework but extend the analysis in two ways: first, while
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they allow for only two types of buyers, we allow for a continuum of such types7. 
Second, and more importantly, in our model the players can realise non-zero 
payoffs during the delay period (i.e. we allow for non-zero ‘inside options’ or 
‘pre-agreement payoffs’). In Admati and Perry (1987) the inside options axe 
assumed to be zero.
We now turn to the formal description of the model. The ex ante period 
(t =  — 1) is exactly as described in section 1.
Ex post the parties bargain over the price of the input. As in the static 
model, the seller’s cost of producing the input is zero and the buyer’s return 
from using the input in the final good production is given by 7 r ,  where 7r is 
distributed uniformly on [7Ti,7T/J. The buyer learns the realisation of n at the 
beginning of the bargaining period (t =  0). Before they reach an agreement 
over the input price the buyer and the seller can each trade with third parties on 
the spot market. By doing so the seller can realise an inside option of s(A) per 
instant of time and the buyer can realise an inside option of b (A) per instant of 
time8. We continue to assume that trade is always profitable, i.e.
(7) VA
where r is the positive discount rate.
The seller can make the first offer at any time t  >  0. Thereafter the parties 
alternate making offers. The minimum time between offers is t  =  — 1 log 5, 
where 6 € [0,1] is the discount factor from one period delay. After a player 
has received an offer he can take either of two actions: accept the offer, in
which case trade takes place and the game ends, or reject the offer and make a
7Crampton (1992) studies a model in which he allows for a continuum of types and two- 
sided asymmetric information.
8 Note the difference between inside and outside options. Inside options axe the payoffs 
that the parties realise while they disagree temporarily. Outside options, in contrast, are 
the payoffs that the parties realise if they terminate bargaining. For full information models 
with positive inside options see, for instance, Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) and 
Muthoo (1999).
58
counteroffer. Either action can be taken at any time after the minimum delay 
period t. After a player has made an offer he can take no further action until 
the other player has either accepted the offer or made a counteroffer.
Let (t,p) denote an outcome of the game in which the parties agree at time 
t  to trade at price p. For any (t,p) the seller’s payoff is given by e~rtp  +  (1— 
e_rt) s ^  and buyer’s payoff is given by e~rt(7r — p) -f (1— e~rt)^p-. Note 
that these preferences imply that the players are risk neutral and that they are 
impatient, in the sense that they prefer agreement today to the same agreement 
at any later date. Note also that the buyer is more impatient the larger the 
gains from trade.
Let n € {1,2 ,..., oo} denote the number of offers that have been made and 
let r n denote the time after the minimum delay of t  after which offer pn has been 
made. After n rounds have been played the history is given by hn — {p*, Ti}”=1. 
Throughout the analysis, when we state that a player replies “immediately”, 
we mean that he replies without any further delay after the minimum time 
t. Similarly, when we say that an offer pn has been “delayed”, we mean that 
r n >  0.
A pure strategy as  for the seller and a s  (ft) for the buyer specifies, for any 
history hn after which it is the player’s turn to move, the delay period r n+1 , 
whether pn is accepted, and, if not accepted, the counteroffer pn+i- Let A(7t) 
denote the seller’s belief that the buyer is of type 7r, i.e. the seller believes that 
with probability A(7t) the seller is of type n.
Below we study a sequential equilibrium of this game. A sequential equi­
librium specifies the strategies as  and a s  and a system of beliefs such that 
each strategy is optimal given the other strategy and beliefs, and the beliefs are 
consistent with Bayes’ rule (when possible).
4 The A nalysis o f the D ynam ic M odel
We proceed as in the static model: we first describe the equilibrium of the 
bargaining game and then turn to the optimal ownership distribution.
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4.1 The Bargaining game
In this section we construct a sequential equilibrium in pure strategies for the 
dynamic bargaining game. We believe that the equilibrium we study is appeal­
ing because of its simplicity9. However, in general, there may be a large number 
of equilibria and we do not attempt to characterise the conditions under which 
the equilibrium is unique. Thus, we do not show how bargaining must proceed 
and only study one form it might take.
Intuitively, the equilibrium can be described as follows: the seller makes an 
offer at t  =  0. The buyer then either accepts the offer or rejects it. Acceptance 
takes place at t =  t. A buyer who rejects the offer delays her counteroffer so long 
as to distinguish herself from the buyer with a valuation that is just higher than 
her own. She then makes an offer that corresponds to the complete information 
equilibrium offer. This offer is immediately accepted by the seller. Below we 
show that an equilibrium of this form does indeed exist. We first describe the 
complete information equilibrium offer. We then show by how long the buyer 
has to delay her counteroffer to credibly signal her type. Finally, we derive the 
seller’s optimal first offer and describe the players’ strategies and the beliefs that 
support such an equilibrium.
To economise on notation, we suppress the ownership distribution A from 
all the functions that are applied and derived in this section. We analyse the 
impact of changes of A on the described equilibrium in the section 4.2.
T he Full Inform ation G am e Rubinstein (1982) has shown that a full in­
formation alternating offers game with fixed time between offers has a unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium. It is straightforward to extend this analysis to the 
case of non-zero inside options and to show that such a game also has a unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium depends on who makes the first 
offer. Let pb (tt) denote the equilibrium price if a buyer of type nr makes the
9 It is also closely related to the equilibria studied by Admati and Perry (1987) and Cramp- 
ton (1992).
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first offer, and let ps (ir) be the equilibrium price if the seller makes the first offer 
to a buyer of type n. It is straightforward to show (see for example Muthoo 
(1999, pp. 138-43)) that
p B( tt) 
P S ( t t )
1 / c s \— — (8tt -  8 -  +  - )  
l  +  o r r
1 , b ' s .
—— (jt -  -  +  <5- . 
1 +  0 r r
These prices have the property that each player is indifferent between trading at 
the other player’s offer immediately and trading at the player’s own offer next 
period, i.e.
(8)
pB(n) — 8ps {7r) +  (1 -  6)-.
v
D elay Suppose that the seller makes an offer which he expects to be accepted 
by any buyer of type n £ [7rc, 7T/J and rejected by any buyer of type n 6 [71^ , ttc) . 
Suppose further that the seller believes the buyer to be of type 7t ( t , 7rc) if, after 
having rejected the seller’s offer, she makes a counteroffer after a delay of r. 
Finally, suppose that if the seller believes the buyer to be of type 7r, the buyer 
cannot do better than to offer pB(n) and the seller cannot do better than to 
accept. Then the present discounted value of a buyer of type 7r(r, ttc) from 
pretending to be of type 7r(r, 7rc) by counteroffering pb (tt(t, 7rc)) after a delay r  
is given by
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(9) U(t ) =  be rT(7r(r,7rc) - p s (7r(r,7rc)) +  (1 -  be rr)~.r
Substituting (8) into (9) and differentiating with respect to r  gives the fol­
lowing first order condition
(10) U'(t ) =  -r[7r(r,7rc) - p 5 (7r(r,7rc))] -  +  b =  ° ‘
If (10) describes a maximum, and we check the second order condition below, 
then the function 7r(r, 7rc) has to satisfy the first order condition (10) for r  =  r. 
Thus, we get
(11) +  r7r(r > nc) ~ j  =  0.
Note that the buyer does not have to signal her type if she has the highest 
possible valuation, so that 7r(0,7rc) =  7rc. The differential equation (11) can then 
be solved:
(12) 7r(r, 7rc) =  7rce~*T +  (1 -
We can now use (12) to confirm that the second order condition for the 
maximisation problem is satisfied. Differentiating (9) twice with respect to r  
and setting r =  r gives
U"(t) =  - ^ e ~ f T(r7rc - j )  <  0, 
so that the second order condition is indeed satisfied.
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Let t(7t, 7rc) denote the inverse of 7t(t,7tc) with respect to r. Hence, if 
the seller knows the buyer types to be distributed on [7r/,7rc], a buyer of type 
7r G [7Tf, 7rc] can credibly signal her type by delaying her offer by r(7r, 7rc). Rear­
ranging (12) gives
(13) e-TT(»,»„) =  / ^  J )<,
rnc - j
It is worth to make three observations about the function r(7r, 7rc). First,
t ( 7 t , 7rc) is decreasing in 7r. Thus, the time needed by the buyer to signal her 
type is longer the lower her profits. This feature of the model is, of course, 
due to the particular preferences we described above which implicitly assumed 
that a buyer is more patient the lower 7r. Second, the time the buyer needs to 
credibly signal her type is increasing in the joint inside options since
<9r(7T, 7TC) <5(7Tc - 7 t )
 or =  7 T7---------T ^ °> for n £  l^i^c  •03  [ t t t  —  3 ) { t 7t c  j )
This feature will be important in the discussion of the optimal ownership struc­
ture below. Finally, it can be shown that
dT{7r,nc) =  8(rn -  j)
OtTq (ttt -  j ) ( rnc -  j)
so that signalling takes longer the larger the support of the distribution of buyer 
types.
T he First Offer It follows from (8) that a buyer of type 7r =  ttc E [tti, nr j is 
indifferent between immediately accepting an offer p s (ttc) and buying the input 
for pB(7rc) after the minimum delay t. Also, any buyer n >  nc strictly prefers 
accepting ps (7rc) and any buyer 7r < 7rc strictly prefers buying the input for 
pB (7rc) after the minimum delay t.
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Suppose that the seller makes an offer p  =  ps (7rc), for any 7rc G [71-/, 7t^ ] , and 
that the players then respond in the following way: any buyer of type 7r G [7rc, 7T/J 
immediately accepts while any buyer of type 7r G [7Tj, 7rc) rejects the offer and 
instead counteroffers P B ( t t )  after r(7r, 7rc) which the seller immediately accepts. 
Let i?(7rc) denote the seller’s expected return from making an offer of ps (nc). 
Then
R(ttc) =     [<5p5(7rc)(7r/l-7 rc) +  [  82e~rT^ '7rc)pB( tt)
J  7Tj
+(1 -  (52e-rT ’^r,lrc^ ) <i7r].
r
The optimal cutoff type n* is then given by
(14) 7r* =  arg max R (ttc).
7TcG[7rz,7rh]
The next lemma describes the solution to (14) when <5 —► 1 (the case for <5 <  1 
is described in the appendix).
Lem m a 4 For <5 —> 1 the maximisation problem (14) has a unique solution 
n* G (TTi,7Th) which solves
(15) 3r{rrh -  7r*)(r7r* -  j ) 2 -  (ttt* -  j ) 3 +  (ttti -  j f  =  0.
It can be shown that
d <  n 
> 0 'dj
Proof: see appendix.
It is now straightforward to prove the following proposition:
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P roposition  2 The following strategies and beliefs form  a sequential equilib­
rium  of the dynamic bargaining game:
•  The se ller’s beliefs: Suppose the se ller’s last offer was p s . I f  p s = p s (tvc), 
fo r  any tvc £  [TVi,TVh], then A (7r) =  1 if  the buyer makes a counteroffer after 
a delay o f r ( 7r, 7rc) and A(7vi) =  1 otherwise. I fp 3 >  p s (Tvh), then X(tv) =  1 
i f  the buyer makes a counteroffer after a delay o f r(7r, tt^ ) and A(7v{) =  1 
otherwise. If p s <  p s (tv{) and the buyer rejects the offer, then X(tvi) =  1.
•  The se ller’s strategy: The seller starts by offering p s (7r*). Suppose the 
buyer’s last offer was p b. I f  X(tt) =  1, then the seller im m ediately accepts 
i f  p b >  p B(7r) and im mediately counteroffers p s  (tv) i f  p b <  p B(tv).
•  The buyer’s strategy: Suppose the seller’s last offer was p s . I fp 3 =  p s (tvc), 
fo r  any 7rc £  [71^ , tv^ }, then any buyer tv £ [7rc, 7Th] accepts the offer while 
any buyer tt £  [7^, 7rc) counteroffers p b (tt) after a delay o f r(iz, 7rc). If  
p 3 >  p s {fth) then any buyer tv £  [ni, 7rJ counteroffers p B(tv) after a delay 
of t (tv, tvh)- I f  Ps <  Ps (ni) then all buyers accept im mediately.
Proof: see appendix.
4.2 The Optimal Ownership Distribution
In this section we analyse the optimal ownership structure when the minimum 
time between offers gets arbitrarily small, i.e. 6 —► 1. It is one of the appealing 
features of the Admati and Perry (1987) analysis, which continues to hold in 
this model, that delay occurs with positive probability even if parties can reply 
to offers instantaneously.
At t  =  — 1 the players contract over the ownership distribution. Since the 
agents are risk neutral, forward looking, and not wealth constrained, they always 
agree on the jointly efficient ownership distribution. The players know that, ex 
post, the seller makes an offer which is instantly accepted by any buyer of type 
tv  £ [Tv*(A),TVh\. If the buyer is of such a type, then the parties immediately
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realise a joint surplus of n. Any buyer of type tt e  [7r/,7r*(A)) does not accept 
the seller’s initial offer and instead she waits r ( 7 r ,  before making an offer
that the seller accepts immediately. Thus, for any buyer of type n € [ni, tt*(A)) 
the joint payoff is given by
Recall that A and A denote the ownership distributions that, respectively,
A  affects expected social surplus in two opposing ways: on the one hand, such a 
change accelerates agreement but, on the other hand, it also makes temporary 
disagreement more costly. To understand the acceleration effect, consider how 
7r*(A) and r(7r, tt*(A)) depend on the joint inside options. In lemma 4 we have 
shown that 7r*(A) is increasing in j(A).  Hence, the higher the joint inside 
options, the less likely it is that the buyer will accept the seller’s first offer. We 
have also noted above that the delay period r(7r, 7t*(A)) is increasing in the joint 
inside options and in the cutoff type n* (A). Together these two effects constitute 
the acceleration effect: the lower the joint inside options, the faster the parties 
can be expected to reach agreement. While lower inside options accelerate 
agreement, they also make temporary disagreement more costly. The last term 
on the RHS of (16) gives the joint payoff during the delay period which, for a 
given r(7r, 7rJ(A)), is clearly decreasing in the joint inside options j(A).
Expected social surplus is then given by
(16)
^ 1 ( 1  -
maximise and minimise j{A). Changing the ownership distribution from A  to
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It follows from this discussion that the increase in expected social surplus of 
moving from A to A  is given by
  1 /,7rclA/   _
(17) A W (A ,A )  =  -r—1 r[ I (rn -  j (A )) ( l  -
T\7Th Tfl) J tt*(A.)
rK(A)   _
+ / (rv -  j (A )) (e -TT^ -*’m  -
J 1T[
rK(A) _
-  /  (j(A) -  j(4))(l -  e-r* r* U » )d l'].
J  IT I
The acceleration effect is given by the first two integrals. The last integral 
represents the resource cost of reducing the inside options. Note that, since 
n*(A) >  7r*(A) > 7ti >  j(A) > j  (A) , both the benefit (the acceleration effect) 
and the resource cost of reducing inside options are always weaHy positive. Note 
also that, for a  =  0, the parties reach agreement instantaneously, independent 
of the ownership distribution. Thus, A W (A , A) =  0 for a  =  0.
It is worth to note the similarity of the expressions for A W  (A, A) in the static 
(equation (6)) and the dynamic model (equation (17)). In the static model 
reducing j (A)  increases the probability of agreement, while making permanent 
disagreement more costly. Here a reduction in j  (A) accelerates agreement, while 
making temporary disagreement more costly.
In contrast to the static model we have, so far, not been able to find a 
complete analytic solution for the dynamic model10. To make further progress 
we now rely on simple simulations of equation (17). Consider figure 2 which 
plots the efficiency gain of moving from A to A for several different parameter 
configurations11. As expected, A W  (A, A) =  0 for a  =  0. For small positive
10 The problem we face is that we cannot find a closed form solution for 7r* (see lemma 4).
11 Obviously, simulations do not allow us to draw definite conclusion about the shape of the 
AW(A, A) function. We have made simulations for a large number of parameter values and 
the general shape of the graph is always as shown in figure 2. We hope that the insights from
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values of a  there is an expected efficiency gain of moving from A to A. In 
this region the acceleration effect dominates the resource cost effect. As a  
becomes larger, however, the resource cost effect becomes larger relative to the 
acceleration effect. For large enough a  the resource cost effect dominates the 
acceleration effect. In this case a reduction in the joint inside options leads to 
an expected efficiency loss. Note again the similarity of figures 1 and 2 which, 
respectively, plot the expected efficiency gain of moving from A to A for the 
static and the dynamic model. In both cases moving from A to A is efficiency 
enhancing (reducing) if uncertainty is small (large) relative to the gains from 
trade. In figure 2 it can be seen that max(W (j  =  50) ,W ( j  =  20)) >  W (j  =  
30). This suggests that, as in the static model, only A and A can be efficient 
ownership distributions12. The players then agree on an ownership distribution 
that minimises their joint inside options if the degree of uncertainty is small 
relative to the gains from trade and they agree on an ownership distribution 
that maximises the joint inside options if the degree of uncertainty is large 
relative to the gains from trade.
5 D iscussion
The analysis above shows that the ownership distribution of physical assets 
influences the size of ex post inefficiencies. In this section we explore how 
the findings of our model relate to observed ownership patterns. We start by 
analysing a simple example. We then move on to discuss different ownership 
arrangements that reduce the agents’ joint inside options. We conclude this 
section by briefly analysing the relationship between efficiency and the size of 
firms.
these simulations will allow us find an analytical solution for the shape of A W  (A , A) in future 
work.
12 We again repeated these simulations for a large number of parameter configurations which 
all gave the same result.
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5.1 A  Simple Exam ple
Suppose there axe only two assets, a\ and a2. Let Aq and As  denote the assets 
which are owned, respectively, by the buyer and the seller given an ownership 
distribution A. We assume that the players axe symmetric, in the sense that 
s(As) =  b(AB),VAs =  A b . We refer to ‘integration’ as the ownership structure 
in which both assets axe owned by one agent, and ‘non-integration’ as the one 
in which each agent owns one asset13. Furthermore, it is useful to introduce the 
following definitions:
D efin ition 1 The assets ai and 0 2  are ‘synergetic ’ if
6(ai, 0 2 ) b(ai) (^a2)-
D efin ition  2 The assets cq and <22 are ‘non-synergetic’ if
6(ai, a2) +  b{4>) < b(ai) +  b(a2).
D efin ition  3 The assets a\ and a2 are ‘strictly complementary ’ if
b(ai,a2) > b(ai) =  b(a2) =  b(</>).
Thus, assets are synergetic if, in the case of temporary disagreement, the joint 
payoff is higher under integration than under non-integration. Correspondingly, 
assets axe non-synergetic if, in the case of temporary disagreement, the joint 
payoff is higher under non-integration than under integration. In the case of a 
restaurant, for instance, the room and the furniture used to equip it axe likely 
to be synergetic assets: if the chef owns the room and the waiter owns the 
furniture, then neither is able to generate much surplus without the cooperation 
of the other. If, instead, the chef owns both assets, then, in the case of non- 
coorporation, he would be able to generate some surplus by serving a smaller
13 Because of the symmetry of the example we do not need to distinguish between buyer and 
seller integration or between the two possible non-integration cases.
69
number of customers himself. In contrast, a restaurant and the plant used by 
the restaurant’s supplier of foodstuffs are likely to be non-synergetic: in the case 
of disagreement more surplus can be generated if each is run independently of 
the other.
The analysis in the previous sections has shown that the parties optimally 
choose an ownership distribution which minimises their joint inside options when 
the degree of uncertainty is small relative to the gains from trade. When a\ 
and a2 are jointly owned by the buyer and the seller, then neither can use any 
assets during the delay period and their joint inside option is minimised to 
26(0). To see why joint ownership is optimal in this parameter range, consider 
moving from joint ownership to any other ownership distribution. Independent 
of whether the assets are synergetic or non-synergetic, such a change in the 
ownership distribution would lead to higher joint inside options. On the one 
hand, this implies a reduction in the cost of disagreement. On the other hand, 
however, it also implies a longer duration of the disagreement period. The latter 
effect dominates the former when the gains from trade are large relative to the 
degree of uncertainty. In this case moving from joint ownership to any other 
ownership distribution does, on average, lead to an efficiency loss.
The parties optimally agree on an ownership distribution that maximises 
their joint inside options when the degree of uncertainty is large relative to the 
gains from trade. Thus, integration is optimal when assets are synergetic, and 
non-integration is optimal when assets are non-synergetic. Note that this might 
provide an explanation for why firms own a large number of assets and do not 
distribute them among their work force14: a firm can expect to spend a lot of 
time haggling with its work force, even after distributing its assets among the 
workers, when it faces a very uncertain environment. When the firm’s assets are 
synergetic, it is optimal for the firm to reduce the cost of haggling by becoming 
the owner of all the assets.
14HolmstrOm (1999) argues that this asset clustering is one of the most striking ownership 
patterns that we observe and that it is not easily explained by the property rights literature.
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Note that, in the case of non-synergetic assets, the above arguments imply 
a negative relationship between the average size of firms and the degree of un­
certainty that they are exposed to15: it is optimal to have one large (jointly
owned) firm when uncertainty is small, while two small, separately owned firms 
are optimal when uncertainty is high (relative to the gains from trade). It is 
well known that small firms tend to have more volatile share prices than larger 
firms. Taking the volatility of the share price as a proxy for the uncertainty 
in a firm’s environment our argument reverses the causality that is usually used 
to explain this stylized fact: it is not because firms are small that they have 
a very volatile share price. Instead, it might be that, because a firm faces a 
very uncertain environment, it optimally chooses to be small so as to minimise 
bargaining inefficiencies. These arguments suggest a way of empirically testing 
our theory16.
5.2 Reducing Joint Inside Options
We have already seen that the joint ownership of physical assets reduces joint 
inside options. Giving veto rights over certain aspects of a firm’s operation to 
one of its patrons is another closely related arrangement17. In this section we 
briefly discuss other observed ownership arrangements that reduce the parties’ 
joint inside options.
Agents who are locked-in sometimes increase their interdependence further 
by exchanging ‘ugly princess hostages’18. The term refers to a practice in which 
agents exchange ownership of assets that are very valuable to themselves, but
15 In the case of synergetic assets there is no relationship between the size of firms and the 
degree of uncertainty.
16 To our knowledge the existing empirical literature on the size of firms (see, for example, 
Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999)) does not take into account the degree of uncertainty in 
a firm’s environment as a determinant of its size.
17 Another similar arrangement is the German law on codetermination which entitles workers 
to elect half of the members of the supervisory board in all large German firms (see Hansmann 
(1996), p. 110-112). Codetermination further increases the interdependence between firms and 
their work force. Note, however, that codetermination is required by law and is only observed 
in Germany.
18 See, for example, Williamson (1985).
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which have little value for the other party. The Japanese car industry provides 
an example of such an arrangement. There it can be observed that physical 
assets which are specific to a particular car manufacturer are often not owned 
by that firm but by its supplier19.
Agents can also reduce joint inside options by abolishing assets that can be 
used unilaterally during a disagreement period. For instance, Holmstrom and 
Roberts (1998) report the case of an airline alliance between KLM and Northwest 
Airlines20. In this case the airlines deliberately increased their interdependence 
by eliminating their duplicate support operations. Interestingly, they did so 
after running into a costly dispute which led to the dismantling of the companies’ 
cross-ownership structure.
Firms that are engaged in long term vertical relationships often make them­
selves remarkably dependent on each other by using exclusive sourcing arrange­
ments. The Ford case that was described in the introduction is one example. 
Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) provide another example. They report the case 
of Nucor, which has been the most successful steel manufacturer in the US in the 
last 20 years. Instead of following the industry standard by integrating back­
ward, the firm made itself very dependent on only one independent supplier. 
Given the size of Nucor, the supplier is also very dependent on this relation­
ship21. We can interpret such an arrangement as an example of non-integration 
in the case of synergetic assets. By not integrating backwards, Nucor and its 
supplier increase their interdependence which, in turn, reduces the expected 
duration of potential disputes. This argument is in line with Holmstrom and 
Roberts (1998) who hypothesise that, in the case of Nucor, “one reason why 
the partnership has been working so well may be the high degree of mutual 
dependence”22.
Finally, it can be observed that firms at times agree on the separate ownership
19HolmstrSm and Roberts (1998), p.80-81.
20Holmstr6m and Roberts (1998), p.84.
21 The supplier is estimated to make about 50% of its scrap business with Nucor.
22 Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), p.83.
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of strictly complementary assets. For instance, Dnes (1993) observes that, 
in some franchise agreements, the franchisee and the franchisor agree on the 
separate ownership of the land on which the premise is built and the assets used 
to equip it. The separate ownership of strictly complementary assets is similar 
to joint ownership and minimises the parties’ joint inside options.
The analysis in the previous section has shown that lowering joint inside op­
tions reduces ex post inefficiencies when the gains from trade are large relative 
to the degree of uncertainty. To some extend our model is therefore consistent 
with the type of ownership arrangements described in this section. Note, how­
ever, that in our model it is optimal to either maximise or minimise joint inside 
options. Ownership arrangements that reduce joint inside options, but do not 
minimise them, can therefore not be fully explained with the given framework23. 
Note, also, that our model is not the only one in the property rights literature in 
which joint ownership can be optimal. In particular, Raj an and Zingales (1998), 
de Meza and Lockwood (1998), and Chiu (1998) show that joint ownership can 
be optimal in models that focus on ex ante investment inefficiencies.
5.3 Decreasing Returns from M anagerial Inputs
It is often argued that there are decreasing returns from managerial inputs and 
that this puts an upper bound on the size of firms. For instance, Coase (1937) 
argues that: “[...] as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the 
entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organizing additional transactions 
within the firm may rise”24. The analysis in this chapter suggest another 
reason for why large firms may be inefficient. To see this, consider a firm 
that increases its size by buying additional assets from a third party. It seems 
natural to assume that, at least in a weak sense, the cost of disagreeing with 
any patron is decreasing in the number of assets owned by the firm. This may,
23 We conjecture that interior solutions can be optimal in a version of our model in which the 
gains from trade can be negative, and in which there is uncertainty about the agents’ outside 
options.
24Coase (1937), p.340.
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for instance, be due to the firm’s ability to produce some of the inputs it usually 
obtains from a supplier. As a consequence, the size of a firm is positively 
related to the expected duration of disagreement, and it is negatively related to 
the cost of disagreement. If the gains from trade axe large relative to the degree 
of uncertainty, then the former effect dominates the latter. In this case firms 
that increase in size become less efficient because they axe in a stxong bargaining 
position vis-a-vis their patrons and axe expected to spend a long time haggling 
with them.
6 Conclusion
There are many situations in which agents, firstly, depend on each other to 
generate a surplus and, secondly, anticipate that bargaining over the sharing 
of the surplus may be costly. In this chapter we have shown that in such a 
situation agents may have an incentive to take actions prior to the bargaining 
stage to further increase their interdependence, in the sense of lowering the 
sum of the payoffs the parties realise during the bargaining process. Increased 
interdependence accelerates decision making but also makes disagreement more 
costly. In the analysis we have shown that the former effect dominates the latter 
if uncertainty is small relative to the agents’ expected gains from trade. In this 
case it is efficient for the agents to increase their interdependence by minimising 
their joint pre-agreement payoffs. The opposite is true if uncertainty is large 
relative to the gains from trade. In this case it is efficient for the agents to 
minimise their interdependence by maximising their joint pre-agreement payoffs.
In this chapter we have applied these arguments to the theory of the firm 
and discussed the efficiency implications of various observed ownership patterns. 
We believe that the basic effects in our model can also help us understand other 
institutions and legal arrangements. An obvious example is the marriage con­
tract which can be interpreted as a contract that increases the interdependence 
of two partners who anticipate to be locked-in in future25. In this interpretation
25Here lock-in may not only be due to exogenous factors, such a mutual attraction, but also
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the marriage contract is a means of accelerating domestic decision making which, 
however, comes at the cost of lower disagreement payoffs26. While we believe 
that the basic effects in our model can help us understand a number of institu­
tions, it is also evident that our formal model is quite restrictive. In particular, 
among other assumptions, we only allow for two players, one-sided asymmetric 
information, and assume a particular extensive form bargaining game. Relaxing 
any of these assumption may be interesting future work.
to relationship-specific investments.
26In so far as our model can be extended to multilateral bargaining situations, arguments 
similar to those presented above might also be used to explain the institution used by the 
Roman Catholic church to elect a new pope. A new pope is elected by an assembly of 
cardinals who are locked up in a part of Vatican Palace until they reach agreement. This 
institution, called a ‘conclave’, originates in the 13th century when the cardinals failed to elect 
a new pope for two years. A local magistrate then decided to improve the cardinals’ incentives 
by locking them up in the episcopal palace, removing its roof, and allowing them nothing but 
bread and water until they elected the next pope (for more details see www.britannica.com). 
The observation that this institution has not been abandoned (but only somewhat adapted) 
suggests it might be efficient for the church as a whole (including the decision making cardinals) 
to accelerate the decision making process by lowering the payoff the cardinals realise during 
their negotiations.
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7 A ppendix
P roof of lem m a 2:
Prom (4) it follows that
< ( 4 )  =  < ( 4 )  =  7T, for a  € [0 , ^(/j, -  j(A))]
< ( 4 )  > K (A )  =  *1 for a  G (^(M - j ( 4 ) ) , | ( / i - j ( 4 ) ) ]
< ( 4 )  > < ( 4  ) > 7 t; fora  e  ( | ( m ~ j ' ( 4 ) ) , / i - j (4 ) ) ] .
Consider first aG  [0 ,^ (//-j  (A))]. It then follows from (6 ) that W (A) —W  (A) =
0 .
Consider next a  G — j(A)),  |( / i  — j (A))]* Prom (6 ) we get
_ i rCCA) _
I F ( A )  -  V F ( A )  =  -----------------  /  7T —  j ( > l ) d 7 r .
J m
Note that in this parameter range ft*(A) > irj and that, by assumption (1), 
7T/ >  j (A).  It then follows immediately that W(A) — W(A) >  0. Substituting 
(4) into (6 ) and solving gives
A W (A ,A )  =  - ^ [ S a  -  (fi -  j(A))][3(fj, -  j(A))  -  a].
Differentiating gives
9 A ^ ( 4 , 4 ) _  1 j ( A ) r - ^ .
da  16a2
Because of assumption (1) it then follows that > o.
Finally, consider a  G ( |( / i  — j(A)),  fi — j(A))}- Substituting (4) into (6) and 
solving gives
A W (A ,A )  =  -  3 j ( 4 )  -  3 j (A )  -  1 0 a )
Hence, AW (A, A) >  0 if a  G (l ( f i - j ( A )), |( /i- |(j(A )+ j(^ 4 )))  and A W  (A, ~A) <  
0 if a  G [§(/  ^— \ ( j (A)  +  j(A)),  /i — j(A))]. Also, taking the derivative gives
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P roof o f proposition 1:
Let j(q) =  qj(A) +  (1 — q)j(A). Furthermore, let q be implicitly defined by 
+  j(o)) =Tti- Then (5) can be rewritten as
i  r ^ h  r < U ( v ) )
(18) W(q) = --------- ( /  ndir +  / j{q)d7r) for q € [0 , 1].
^ h  “f t I  d i r * ( j ( g ) )  J i r i
Differentiating (18) with respect to q gives
.. , f 0 if q < q
W( q )  =  < _
I - j ( A ) ) (n h  +  3j(q) — 47T|) if 5  >  q
and
W'_(q) =  0
W +®  =  +  3j(§) -  4tt,).
Differentiating twice gives
1 l ( ] ( A )  -  ](A))2 if 9 > 9
and
VKl® = 0
h C(5) =  & (j ( 3 ) - jW -
Hence, IF(g) has a kink at g =  q. It is flat for q < q which implies that 
W(q) =  W (0 ) for q <q .  For q >  q the function W(q)  is convex. Clearly, local 
maxima of a convex function are given by the corner solutions, i.e. q =  q or 
q =  1 . Hence, max[W(q =  1), W(q =  0)] > W ( q )  for any q G [0,1]. ■
P roof o f lem m a 4:
Substituting (8 ) and (13) into (14) and differentiating with respect to 7rc 
gives
R ' i i t c )  =  ^  1~ -j [ 8 p S , { n c ) ( i r h  -  ttc) -  6 p s ( t t c )
4
+S2pB(irc) +  (1 -  S2)^ -  - L - r  I  L W <fer]
r  1  +  o  A ,  r7Tc -  J
and
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Note that B!'{7rc) < 0 for any 7rc G [717, 71^ ]. For <5 —> 1 the first order condition 
reduces to
(20) ^  =  2 K ^ ) (,rA -  ^  ° ( S ^ i )2<i7r) =  °-
Note that
and
n i l  —  \  3 r ( r i T |  —  j ) ( 7 T k  —  7T() 
H ( 7 r i ) =  2^ - . , )  > 0
w = * y i ! z ± z ^ 2 a < 0 .
2r3(7T/l -  7TZ)
Thus, for <5 —► 1 it must be that ir* G
Since i2"(7r*) <  0 we can apply the implicit function theorem to (20). Totally 
differentiating (20) gives
*7Tc
Hence,
r(r7r — — ?r) 1 r e r j n
„ ^  " 3 + (^ 7} ^  = °
dTT* _  r(7T* -  7TZ)2(r7T* +  2r7TZ -  3 j) >  0
<9jf 4(t’7t* — ji)3 +  2(r7rz — j ) 3
P roof o f proposition 2:
To verify that these beliefs and strategies are an equilibrium we have to show 
that each strategy is a best response given the other strategy and that the beliefs 
are consistent with Bayes’ rule.
Consider first the seller’s strategy. Suppose the buyer’s last offer was p b and 
that A(7r) =  1. The seller can then either accept this offer, in which case he 
realises a payoff p b, or he can reject it and make a counteroffer p s. If p s <  p s (n), 
then the seller expects the buyer to accept immediately, while if p s > ps {tt) the 
seller expects the buyer to offer p b (tt) after signalling her type. Thus, if the 
seller rejects then he cannot do better than to offer p s (n) and realise an 
expected payoff of 6ps (7r) +  (1 — 6)^ =  p B(n). It then follows that, if A(7r) =  1, 
the seller’s best response to an offer pb is to accept immediately if p b >  p B(tt) 
and immediately counteroffer p s (tt) if p b <  p B(n). That the first offer pc(^ t)  is
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a best response to the buyer’s strategy follows immediately from the fact that 
t t *  solves the maximisation problem (14).
Consider now the best response of any buyer t t  to an offer of p s =  p s (t t c ) ,  for 
any t t c  G [ t t i , tr/J. Note first that, given the seller’s strategy and the construction 
of the function r( t t , t t c ) ,  the buyer 7r always prefers to make the counteroffer 
p B(n) at t ( t t , 7rc) to counteroffering p b ( t t )  after t ( t t , 7rc), for any t t  = £ t t . Also, if 
the buyer t t  makes a counteroffer after a delay r(7r, 7tc), then, given the seller’s 
beliefs and his strategy, she cannot do better than to offer pB(t t ) .  Finally, it can 
never be optimal for the buyer to make an offer after a delay r  >  t ( t t i , 7rc). Thus, 
if the buyer rejects p 3, then she cannot do better than to counteroffer p B(t t )  after 
t ( t t , t t c ) ,  in which case she makes 8e~rT^ 'nc^ (n — p B(t t ) )  +  (1 — £e-rT(7r’7rc))l;. If 
the buyer t t  accepts p s , then she realises t t  —  p s { t t c ) .  It follows that it is a best 
response for the buyer t t  to accept p s if t t  >  n c and it is a best response for her 
to counteroffer p B(n) after t ( t t ,  t t c )  if n < t t c . Suppose now that the seller’s last 
offer was p s >  p s (T r h ) .  Since, for any t t , t t —  p s (TTh ) < 8 ( t t  —  p B (TTh ) )  +  (1 — 8)£ 
it follows that it is a best response for any buyer t t  to reject the offer and 
counteroffer p B ( t t )  after t ( t t , T r h ) .  Finally, suppose the seller’s last offer was p s < 
P s ( t t i ) .  If the buyer n rejects, then she cannot do better than to immediately 
counteroffer p b ( t t i ) .  Since, for any t t , t t —  p s ( t t i )  >  8 ( t t  —  p b ( t t i ) )  +  (1 — 6 ) %  it 
follows that the buyer’s best response is to accept any p3 < PS(lTl)
At last, we need to check that, on the equilibrium path, the seller’s beliefs are 
consistent with Bayes’ rule. Given the strategies, the seller’s first offer pc(7r*) 
is immediately accepted by any buyer of type t t  G [7r*,7T/J. Any buyer of type 
t t  G [7t i , 7r*) rejects pc(t t * )  and offers p b ( t t )  at t ( t t ,  t t * ) .  Thus, on the equilibrium 
path an offer of p b ( t t )  is made after a delay of t ( t t , t t * )  if and only if the buyer 
is of type t t . Thus, the belief that X ( t t )  =  1 if the buyer makes an offer pB( t t )  
after a delay of r(7r, 7r*) is consistent with Bayes’ rule. ■
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Figure 1: Efficiency gain of moving from A to A in the static model.
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0 —
Dfegpee o f uncertainty
W {j^0>\H H 0) —  -  \M j^0>\M j=30)------- \Mj=50>\Hj=20)
Figure 2: Simulated efficiency gain of moving from A to A in the dynamic model 
for [i = 100, r  =  1, j(A) = 50 and j(A) = 40,30,20.
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Chapter 3
Coercive Power and Economic Exchange:
The Invisible Hand versus the Grabbing Hand
The protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts are key de­
terminants for the development of an economy1. In most democracies the 
state uses its monopolised coercive powers to enforce private contracts. There 
axe, however, numerous instances in which states either give up some of their 
monopoly powers or at least refrain from using them for contract enforcement 
purposes. Private organisations with coercive powers may then have an in­
centive to enter the market and satisfy the demand for contract enforcement. 
Hay, Shleifer and Vishny (1996), for instance, observe that, because of the in­
efficiencies in the Russian legal system, “[...] business people stay away from 
using the legal system, and use the services of organised crime instead”2. Also, 
Gambetta (1993) argues convincingly that, contrary to public perception, the 
Sicilian Mafia’s primary business is that of contract enforcement.
In contrast to other markets, the provision of contract enforcement services 
requires the control of coercive powers by the suppliers. This suggests a par­
ticular problem with the private provision of contract enforcement services in 
so far as potential suppliers may find it more profitable to engage in extortion 
rather than to supply these services in the market place. In this chapter we 
take a closer look at the incentives of agents with coercive power. In particular, 
we study when such powerful agents have an incentive to enforce private con­
tracts, and analyse the degree to which they engage in potentially distortionary
1 See, among many others, Rosenthal (1992), who argues that at least a part of the difference 
in economic development between France and England in the 18th and 19th century can be 
explained by differences in their legal systems.
2Hay, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996), p.562. For a discussion of contract enforcement in 
Russia see also Greif and Kandel (1995), Pistor (1996), and Hay and Shleifer (1998).
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extortion. We compare the powerful agents’ optimal strategies under different 
governmental regimes and describe the welfare implications.
As a benchmark we first consider an anarchic economy in which nobody has 
enough coercive power to determine the allocation of assets and payoffs unilat­
erally. Because of the lack of force there is no extortion in such an economy. 
However, for the same reason, an anarchy depends on reputation building to 
ensure that agents abide by contracts. While reputation building mechanisms 
work well in many situations, they are less useful when agents interact infre­
quently or have short time horizons3. Thus, while an anarchy might experience 
little distortionary taxation, the lack of coercive power also prevents some trans­
actions from taking place.
We then show that a patient monopoly mafia has an incentive to provide 
contract enforcement services. This enables private agents to transact, thereby 
allowing them to realise gains from trade. However, the mafia only enforces 
contracts to maximise the total surplus from which it extorts its own income. 
Since extortion distorts the private agents’ investment incentives, it also reduces 
welfare. Thus, the welfare implications of moving from an anarchic society to 
one in which contract enforcement services are supplied by a monopoly mafia 
turn out to be ambiguous.
To analyse the effect of competition in the contract enforcement industry, we 
consider a regime in which coercive power is shared by two competing mafias. In 
this regime, as in the other regimes described in this chapter, the private agents 
do not have the option of leaving the economy for one with a more favourable 
governmental system. The mafias are therefore ‘competing’ in so far as each is 
trying to extract as much surplus as possible from the same fixed group of private 
agents4. We argue that, in this case, the two mafias have a strong incentive to 
collude by coordinating their contract enforcement and extortionary activities.
3 Also, even when reputation building is possible it can be inefficient to rely on such mech­
anisms exclusively since they may constitute barriers to entry for new firms.
4 Note that this is different from the more familiar type of competition where jurisdictions 
compete to attract mobile subjects by lowering taxes or providing other types of privileges. 
See section 3.
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In the model we show that, as long as conflicts between mafia families axe not 
too wasteful, competition between mafia families leads to more extortion and 
less contract enforcement, and therefore reduces welfare.
Finally, we compare the public and private provision of contract enforcement 
services. For this purpose we analyse a democratic economy in which the citizens 
can use elections to discipline self-interested powerful agents. We show that 
public contract enforcement is more efficient than the provision of such services 
by a private monopoly mafia.
This chapter is structured as follows: the next section presents the model. 
In section 2 we solve the model and compare social welfare between the various 
regimes. Section 3 discusses the related literature and section 4 concludes.
1 The M odel
The model is an infinitely repeated game. We first describe the basic stage 
game when there are no elections. In section 1.2 we turn to the stage game in 
which the powerful agent faces elections.
1.1 T he Stage Game w ithout Elections
The basic stage game is a sequential game with four stages denoted by s* with 
i =  1 ,2 ,3 ,4 . There is an infinitely large population of ex ante identical, risk 
neutral, and infinitely lived agents. We will, at times, refer to these agents 
as ‘private agents’ (as opposed to the ‘powerful agents’ described below). At 
Si two agents are randomly drawn from this population, one of who becomes 
an entrepreneur ‘E’ and the other a worker ‘L’. They are each endowed with 
one discrete unit of labour and their respective labour supply is denoted by 
I e  £ {0,1} and II 6  {0,1}. Their utility functions are given by Uj =  yj — ljUj, 
for j  =  E ,L , where y j  denotes agent j ’s consumption of the final good y  and 
Uj >  0 denotes his disutility of working. We assume that the worker has a 
comparative advantage in supplying labour in the sense that ue >  itj,.
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At S2 the entrepreneur can make an unobservable investment i at cost c(z). 
We assume that, Vz, d(i) >  0, c"(z) > 0, d"(i) >  0 as well as c'(O) =  0 and 
c'(l) =  oo. With probability i the investment is successful and leads to the 
development of a new production technology while with probability 1 — i the 
entrepreneur fails in developing a new technology. The investment’s success is 
indicated by z  £  { 0 , 1 }, where z =  1 if a new technology was developed and 
z =  0 otherwise. We assume that a new technology is only operational for the 
duration of one stage game. At times we refer to a stage game in which a new 
production technology has been developed as a ‘successful stage game’.
At S3 the entrepreneur and the worker choose simultaneously how much 
labour to supply. The labour supply by each agent is observable. The new 
technology, together with labour input I =  Ie +  II, generates output according 
to the following production technology:
We assume that the technology is productive even when it is operated by the 
entrepreneur, in the sense that ue < 1. Also, while labour input is supplied at 
S3 , output is only generated at the next stage.
At S4 the output is generated, distributed among the agents, and consumed. 
In the current stage game, without any elections, we allow for three separate 
regimes which only differ with respect to the specification of stage S 4 .  In the 
first regime, which we refer to as ‘anarchy’, any output that is produced first 
accrues to the entrepreneur who can then decide how to distribute it between 
herself and the other agents.
In the second regime, which we refer to as the ‘monopoly mafia regime’, 
there is one ‘powerful agent’ (denoted by ‘M’) who distinguishes himself from the 
private agents in so far as he has access to an enforcement technology that allows 
him to unilaterally determine the distribution of final output across agents. In
0  otherwise.
1 if I >  1
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particular, at S4 the powerful agent chooses a distribution d =  (t, r, w), where 
t, r, and w denote the fraction of y  that is given to the powerful agent, the 
entrepreneur, and the worker respectively. The distribution D  that is actually 
implemented is then given by D  =  d. Further, we assume that the powerful 
agent is infinitely lived and derives utility from the consumption of the final 
good, so that her per stage game utility is given by Um =  2/m , where yM is her 
consumption of the final good. In contrast to the entrepreneur and the worker, 
the identity of the powerful agent cannot change from one stage game to the 
next.
Finally, we consider a regime, the ‘mafia cartel regime’, in which there are 
two powerful agents ‘Mm’, for m — 1 ,2. These agents are again infinitely lived 
and their per stage game utility is given by U M m —  2 /M m , where y M m  denotes 
Mm’s consumption of the final good. At S4 the powerful agents jointly and unco­
oper at ively determine the distribution of payoffs across all agents. Specifically, 
at S4 each powerful agent chooses a distribution dm =  ( t i , t2,r ,w ), where tm 
denotes the fraction of y that is given to Mm. The distribution that is actually 
implemented is then given by
[ di  if di =  d2
(1 ) D = \
[  f  (di +  d2) if di ^  d2,
where a  E [0,1] is an exogenous parameter. The enforcement technology has 
the following interpretation: if the two powerful agents agree on the same
distribution, then this particular distribution is also implemented. In the case 
of disagreement, the implemented distribution is a convex combination of d \ , d2 
(each with an equal weight of f ), and the zero vector (with weight 1 — a). The 
parameter a  therefore indicates how wasteful it is for the two powerful agents to 
engage in conflict. For simplicity we only consider the case in which the powerful 
agents are symmetric, which is captured by the equal weighting of d\  and d2. 
This implementation technology is, of course, entirely ad hoc. Nevertheless, it
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allows us to describe some effects that we believe to be interesting.
Note that the powerful agents only have power over physical assets (i.e. the 
distribution of the final good); by assumption they cannot force the entrepreneur 
and the worker to invest or to provide labour. As was demonstrated on the
human capital investments. However, we still make this assumption since we 
believe that there are dimensions to human capital investments which can only 
be provided voluntarily. In particular, private agents cannot be forced directly 
to engage in the type of human capital investments that are important for the 
development of an economy, such as learning and conducting research.
After the payoff distribution has been determined at S4 consumption takes 
place and the stage game ends. Summarising, the four stages are given by:
51 E  and L axe randomly chosen.
52 E  invests i.
53 E  and L decide whether to supply labour.
Finally, we assume that, while there is no discounting within each stage game, 
payoffs between two subsequent stage games are discounted at a rate 8 e  [0 , 1 ). 
Social surplus per stage game is denoted by V.
1.2 The Stage Gam e w ith Elections
We now turn to the case in which the group of private agents (the citizens) 
can delegate the monopoly over coercive power to any private agent for the 
duration of at least one stage game. We need to distinguish between the first 
and all subsequent stage games. At the beginning of the first stage game one 
agent is drawn randomly from the population of private agents and given the
Roman galleys, physical force and intense monitoring can also be used to induce
E  decides on payoff distribution (‘anarchy’) 
M  chooses d (‘monopoly mafia regime’)
and M 2 choose di and d2 (‘mafia cartel regime’).
monopoly over coercive power. The next stages Si to S4 are then the same as 
those described above. At s5 there is an election in which the private agents 
can vote between two alternatives: either they re-elect the incumbent T , in
which case this agent remains ‘in office’ until the end of the next stage game, 
or they vote to remove the incumbent from office. In this case the incumbent 
is replaced by an agent who is randomly drawn from the population of private 
agents5. From the second stage game onwards the stages are therefore given
by:
S i E  and L are randomly chosen.
S2 E  invests i.
S 3 E  and L decide whether to supply labour.
s4 I  chooses d.
S 5 Election takes place.
2 T he A nalysis
In this section we solve the different games that were described above and com­
pare social welfare between the regimes.
2.1 Anarchy
We first consider an anarchic economy in which there are no powerful agents. 
Recall that the population is assumed to be infinitely large. Hence, a worker and 
an entrepreneur who are drawn in one stage game do not expect to meet again 
in the future. Reputation building mechanisms are therefore not applicable 
in this environment6. Consider then the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the 
stage game. At S4 it is always optimal for the entrepreneur to consume the
5 Thus, we do not allow private agents to abstain, they have to vote either for or against 
the incumbent.
6 For the analysis of two historical cases in which reputation mechanisms were applied see 
Greif (1993) and Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994).
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entire amount of y € {0 , 1 } that has been produced and not to share any output 
with the worker. At S 3  the entrepreur and the worker have to decide how 
much labour to supply after observing whether or not a new machine has been 
developed. When a new technology has been developed the entrepreneur and the 
worker then face a standard time inconsistency problem: it would be profitable 
for the entrepreneur to ‘hire’ the worker, and for the worker to supply labour, 
since u l < u e  <  1. However, the worker cannot commit himself to work after 
receiving his wage and the entrepreneur cannot commit herself to pay the worker 
after he supplied labour. Thus, at S 3  it is never optimal for the worker to supply 
any labour (independent of his beliefs about the entrepreneur’s investments) and 
instead the entrepreneur has to engage in home production by providing labour 
herself. At S 2  the entrepreneur has to decide how much to invest. Anticipating 
a return of 1 — ue if a new technology is developed, and zero otherwise, she 
optimally invests
(2 ) ia — i*( 1 — ue) =  argm axi(l — ue) — c(i).i
In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium the entrepreneur then invests ia 
(at S2), plays Ie =  1 if the investment was successful and Ie =  0  otherwise 
(at S 3 ) ,  and consumes any output that is produced (at S 4 ) .  At S 3  the worker 
always plays II =  0 and always believes that the entrepreneur invested ial. It 
immediately follows that, under anarchy, social welfare per stage game is given 
by V a, where
(3) Va =  ia{ 1 -  uE) -  c(ia) >  0.
7 Note that there are no information sets off the equilibrium path so that we do not have 
to be concerned with off the equilibrium path beliefs.
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2.2 M onopoly Mafia
We now consider the monopoly mafia regime in which there is one powerful 
agent. It is well known that, for ‘high enough’ <5, an infinitely repeated game of 
the type described above can have a large number of trigger strategy equilibria. 
Here we focus on one particular trigger strategy equilibrium, namely the one in 
which the present discounted value of the monopoly mafia’s equilibrium payoff is 
maximised. Most of this section is used to derive and describe this equilibrium.
The trigger strategies that maximise the mafia’s equilibrium payoff must have 
the following four features: first, they must punish deviation by the mafia as 
severely as possible, in the sense that, following deviation, the mafia realises its 
reservation payoff of zero ever after. This has to be the case since in equilibrium 
deviation never occurs so that a more severe punishment merely increases the 
set of sustainable outcomes. Second, on the equilibrium path, the players must 
cooperate in every stage game. The more often the players cooperate on the 
equilibrium path, the higher their total equilibrium payoffs (and the lower the 
minimum discount rate for which their strategies form an equilibrium). Third, 
on the equilibrium path, it must be the workers, and not the entrepreneurs, who 
supply labour in every successful stage game. This has to be the case since, in 
every successful stage game, resources ue — ul >  0  can be ‘saved’ by having a 
worker rather than an entrepreneur supply labour. These resources can then 
be used to increase the mafia’s payoff either directly, by increasing the level of 
extortion, or indirectly, by improving the entrepreneurs’ investment incentives. 
Finally, the payoff distribution that is implemented on the equilibrium path 
must be chosen so as to optimise the trade-off between the level of extortion, 
the entrepreneurs’ investment incentives, and the workers’ equilibrium payoffs. 
The following strategies <7 M(d), ^ (d ) ,  and crL(d) satisfy the first three of these 
requirements:
•  crM(d): The mafia plays d =  ( t ,r tw) in the first stage game and continues 
to do so as long as it always played d in the past. If ever the mafia plays
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any d it plays d =  (1 , 0 , 0 ) at every subsequent opportunity.
• cTsid): The first entrepreneur plays z*(r). Any subsequent entrepreneur 
plays i*(f) if and only if the mafia never played any d ^  d and she plays 
i =  0  otherwise. The entrepreneurs always play Ie =  0.
•  crL ( d ) :  The first worker plays =  1 if the investment was successful and 
II =  0  otherwise. Any subsequent worker plays II =  1 if and only if the 
investment was successful and the mafia never played any d ^  d and he 
plays Il =  0  otherwise.
Since there is imperfect information about the entrepreneurs’ investment 
levels the other players have to form beliefs about them. The worker and the 
mafia can be in two ‘types’ of information sets, one in which z =  0  and the other 
in which z =  1. In an information set with z G {0,1} the probability that the 
mafia and the worker attach to the entrepreneur having invested i is denoted by 
&A/(b z ) and bi(i, z) respectively. Consider then the following beliefs:
•  b(d): If the mafia never played any d ^  d in the past, then bM(i*(r), z) =  
&z,(i*(r), z) =  1 , Vz. If the mafia every played any d ^  d, then the beliefs 
satisfy f*  &m(z, z)di =  f* bL(i, z)di =  1, Vz.
It is now straightforward to prove the following proposition:
Proposition  1 The strategies crM(d), cr£;(d), and a ^ d ) and the beliefs b(d) 
form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if the following resource (RC), 
no-cheating (NC), and incentive (IC) constraints are satisfied:
t +  r -\-w <  1 (RC)
c
t  +  - 1 > o (n c )
w > uL. (IC)
The constraints can be satisfied simultaneously if and only if 6 £ [<5,1 ), where 
6 G (0,1) is defined below.
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Proof: see appendix.
We now turn to the fourth requirement for profit maximisation, namely that 
the distribution d is chosen so as to optimise the trade-off between the level of 
extortion, the entrepreneurs’ investment incentives, and the workers’ equilibrium 
payoff. Suppose that 6 G [5,1) and that the players play the strategies crM(d), 
(jE(d), and crL{d) (and have the beliefs b(d)). The mafia’s total equilibrium 
payoff is then given by
*'(»'>*) = YZTg^i7)*-
The profit maximising distribution a =  (t*,r*,w*) maximises ir(r,t) subject 
to the RC, NC, and IC constraints. It is evident that the mafia’s profits can 
only be maximised if no resources are wasted, which is equivalent to saying that 
the RC constraint is satisfied with equality. Also, the mafia’s profits can only 
be maximised if the workers always receive a zero net payoff. Thus, the IC 
constraint must be satisfied with equality, so that w* — uE. Substituting into 
the RC constraint then gives r* =  1 — uE — t . Hence, to fully describe d , we 
now only need to find t* by solving
(4) max 7r(l — ur — t, t)
t€ [  0 , l - u L]
s.t. N C (t , 8) =  t  +   ----- ~2*(l — uL — t) t  — 1 >  0.
l  — o
In the appendix we prove the following proposition:
Proposition  2 For 8 G [0,5) maocimisation problem (4) does not have a solu­
tion. For 8 G [5,1) the solution is given by
where T  =  argmaxtg^i-ux,] tt(1 — ul — t ,t) ,  T(8) is the smallest t  G [0,1 — ul] 
that satisfies N C (t,8) =  0, and 8 G (0,(5) is defined below.
Furthermore, it can be shown that
i. T  G (0,1 — u l ), T  =  T{8), and T  is independent of 8.
ii. for 8 G ( 8 ,1), T(8) G (0,1 — u l) and
&r(6) n
I ®  < o .......................................................
Proof: see appendix.
For 8 G [0,6) there does not exist a distribution d that can simultaneously 
satisfy the RC, NC, and IC constraints. Thus, in this parameter range, there 
does not exist a trigger strategy equilibrium in which the workers supply labour. 
Since, as was argued above, labour supply by the workers is more efficient than 
labour supply by the entrepreneurs, this implies that there also does not exist 
a trigger strategy equilibrium in which the entrepreneurs supply any labour. 
Hence, for 8 G [0,6), each player simply plays the stage game equilibrium strate­
gies in every stage game. It is straightforward to show (for a proof see proposi­
tion 12 in the appendix) that, in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the stage 
game, the mafia engages in complete extortion and, anticipating extortion, the 
private agents do not invest and generate no surplus. Thus, when 8 is too low 
to sustain trigger strategy equilibria, all players realise zero payoffs. Note that 
each player’s stage game equilibrium payoff is equal to each player’s reservation 
payoff.
For the remainder of the analysis we assume that, in the monopoly mafia 
regime, the players play the strategies crM{d*), dE(d*), and crL(cf) and have the 
beliefs b(d*) as long as 8 G [6 ,1). For 8 G [0,6) the players use their stage game 
equilibrium strategies of always playing i =  Ie — II — 0  and d =  (1 , 0 , 0 ) in 
every stage game.
The analysis above shows that a patient profit maximising mafia does not 
only engage in extortion, but also provides ‘contract enforcement’ services. In
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this chapter we say that a mafia ‘enforces contracts’ when it implements a distri­
bution that compensates the workers for their labour supply. That the provision 
of contract enforcement services is optimal for a patient mafia can be seen by 
noting that w* =  ul for 6 £ [<5,1). By enforcing contracts the mafia allows the 
transaction between the worker and the entrepreneur to take place: at S3 the 
entrepreneur can ‘hire’ the worker since the latter is sure to receive ul in return 
for his labour supply It is optimal for the mafia to enforce contracts simply be­
cause resources can be saved by having the worker rather than the entrepreneur 
engage in production. As was noted above, the mafia can then use these extra 
resources to increase its extortionary income either directly, by increasing t , or 
indirectly, by improving the entrepreneurs’ investment incentives.
We have already seen that a profit maximising mafia engages in extortion. 
Note, however, that a patient mafia does not extort the entrepreneur completely 
and always leaves some surplus with her (see proposition 2). Clearly, a patient 
mafia has an incentive to do so since the entrepreneurs only invest, and thereby 
create the surplus from which the mafia can extort, if they expect to receive at 
least some of the returns from their investments8.
Proposition 2 also shows that the optimal level of extortion is (weakly) de­
creasing in the discount rate 6. While this seems to be a very intuitive result, 
it depends crucially on the sequential nature of the production process in our 
model. To see why this is the case, note first that a profit maximising mafia 
would ideally want to commit itself to an extortion rate T. This rate, which 
is independent of 8, is only credible if the mafia is very patient, i.e. 8 E [<5,1 ). 
In this case N C (T ,8) > 0 , and thus t* =  T. Consider now a slightly lower 
discount rate such as 8 =  8 — e. Then the implementation of the distribu­
tion d — (T, 1 — ul — T, ul) is not credible: the private agents anticipate that, 
whenever y =  1, the mafia prefers engaging in full extortion to implementing
8 The observation that it might be optimal for an organisation like the mafia to refrain from 
full extortion is, of course, not new and was indeed already made by Franchetti in 1876 who, 
in the context of the Sicilian Mafia, stated that: ”If the villains made use of their destructive 
abilities to an extreme degree, they would soon lack the very matter from which to steal” 
(Franchetti [1876] (1974), p.126, as quoted in Gambetta (1993), p.33).
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d. To make its tax policy credible, the mafia must then increase the extortion 
rate beyond T9. Since T  maximises the expected tax return i(t)t, charging a 
higher extortion rate reduces the expected tax return. However, it increases 
the mafia’s no-cheating payoff (t  -f yz^*(l — u l — t)t)  relative to its cheating 
payoff (1). For 8 E [£, 8) the profit maximising rate of extortion is then given 
by T(8) > T, i.e. the smallest level of t that satisfies the no-cheating constraint. 
Proposition 2 shows that T(8) is decreasing in 8. This is the case since the mafia 
puts less weight on the negative incentive effect of deviation the less patient it is. 
Thus, the lower 8, the more profitable is deviation relative to non-deviation. To 
prevent deviation in the case of a lower discount rate, the equilibrium extortion 
rate must therefore be increased.
We conclude this section by deriving Vm, the expected social surplus (per 
stage game) that is generated in the monopoly mafia regime. For 8 E [0, £) the 
mafia always engages in full extortion, and hence no surplus is generated. For 
8 E [£,1) the profit maximising mafia enforces contracts and only engages in 
limited extortion. Thus,
0  if 8 E [0,<5)
(5) V m =  ‘
' im(l -  uL) -  c(im) if 8 E [8,1),
where
2.3 Anarchy versus the M onopoly Mafia
In an anarchy contracts cannot be enforced and, as a result, some transaction 
do not take place. A patient monopoly mafia improves efficiency by providing 
contract enforcement services. However, the ultimate aim of a mafia is to engage
9In other words, the mafia optimally chooses a tax rate on the downsward sloping part of 
the Laffer curve so as to make its tax policy credible.
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in extortion which, in turn, reduces welfare. In this section we analyse these 
opposing welfare implications.
First, suppose 8 G [6 , 1). It follows from (3) and (5) that the difference in 
social surplus between the two regimes is then given by
(6 ) Vm -  Va =  ia(uE -  uL) +  (im -  ia)( 1 -  uL) ~  (c(im) -  c(ia)).
The first term on the RHS of (6 ) gives the direct efficiency gain that is due to 
the enforcement of contracts: by allowing the transaction between the worker 
and the entrepreneur to take place, the mafia saves resources of size uE — ul 
in any successful stage game. This term is always (weakly) positive since the 
worker has a comparative advantage in supplying labour.
The mafia only provides contract enforcement services to increase its ex­
tortionary income. Clearly, contract enforcement and extortion have oppos­
ing effects on the entrepreneurs’ investment incentives: while contract enforce­
ment makes the technology more productive and therefore improves the invest­
ment incentives, extortion reduces investment incentives by diminishing the en­
trepreneurs’ return from developing a new technology10. The last two terms 
in (6 ) describe this incentive effect. It is straightforward to show that the in­
centive effect is positive if uE — ul >  T  and negative otherwise (see proof of 
proposition 3). Hence, a mafia improves the entrepreneurs’ investment incen­
tives if the gains from trade are larger than the level of extortion. In this case 
all agents, including the entrepreneurs, prefer a regime with a monopoly mafia 
to an anarchic society.
If the level of extortion is larger than the gains from trade, however, the mafia
10Note that lump sum extortion would not reduce the entrepreneurs’ investment incentives. 
In the analysis we rule out lump sum extortion. We believe that there are a number of reasons 
why this is a reasonable assumption in the present context. For instance, the economies that 
we have in mind are very likely to have imperfect credit markets.
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reduces the entrepreneurs’ investment incentives. In this case the difference in 
social surplus between anarchy and the monopoly mafia regime is ambiguous: on 
the one hand, the mafia saves resources im(uE — ul) >  0  by enforcing contracts 
while, on the other hand, it reduces the entrepreneurs’ investment incentives 
by engaging in extortion, thereby decreasing welfare by (im — ia)(l — uE) — 
(c(im) — c(ia)) <  0. The overall effect depends on the relative size of the 
gains from trade uE — ul and the tax rate t*. In particular, we prove below 
(see proposition 3) that, for 8 E [6 , 1), the difference in expected social surplus 
between the monopoly mafia and the anarchic regime is increasing in gains from 
trade uE — ul and the discount rate <5.
The mafia always engages in full extortion, and thus no surplus is generated, 
if 8 E [0,6). In contrast, in an anarchy the entrepreneurs engage in home 
production and social surplus is generated even if 8 E  [0,<5) (see (3)). Hence, in 
this parameter range, the presence of a monopoly mafia reduces welfare relative 
to an anarchy.
The discussion in this section can be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition  3 The difference in social surplus between the monopoly mafia 
regime and anarchy is given by
' < 0  if S e  [o,£)
Vm — V a < > 0  if 6 E  [£, 1) and uE — uE >  t*
^ 0  if 6 6  [£, 1 ) and uE — ul <  t*.
For 8 G [6 ,1), V m — V a is weakly increasing in 8 and strictly increasing in
uE — uE-
Proof: see appendix.
2.4 Mafia Cartel
We have seen above that a profit maximising monopoly mafia engages in ex­
tortion and, possibly, enforces contracts. In this section we analyse how the
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existence of a second mafia affects the provision of contract enforcement ser­
vices and the level of extortion. Consistent with the analysis in the previous 
sections we again focus on one particular equilibrium, namely the one in which 
the mafias’ equilibrium payoffs are maximised. Here this implies that the mafias 
form a cartel and use trigger strategies to support collusion.
The informal literature on mafias and organised crime notes that collusion 
between separate mafias (or mafia families) is a widespread phenomenon (see 
Gambetta (1993)). In this model, and we believe in reality, mafias have an 
incentive to collude because of two main interdependencies: first, it is a fea­
ture of the enforcement technology that the implemented payoff distribution is 
a function of both the mafias’ actions (see (1)). Thus, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for one mafia to provide contract enforcement services without the 
implicit cooperation of the other mafias. Second, private agents cannot target 
their ‘punishment’ strategies at one particular mafia: when a mafia engages in 
unexpectedly high levels of extortion, the private agents respond by reducing 
their investment levels in future periods. This leads to a reduction in the po­
tential extortionary income for all mafias. Hence, all mafias get ‘punished’ for 
excessive extortion by any one mafia.
The analysis required to describe the trigger strategy equilibrium that max­
imises the cartel’s equilibrium payoff is very similar to the analysis in the 
monopoly mafia case. The trigger strategies that maximise the cartel’s equi­
librium payoff must have the same four features as the corresponding strategies 
in the monopoly mafia case: first, deviation by any mafia must be punished as 
severely as possible. Second, on the equilibrium path, the players must coop­
erate in every stage game. Third, on the equilibrium path, the workers rather 
than the entrepreneurs must supply labour. Finally, the payoff distribution 
that is implemented on the equilibrium path must be chosen so as to optimise 
the trade-off between the level of extortion, the entrepreneurs’ investment incen­
tives, and the workers’ equilibrium payoffs. The following strategies acMi(d°),
, a%(d°), and crcL(dc) satisfy the first three requirements.
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•  <JcMm((f), for m =  1,2: Each mafia plays (f  =  in the first
stage game and continues to do so as long as it was never the case that 
d\ ^  d° or d2 7  ^dt ■ If ever di ^  d° or d2 ^  d°, then Mi plays eg =  (1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) 
and M2 plays eg =  (0 , 1 , 0 , 0 ) at every subsequent opportunity.
•  a%(d°): The first entrepreneur plays i*(fc). Any subsequent entrepreneur
 Q  Q
plays i*(rc) if and only if it was never the case that d\ d or d2 ^  d and 
she plays i =  0 otherwise. The entrepreneurs always play Ie =  0.
•  crcL(dc): The first worker plays II =  1 if the investment was successful and 
lL =  0  otherwise. Any subsequent worker plays II =  1 if and only if the 
investment was successful and it was never the case that d\ ^  cf or d2 ^  d° 
and he plays II =  0  otherwise.
Again we also have to specify beliefs to describe the equilibrium. Let
bMm{i, 2)> for m  =  1,2, denote the probability that Mm attaches to the en­
trepreneur having invested i given that Mm is in an information set with 2: G 
{0 , 1}. Consider then the following beliefs:
•  bc(dc): If it was never the case that d\ ^  <f or d2 ^  d°, then
6x,(z*(rc), z) =  1 , \fz,m . If it was ever the case that di ^  (f  or d2 ^  d°, 
then the beliefs satisfy f* bMm(i, z)di =  f* bL(i, z)di =  1 , Vz, m.
It is straightforward to prove the following proposition:
P roposition  4 The strategies acM(<f), and crcL((f) and the beliefs bc(dc)
form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if the following resource (RC°), 
no-cheating (NC°), and incentive (ICT) constraints are satisfied:
? + r + v ? < i  (r c 0)
tC +  T^ g i t (rc)ic - a ( l  +  t- ) > 0  (NO1)
w° >  ul. (IC°)
The constraints can be satisfied simultaneously if and only if 6 G [6C, 1), where 
<!>c G [0,1) is defined below.
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Proof: see appendix.
Suppose that 8 € [£c, 1 ) and that the players play the strategies a cM(d°), 
and acL{d°) (and have the beliefs bc(dc)). The cartel’s joint equilibrium 
payoff is then given by
tt^ F )  =
—c* -c* ^
The profit maximising distribution d =  (k-, rc*, wc*) maximises n (rc,£ ) 
subject to the RCC, NCC, and ICC constraints. Just as in the case of a monopoly
mafia, it must be that wc* =  ul and rc* =  1 — uL — t°*. To describe d°*, we
therefore only need to find tc* by solving
(7) max tt(1 — ul — t .t)
v ' te[o,i-uL]
C i
s.t. N C °(t, 8) =  t +    - u L -  t)t -  a ( l  +  - )  >  0.
l  — o  1
Any difference between the distribution that is implemented by a profit max­
imising monopolist (d*) and that implemented by a profit maximising cartel 
(d°*) is due to the difference in the no-cheating constraints (N C (t,8) >  0 and 
N C c(t,8) >  0). The existence of a second mafia changes the no-cheating con­
straint in two ways: on the one hand, a second mafia reduces the no-cheating 
payoff since, in a cartel, the two mafias have to share the total exortionary 
income, while one mafia receives the entire income in a monopoly. In terms 
of the model, no-cheating gives a payoff of t +  to a monopolist and
only \ { t  4 - YZfii*(r)t) to a duopolist. Ceteris paribus, a reduction in the no­
cheating payoff makes cheating relatively more profitable. On the other hand, 
however, the existence of a second mafia also reduces the cheating payoff. In 
a monopoly the mafia does not have a counterpart and thus, once production 
has taken place, it can always extort the entire surplus y =  1 . In a duopoly,
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however, deviation by any one mafia always implies a conflict with the other 
mafia. Since the implemented payoff distribution is a function of both mafias’ 
strategies, a deviating mafia does not receive the entire surplus y =  1 even if it 
engages in full extortion. This effect is reinforced if disagreement between the 
mafias is wasteful, i.e. if a  <  1. For both these reasons the deviation payoff in a 
duopoly is less than in a monopoly, i.e. f  ( 1 +  ! ) <  1. Whether the no-cheating 
constraint is ‘more binding’ in the duopoly than in the monopoly then depends 
on the relative size of these two effects.......................................................................
In the appendix we prove the following proposition.
P roposition  5 For 8 G [0, 6 °(a)) the maximisation problem (7) does not have 
a solution. For 8 G [£c(o), 1) the solution is given by
_  . T  i f 8 e [ 8 c(a) , l )
t  =
' T c(8,a) i f 8 e [ 8 c( a) , F(a) ) }
where T c(8, a) is the smallest t that satisfies N C °(t, 8) =  0 and8c(a) G [0, <5°(a)] 
is defined below.
Furthermore, it can be shown that
i. f c(T) =  T  i f T  > 0.
ii. for 8 G (8c(a ), 1), T c(8) G (0 ,1 — ul) and
dTc(8) n
 —  <  0  .
d8
Proof: see appendix.
Proposition 4 implies that, for 8 G [0,£c(a)), trigger strategy equilibria can­
not be sustained. In this parameter range the players then simply play their
stage game equilibrium strategies in every stage game. It is straightforward to 
verify that the following strategies and beliefs always form a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium of the stage game: both mafias always engage in full extortion (i.e.
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Mi always plays cfi =  (1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ) and M2 always plays d2 =  (0 , 1 , 0 , 0 )), the en­
trepreneur does not invest and never supplies labour, the worker never supplies 
labour, and the worker and mafias always believe that the entrepreneur invested 
i =  0. This equilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium of the stage game in 
the monopoly mafia case and we assume that, for 6 G [0,£c(o:)), the players 
coordinate on this equilibrium. In the appendix (see proposition 13) we show, 
however, that for a certain parameter range there exist perfect Bayesian equi­
libria of the stage game in which the mafias do not engage in full extortion and 
the entrepreneur makes a non-zero investment.
For 6 G [£c(a;), 1) the profit maximising mafia cartel enforces contracts and 
only engages in limited extortion. Social surplus per stage game is then given 
by
0 i f ^ € [ 0 , f ( a ) )(8) v c= ;
ic( 1 -  uL) -  c(ic) i f  <5 G [£c(a ) ,  1),
where
ic =  i*(l — ul — F*).
2.5 A  M onopoly M afia versus a Mafia Cartel
In this section we analyse the welfare implications of moving from a mafia 
monopoly to a mafia cartel regime. In the discussion we make use of the 
following results.
Lem m a 1 It can be shown that
i. T(0)  =  0 .
i i  <f (1) >  £, £C(1) > 6, and, for 8 G [<f (1), 1), f c(<5,1) > T(6).
Hi. £c(a;), 8°(a), and, for 8 G [£c(o:), 1)? ^ c(^Ja ) are increasing in a .
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Proof: see appendix.
Suppose that conflicts are not wasteful, i.e. a =  1. Lemma 1, together with 
propositions 2 and 5, then has the following implications. First, a cartel is ‘more 
likely’ to engage in complete extortion than a monopolist: in both regimes the 
mafias engage in complete extortion if 8 G [0, <5) but only the cartel does so if 
6 G [6,6C( 1)). Thus, V c =  Vm if 8 G [0,6) and V m > V c if 6 e  [6,6C( 1)). 
Second, for 6 G [£c(l), <$°(1)), contracts are enforced in both regimes but the 
mafia cartel engages in strictly more extortion than the monopoly mafia, i.e. 
t c* > t*. Since extortion is socially inefficient this implies that V m > V c 
if 6 G [£C(1),<5C(1)). Finally, if 6 G [6°(1), 1), both the mafia cartel and the 
monopoly mafia extort T  and enforce contracts, so that V m =  V c. These 
arguments can be summarised in the following proposition.
P roposition  6  When conflicts are not wasteful, i.e. a  =  1, social welfare in 
a monopoly mafia regime is weakly higher than in a mafia cartel regime. In 
particular,
' = 0  if  6 e [ 0 , 6 )
V m - V c l  > 0  if  6 £ [ 6 , T (  1))
, = o  if  « e t r ( i ) , i ) .
While comparing American and Sicilian mafias, Gambetta (1993, p.42) notes 
that: “The greater restraint of the American cartel may well depend on its rela­
tive stability. Mafia families in the United States are also fewer in number and 
larger - five in New York as opposed to eighteen in Palermo alone - presumably 
decreasing the tension between firms Our analysis is consistent with this
presumption in so far as it implies that, as long as conflicts are not wasteful, 
collusion between mafias is more difficult to sustain when there are more mafia 
families.
In the context of a discussion about the welfare effects of the different types 
of warlords who apparently controlled large parts of China in the 1920’s Olson 
(1993) poses the following ‘puzzle’: “Why should warlords, who were stationary
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bandits continuously stealing from a given group of victims, be preferred, by 
those victims, to roving bandits who soon departed? The warlords had no claim 
to legitimacy and their thefts were distinguished from those of roving bandits 
only because they took the form of continuing taxation rather than occasional 
plunder”11. In terms of our analysis stationary bandits are preferred to roving 
bandits because they have a higher discount rate and therefore put more weight 
on the negative incentive effect of extortion. This leads to less extortion and 
makes the provision of contract enforcement services more likely. Even if they 
have the same discount rate, a single stationary bandit is preferred to a group 
of roving bandits if the conflict technology is not wasteful. Again, the reason 
for this is that a single bandit is more easily deterred from engaging in complete 
extortion than members of a group of bandits.
Suppose now that conflicts completely destructive, i.e. a  =  0. Lemma 1 and 
proposition 5 show that the mafia cartel then enforces contracts and extorts T  
for any 8 G [0,1). We know from proposition 2 that a monopoly mafia enforces 
contracts if and only if <5 G [6 , 1), that it extorts T  > T  if 8 G [£, 8), and that it 
extorts T  if 8 G [<5,1). Since extortion is distortionary, it immediately follows 
that Vm < V c if 8 G [0,8) and Vm =  V c if 8 G [<5,1). This discussion can be 
summarised in the following proposition.
P roposition  7 When conflicts are completely destructive, i.e. a  — 0, social 
welfare in a mafia cartel regime is weakly higher than in a monopoly mafia 
regime. In particular,
{ < 0  if 8 e [ 0 , 8 )yvn _ y c  )
\  = 0  if 8 e [ 8 , 1 ).
Finally, consider intermediate values of a.  Lemma 1 implies that the pa­
rameter range in which a cartel enforces contracts is decreasing in a  and that, 
for any 8, the level of extortion is weakly increasing in a. It therefore follows
11 Olson (1993), p.568.
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that, for any <5, V c is (weakly) decreasing in a. Since Vm is independent of a  
(see (5)) this in turn implies that V m — V c is weakly increasing in a. Thus, 
relative to a monopoly mafia, a mafia cartel becomes socially more efficient the 
more destructive the conflict technology.
2.6 Dem ocracy
We now consider a regime in which the private agents use democratic elections 
to control coercive power by solving the game that was described in section 1 .2 . 
Recall that, in this game, any agent who controls coercive power in one stage 
game faces an election after having implemented a tax policy. We analyse to 
what extent elections can be used to discipline agents with coercive power. As in 
the previous sections we again focus on the equilibrium in which the equilibrium 
payoff of the ‘long-run player’, in this case is the electorate, is maximised.
At the election stage all the private agents are identical. In particular, 
they all have the same probability of being chosen as a worker, an entrepreneur, 
or a ruler in any subsequent stage game. Hence, when we study the voting 
strategy of the private agents we only need to be concerned with the behaviour 
of one representative voter, who we denote by ‘R’. However, it is evident that, 
in our model, the representative voter expects a zero return from any voting 
strategy. This is due to the assumption that the population of private agents 
is infinitely large. We, therefore, assume that if the representative voter is 
indifferent between voting strategies, he uses the strategy that maximises the 
expected payoff of the electorate12.
In a first best world the powerful agents enforce contracts and do not engage 
in extortion. In terms of the model this corresponds to implementing the 
distribution d =  (0,1 — ul, ul). To see whether the voters can induce an 
incumbent to implement d, consider the following voting strategy: vote for the 
incumbent if she implemented d* in every previous stage game and do not re-elect
12This is equivalent to assuming that, while the population may be very large, it is not quite 
infinite.
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her otherwise. In every stage game the incumbent must then decide whether 
to implement d and be re-elected or to engage in full extortion and be thrown 
out of office. The former strategy gives the incumbent a zero payoff, while the 
latter gives her a payoff of y =  1 (if production has take place). Thus, faced 
with such a voting strategy, the incumbent never implements d and engages in 
full extortion whenever production has taken place.
The incumbent only has an incentive to refrain from full extortion if there 
are some gains from being re-elected. In this simple model these gains can only 
take the form of extortionary income. Consider, therefore, a voting strategy in 
which the voters ‘allow’ the incumbent to extort t  as long as she also enforces 
contracts. Hence, they re-elect the incumbent if and only if she implemented 
d =  (t, 1 — u i  — t, ul)  during previous terms in office. In every stage game 
the incumbent must then choose between either implementing d and being re­
elected or engaging in full extortion and being thrown out of office. In a stage 
game in which production has taken place the incumbent prefers to implement 
d if and only if t  +  yz^*(l — u l  — t)t >  1 , i.e. the no-cheating constraint 
is satisfied13. Recall that the smallest level of t  that satisfies this constraint 
is given by T(6) and that T(6) < 1 — ul  for 6 6  [£,1)- Since the private 
agents prefer low levels of t, the best policy they can induce is therefore given by 
dv* =  (T(<5), 1 — u l ~  T ( 6 ) , u l ) 14. It was shown above that, for 6 € [0,6), there 
does not exist a t  € [0,1 — u j  that satisfies the no-cheating constraint. Thus, 
in this parameter region, any incumbent engages in full extortion, independent 
of the private agents’ voting strategy and no surplus is generated.
Before stating the strategies and beliefs that form a perfect Bayesian equi­
librium in which the incumbent implements d°* it is useful to introduce the 
following definition that allows us to rationalise on the exposition.
13 Clearly, the incumbent never has an incentive to cheat when production did not take 
place.
14This result, that agents ‘tolerate’ limited extortion by the incumbent to prevent her from 
engaging in full extortion, is related to Klein and Leffler (1981). In their model short run 
consumers pay a premium above the competitive price to induce long run firms to produce 
high quality goods.
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D efin ition  1 In any stage game ‘condition A ’ is said to be satisfied if and only 
if in any prior stage game an incumbent was removed from office if and only if 
she ever played d ^  d°*.
Corresponding to the notation introduced above we denote by 6/(z, z) and 
bR(i, z) the probability that the incumbent and the representative voter attach 
to the entrepreneur having invested i given that they are in an information set 
with z 6  {0,1}. We can now state the following proposition.
P roposition  8  For 6 G [<5,1), the following strategies and beliefs form a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium:
•  <jvr : In any stage game the representative voter votes against the incumbent 
if and only if she ever played d ^  dv*. Otherwise the representative voter 
votes for the incumbent.
•  <tJ: In the first stage game the incumbent plays dv*. Any subsequent 
incumbent plays dv* if condition A is satisfied and she plays d =  (1,0,0) 
otherwise.
•  ovE: The first entrepreneur invests iv =  z*(l — uR — T(6)) . Any subsequent 
entrepreneur invests iv if and only if condition A is satisfied and she invests 
i =  0 otherwise. The entrepreneurs always play II =  0.
•  avL: The first worker plays II =  1 if the investment was successful and 
lL =  0  otherwise. Any subsequent worker plays II =  1 if and only if the 
investment was successful and condition A is satisfied and he plays II =  0  
otherwise.
•  bv: If condition A is satisfied, then bj(iv,z) =  bi(iv,z)  =  bn(iv,z) =  1 , 
\/z. If condition A is not satisfied, then the beliefs satisfy f*  6jw(z, z)di =  
fo bL(i, z)di =  Jo bR(i, z)di =  I, Mz.
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Proof: see appendix.
Finally, consider social welfare in a democracy. For 6  E [6 , 1) the democratic 
ruler enforces contracts and only engages in limited extortion. For 8 E [0,6) 
even a democratic ruler engages in complete extortion. Social surplus per stage 
game is, therefore, given by
0  if 6  G [0 , 6 )
iv(l — ul) — c(iv) if 6  € [6 , 1 ).
2.7 D em ocracy versus a Mafia M onopoly or D uopoly
Consider first the welfare implications of moving from a monopoly mafia regime 
to a democracy. Figure 1 shows the payoff distributions that are implemented 
in the two regimes as a function of the discount rate. For 6  €  [6 ,1) both 
the monopoly mafia and the democratic ruler enforce contracts. The former 
does so because it maximises its extortionary income and the latter because she 
would be thrown out of office if she did otherwise. The two regimes differ, 
however, with respect to the level of extortion. In particular, when 6  G [6 ,1) 
the democratic ruler extorts T  while the monopoly mafia extorts T.  Since it 
was shown in proposition 2 that T  > T  for 6  E (6 ,1) it follows that, in this 
parameter range, social welfare is strictly higher under a democratic ruler than 
under a monopoly mafia, i.e. Vv > Vm. Figure 1 also shows that the level 
of extortion, and thus social welfare, is the same in both regimes if 6  E [6 , 6 ]. 
Finally, figure 1 shows that, in both regimes, the powerful agent engages in 
complete extortion if he is very impatient, i.e. 6  E [0,6 ). Thus, in this parameter 
region, V v =  V m =  0. To see why social welfare in a democracy can be strictly 
higher than under a monopoly mafia, consider the ‘punishment devices’ which 
the private agents can use in either regime to penalise extortion by the powerful 
agent. In the case of a monopoly mafia the private agents can respond to 
extortion only by reducing their private investment levels and hence the mafia’s
108
potential extortionary income. In a democracy elections provide an additional 
punishment device which can be used to discipline the ruler. The analysis above 
shows that this additional punishment device ‘has bite’, in the sense that it leads 
to a lower level of extortion, if and only if the powerful agents are patient, i.e.
8 €  (8,1). The analysis can be summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Social welfare in a democracy is weakly higher than in a monopoly 
mafia regime. In particular,
f = 0 i f  8 e  [0,6]y v  _ y m  i
[  > 0  if 8 e ( 8 , 1).
Consider now the welfare implications of moving from a mafia cartel regime 
to a democracy. We have seen above that the level of social welfare under a 
mafia cartel depends crucially on the technology parameter a. In particular, 
proposition 6  shows that for a =  1 social welfare is weakly higher under a 
monopoly mafia than under a mafia cartel. Since we have just shown that a 
democracy is weakly more efficient than a monopoly mafia it follows that for 
a  =  l a  democracy is also weakly more efficient than a mafia cartel. The 
proposition below follows immediately from propositions 6  and 9.
Proposition 10 When conflicts are not wasteful, i.e. a  =  1, social welfare in 
a democracy is weakly higher than in a mafia cartel regime. In particular,
0 i f  8 e  [0, 6)
y v -  y c '
’ > 0  if 8 £ [ 8 , 1 ).
We have argued above that, in the case of a mafia cartel, the level of welfare 
is weakly decreasing in a. To see whether a regime with a mafia cartel can 
ever be more efficient than a democracy, consider the case when conflicts are 
completely destructive, i.e. a  =  0. Figure 2  shows the payoff distributions 
that are implemented in both regimes as function of the discount rate. When 
8 G (8,1), the cartel extorts T, the democratic ruler extorts T, and both enforce
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contracts. Since T  > T  if 6 € (6,1 ) it follows that in this parameter range a
democratic ruler is socially more efficient than the mafia cartel, i.e. Vv >  V c.
Figure 2 shows that, for 6 € [0,6), a cartel engages in less extortion, and is more 
likely to enforce contracts, than a democratic ruler. Thus, in this parameter 
range, social welfare under a mafia cartel is strictly higher than in a democracy15. 
Finally, for <5 =  8 a mafia cartel and a democratic ruler generate the same level 
of social welfare since they both enforce contracts and extort T.  The analysis 
can be summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 11 When conflicts are not wasteful, i.e. a  — 0, the difference in 
social welfare between a democracy and a mafia cartel regime is given by
' < 0  if S e  [o,5)
Vv -  Vc = 0  if 6 = 6
w > 0  if 6 e { 6 , 1 ).
3 R elated Literature
In this section we show how the existing literature relates to our analysis. Bren­
nan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) propose a theory of the public sector in 
which the government aims to exploit the citizens through the maximisation of 
the tax revenues that it extracts from the economy. This ‘Leviathan’ hypoth­
esis has received considerable attention in the literature. A key argument in 
their analysis is that, due to interjurisidictional mobility of citizens, competi­
tion between governments can limit excessive taxation16. In contrast, in our
15 Our model focuses exclusively on the efficiency implications of distortionary extortion and 
contract enforcement. It is evident that one may prefer a democratic contract enforcement 
to enforcement by a mafia cartel for a number of additional reasons which we do not model 
here. One may, for instance, have equity concerns about the income distribution that results 
from private enforcement activities. Also, one may worry about the association of private 
enforcement organisations with acts of violence.
16 See, for instance, Brennan and Buchanan (1980), p. 184: “interjurisdictional mobility of 
persons in pursuit of ‘fiscal gains’ can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for explicit 
fical constraints on the taxing power”. This hypothesis has been tested in a number of paper, 
including Oates (1985) and Forbes and ZampeUi (1989).
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model citizens do not have the option of leaving the economy for one with a 
more favourable governmental system. Instead, the mafias are ‘competing’ in 
so far as each is trying to extract as much surplus as possible from the same 
fixed group of private agents. To our knowledge the only other paper studying 
this type of competition is Konrad and Skaperdas (1999). In particular, they 
study different government regimes in which powerful agents use their coercive 
power to extort citizens but also to protect them against bandits and competing 
lords. In one regime “peasants are tied to their land and at the mercy of the 
lords who compete over how to divide them up17”. They stress the importance 
of this type of competition and state: “From Mesopotamia to China, Egypt, 
Mesoamerica, or feudal Europe, serfs were tied to the land and free peasants 
typically had no outside options, with rulers coming and going but without any 
change in their incentives for production. Even in the past two centuries, with 
the rise of the rights of man, the most libera] of states have sequestered their 
citizens with barbed-wire borders and passport controls18”.
Olson (1993) argues informally that a self-interested dictator might provide 
public goods to increase his tax base. He also outlines arguments for the dif­
ference in economic development between dictatorships and democracies. The 
ideas presented in Olson (1993) are formalised in McGuire and Olson (1996). 
While our analysis is similar in spirit, the models differ in several dimensions: 
first, they discuss public goods in general, while we focus on the special public 
good of contract enforcement. We believe that this public good has particular 
characteristics which need to be model explicitly. Second, McGuire and Olson 
(1996) use a static model and do not address the reputation mechanisms which 
are central in our analysis. Third, they focus on autocracies and democracies 
while we allow for different government systems.
In recent years there have been a number of contributions that discuss private 
and public contract enforcement with special reference to Russia. Drawing on
17 Konrad and Skaperdas (1999).
18 Konrad and Skaperdas (1999), p. 17.
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examples from Russia, Hay, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) describe why private 
agents may prefer using private methods of dispute resolution to relying on a 
“dysfunctional legal system”. They build a very simple model to show that basic 
legal rules can be used to make a public legal system more attractive to private 
parties than contract enforcement by a mafia. However, they do not discuss the 
incentives of a state or a mafia to provide contract enforcement service. Hay 
and Shleifer (1998) describe some shortcomings of the Russian legal system and 
discuss the different ways in which private agents respond to the absence of 
public contract enforcement services. They state that “the principal argument 
of this paper is that the appropriate legal-reform strategy for a country like 
Russia is private enforcement of public rules19”. In this context they discuss 
the importance of reputation development by private enforcers. However, they 
do not provide a formal analysis. Greif and Kandel (1995) and Pistor (1996) 
provide very interesting descriptive analysis of the Russian legal system and 
describe the response of various private parties to the lack of public contract 
enforcement.
Klein and Leffler (1981) use an infinitely repeated game with short- and long- 
run players to analyse how reputational mechanisms can induce firms to abide 
by contractual obligations in the absence of third-party enforcers. Kreps (1990) 
develops a similar framework to model reputation building and the role of firms. 
While the issues we address in this chapter are very different, the methods we 
use axe similar to those developed in these papers.
De Long and Shleifer (1993) provide empirical evidence that autocratic gov­
ernments axe associated with low gxowth. Finally, Gambetta (1993) gives a 
very interesting account of the Sicilian Mafia.
19Hay and Shleifer (1998), p.400.
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4 C onclusion
In this chapter we analysed the incentives of agents with coercive power to 
supply contract enforcement services. We have shown that when these agents 
are patient enough they do indeed have an incentive to use their powers to 
enforce privately optimal contracts. However, these powerful agents are not 
only guided by the invisible hand to provide contract enforcement services but 
also use their grabbing hands to enrich themselves. Indeed, the sole purpose of 
providing contract enforcement is to maximise the surplus from which they can 
extort their income. Whether a society is better off with or without powerful 
agents depends on the relative size of two opposing effects: on the one hand, 
they allow private agents to realise gains from trade but, on the other hand, 
they also engage in extortion and thereby distort private investment incentives. 
Which effect dominates depends on the degree of competition between powerful 
agents and on whether or not they face democratic elections.
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5 A ppendix
Before proving proposition 1 it is useful to consider the following lemmas.
Lem m a 2 It can be shown that
d2NC(t,8)  f = 0  if 6 =  0 
dt2 \  < 0  i f S e  (0 , 1 ).
Proof:
Differentiating NC(t ,8)  gives
dNC{t,8)
dt
d2NC(t,8)
6 . . . di*(l — uL — t).
_  8 ( nd i * ( l - u L - t )  t ^d2i * ( l - u L - t ) s
1 dr dr2dt2
To determine the sign of these derivatives, we need to consider the optimal 
investment level i*(r). The optimal investment level i*(r) is implicitly defined 
by the first order condition r =  d{i) (the second order condition c"(i) > 0  is
satisfied for all i). Applying the implicit function theorem to the first order
condition gives dr — d'(i)di — 0. Hence,
di* -  1 
dr cf'(i) >
By differentiating again we can find
W  C"(<*) ^  0
dr2
It then follows that
d2NC{t,6)  f = 0  if 8 =  0
dt2 |  < 0  if <5 e  (0 , 1 ).
Lem m a 3 There exists a unique 8 that solves
dN C (l  — ul , 8) 
dt
Let this 8 be denoted by 8. It can be shown that 8 € (0,1).
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Proof:
Prom the proof of lemma 2 we know that
d N C { l - u L,S) S ^**(0)
 dt  =  1 "  C T 1 "  “ i ) _ a T -
Since 9Arc^ “I"0'> =  1, limi_,i =  —oo, and
a2N C ( l  -  uL,S) 1 a*(0)
 m s  =  “  ( T ^ (1 "  “ L )_ a r  <  ° ’
there must be a unique <5 E (0,1) that solves
d N C ( l - u L,8)
dt
Lem m a 4 Consider
=  0 .
max NC(t,8).
t€[ 0,1—uL]
It can be shown that this maximisation problem has a unique solution X{8). This 
solution has the following properties:
i. For 6 E [0,6), A(8) =  1 — ul  and A'(8) =  0.
ii. X(6) =  1 — ul, A'_(<5) =  0, and X'+{8) < 0 .
Hi. For 6 E (6,1), A(<5) E (0,1 — uL) and A'(6) <  0.
Proof:
Note that, for any 8 E [0,1), ?NC£P’6) >  o. Thus, A(<5) > 0, for any 8 E [0,1). 
It follows from the proof of lemma 3 that
d N C { l - u L,8)
dt
> 0  if 8 e  [0 , 6 ) 
=  0  if 6 =  6 
< 0  if 6 E ( 8 , 1).
Since NC{t,8)  is concave in t (see lemma 2 ) this implies that A(<5) =  1 — ul  
for 8 E [0,(5]. Also, for <5 E (<5,1), this implies that A(<5) < 1 — u^ is implicitly 
defined by
(,)
Suppose <5 E {8,1). Totally differentiating dNCd^ 6) =  o gives
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d*NC(t,6) d*NC(t,6)
dt? dt+ dtds rf5 = 0-
We know from lemma 2  that 8 <  0  for 6 €  (0 , 1 ). Also,
d*NC(t,S)  1 « * ( 1  - u L - t )
ms  = ( T ^  (1 - UL~t] ~ * a? }-
Since, for 8 €  (6 ,1),
an .d i*(l  — uL — \ )  1 — 8
»*(1 - U£- A ) - A  d r L ; = - —  < 0 ,
this implies that 8 <  0. Thus, for S € (S, 1),
d*NC(\,S)  d2N C ( \ , 6 ) ' ,
A w  ( aP }
Suppose now <5 € [0,<5). Since A(8) =  1 — ul for any 8 €  [0, <5), it follows 
that X'{8) =  0 .
Finally, consider 8 =  8. Then,
~ a2J v c ( i - « i ,« )  d * N C { \ - u L,s)  x
A+(5) =  ms  ( aP } <0
and
A'__(?) = 0. ■
P roof of proposition 1:
We first prove that crM(d), o\E;(d), and ^ (d )  are best responses for each 
other, and that the beliefs b are consistent with Bayes’ rule ‘where possible’, if 
and only if the RC, NC, and IC constraints are satisfied:
tJM(d): Consider any stage game. If, prior to this stage game, M always 
played d, then M’s expected return of playing d is y(t +  while the best
alternative, playing d, gives a return of y. Thus, d is a best response if and only 
if the NC constraint is satisfied. If, prior to this stage game, M ever played any 
d d, then playing d is a best response since doing so gives a return of y, while 
playing d gives yt <  y.
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<*E(d): Consider any stage game. If, prior to this stage game, M always
played d, then E expects a return of r if her investment is successful and zero 
otherwise. Hence, i*(f) is a best response. If, prior to this stage game, M ever 
played any d =£ d, then E expects no returns from investing so that i =  0 is a 
best response. Note that it can never be optimal for E to play lE =  1 since, 
first, it is costly for her to do so (she incurs a disutility of uE) and, second, given 
the other strategies, the payoff she realises at S4 is independent of lE. Thus, 
lE =  0  is always a best response.
crL(d): Consider any successful stage game. If, prior to this stage game, M 
always played d, then II =  1 gives an expected return of w — uE and II =  0  
gives zero. Hence, II =  1 is a best response if and only if the IC constraint is 
satisfied. If, prior to this stage game, M ever played any d ^  d, then II — 1 
gives a return of — u l  and II =  0  gives a zero return, so that II =  0  is a best 
response. Clearly, in any unsuccessful stage game II =  0 is a best response 
since it gives a zero return while ZL =  1 gives — u l -
b(d): Given these strategies, E invests i*(r) if M always played d. Thus, the 
beliefs bM(i*(r),z) =  bL(z*(r), z) =  1 , Vz, are consistent with Bayes’ rule, given 
the equilibrium strategies. A stage game prior to which M ever played any 
d 7  ^d is off the equilibrium path and M and L can have any beliefs that satisfy 
fo bM(h z )di =  Jq bL(i, z)di — 1 , Vz. Note that, independent of their beliefs, it 
is always optimal for M and L to play d and II — 0 in such a stage game.
We now prove that the RC, NC, and IC constraints can be satisfied simulta­
neously if and only if 8 >  S, where 6 G (0 , 1 ) is a parameter that will be defined
For this purpose we need to investigate the NC constraint when the RC 
and IC constraints are satisfied with equality. From lemma 4 it follows that
below.
ATC(A(0),0) =  — uEy lim^-,! NC(\(6),6)  =  0 0 , and
if 5 e  [0 , 6 ]
i*( 1 - u L -  X(6))X(6) > 0  if d G (S, 1 )
dNC(X,8) _  I 0
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Thus, there exists a unique 8 E (8,1) such that NC(X(8), 8) =  0. Let this critical 
8 be denoted by 8. Thus, for 8 E [0, 8), there does not exist a t E [0,1 — uL\ for 
which N C (t , 8) > 0 . As a result, in this parameter range, the RC, NC, and IC 
constraints cannot be satisfied simultaneously. In contrast, for <5 E [6 , 1), the 
RC, NC, and IC can be satisfied simultaneously. ■
P roof of proposition 2 :
We first show that 9 < 0, for any t  E  [0,1 — uL\. Differentiating
7r(l — ul — t, £) gives
d * ( l - u L - t , t )  1 . . 9i*(l — U i  —  t)
 at  =  1 3 j f c U - t a - f ) - *  -------- )
d27r(l - ul -  t , t )  _  1 . d i * ( l - u L - t )  d2i * ( l - u L - t )
dt 2 1 — 8 dr dr2
Thus, < o, for any t € [0,1 -  uL\.
Note next that > 0 and < 0. Hence, T  € (0,1 — ul) is
uniquely defined by the first order condition =  q ancj ^ therefore
independent of 8.
Note also that iVC(T, 0) <  0, lim ^ i N C (T , 8) =  oo, and
d N C ( J '6\  =  _  UL _  > 0 , for any 8 e  [0 , 1 ).
Thus, there exists a unique 8 E  (0,1) which solves NC(T,8) =  0. Let this 
critical 8 be denoted by 8. Then, NC(T,8)  >  0 for 8 E  [6 ,1). Thus, in this 
parameter range, t* =  T.
We proceed to describe t* for 8 E [0,<5). To do so we first show that 8 < 8 .  
For this purpose note that dNC£ r’6^  =  1 and NC(\(8),8)  >  NC(T,8)  =  0. It 
was shown in the proof of proposition 1 that, for 8 E [£,1), dNCM6)’6) >  o. 
Thus, 8 < 8.
We know from the proof of proposition 1 that, for 8 E  [0,6 ), there does not 
exist a t E  [0,1 — ul] that satisfies NC(t,  8) >  0. Thus, in this parameter range, 
maximisation problem (4) does not have a solution.
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Consider, then, t* for 8 G [£,<$). Note that, for 8 G [£,£), NC(\(8) ,8)  >  0 
and NC(T, S) <  0. Recall that dNC£''6) >  0 and < 0. It follows that
for any t  that satisfies NC(t,  S) >  0 it must be that t  > T .  Thus, in the given 
parameter region, the optimal extortion rate must be larger than T  to satisfy 
the constraint NC(t ,8)  >  0. Note also that ^ (1-^1,-M) < 0 for any t  >  T. 
It follows that, for 8 G [£, 8), t* =  T(8), where T(8) is the smallest value of 
t G [0,1 — uL\ that satisfies N C ( t , 8) =  0.
Since NC(0,8)  =  — 1 it must be that, for 8 G [5,1), T(8) >  0. Also, since, 
for 5 € K ,l), <  0  “ d <  0 , it must be that T(8) < 1 — uL.
Moreover, it follows from NC(T,8)  =  0, dN-cJ?'6) >  o, and <  0 that
T  (?) =  T.
Finally, consider for 8 G (8 ,1). Totally differentiating NC(t ,8)  =  0 
gives
Since, for 8 G (£,1),
and
it follows that
o.
at 38
3NC(T,  8)
dt
3NC{T,8)
38
> 0
> 0,
3T{8) d N C F ^ . d N C i F J ) ^  _ _  c ,c
P roposition  12 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the stage game in the 
monopoly mafia regime E, L, and M play the following strategies:
• E plays i =  0 and Ie — 0.
•  L always plays Il =  0.
•  M  always plays d =  (1,0,0).
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Proof:
At s4 it is always optimal for M  to play d — (1,0,0), whether or not y =  0 
or y  =  1 and independent of his beliefs about E's investment level. Thus, at 
S3 E  and L anticipate total extortion and therefore always play Ie =  II =  0, 
independent of the investment’s success and L’s belief about E ’s investment. 
Clearly, at S2 E  then optimally plays i =  0. If the investment is unsuccessful, 
L and M  (rightly) believe that E  played i =  0. At off the equilibrium path 
information sets we can specify arbitrary beliefs, for any of which it is optimal 
for L and M  to play II =  0 and d =  (1 ,0,0). ■
P roof o f proposition 3:
Vm — V a <  0 for 6 G [0,6) follows immediately from (3) and (5).
Next consider (6 ) for 6 G [6 ,1). Note that the first term on the RHS is always 
weakly positive. We now show that the last two terms on the RHS are weakly 
positive if and only if ue — u l  >  T.  Let F(i) =  z(l — ul)  — c(i) and let 
i** =  argmaxi F(i). We then need to show that F(im) — F(ia) >  0 if and only 
if ue — v>l> t*. Note that i** >  maxjz771,^0]. Since F'(i) >  0 for any i <  i** it 
then follows that F(im) — F(ia) >  0 if and only if im >  ia. Note that im > ia if 
and only if u e ~ u l  >  t*. Hence, F(im) — F(ia) >  0 if and only if u e ~ u l >  £*. 
It immediately follows that V m — Va >  0 if 6 G [<5,1) and ue — uL > t*, and 
y m  _  y a  ^ 0  if 6 G [£, 1) and ue — u l  < t*.
We know from proposition 2 that, for 6 G [6,1), 7  is weakly decreasing in 6. 
This implies that, in this parameter range, Vm is weakly increasing in 6. Since 
V a is independent of 6, it then follows that, in this parameter range, Vm — V a 
is weakly increasing in 6.
It follows from proposition 2 that t* is independent of ue- We now analyse 
how t* depends on tq> For 6 G [6 ,1), t* =  T, where T  is implicitly defined by 
the first order condition
Implicitly differentiating then gives
j v t ,  d i * ( l - u L- T )  , rn d 2i * ( l - u L- T )
01  dr  +  1 d r2
duL o dz*(i - ttL-T )  , j 7 a2t* ( i-u x ,- r )  ’
d r  d r2
so that
dT
d o) - 1 < ^ < 0 -
For <5 G [£,6 ), t* — T(6), where T(<5) is defined by the unique t that solves 
the conditions N C ( t , 6 ) =  0 and >  0. Implicitly differentiating the first
condition gives
a f(g ) S - f t - ( l - « t - f )  dNC{T,8)  .
1 ; 1 — (5 9r at ' -
Differentiating (6 ) and substituting the first order conditions ^ (^ (l — u^)) =  
1 — uE and ^ (^ (l — uL — t*)) =  1 — uL — t* gives
d(Vm -  V a) 
duE
and
=  z*(l — uE) >. 0
Because of (10) and (11) it follows that d V^Q ^   ^ <  0. Thus, for 6 G [£, 1), 
ym  _  ya  js increasing m uE — uE. ■
Before proving proposition 4 it is useful to consider the following lemmas. 
In general, the proofs for the cartel and the monopoly mafia regimes are very 
similar.
Lem m a 5 It can be shown that
d2N C c{t, 8) ( = 0  if 6 =  0 
dt2 \  < 0  if 6 e  (0 , 1 ).
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Proof:
Differentiating N C c(t,8) gives
d N C c(t,6) a  6 , d i * ( l - u t - t )
at = l - 2 + — s {%{1- UL~ t ) - t  Fr }
d2NC°(t,  6) =  6 d i * ( l - u L - t )  d2i * ( l - u L - t )
dt2 1 — 6 dr dr2
Since, as was shown in lemma 2, 81 > 0 and ^ 1 <  0, it follows
that
d2N C c(t, 6) f = 0  if <5 =  0 
0 * 2 |  < 0  if<5G (0 , 1 ).
Lem m a 6  T/iere ezzsts a unique 6 that solves
d N C c(l — uL,S) 
dt
— C — C
Let t/ws <5 6e denoted by 6 . It can be shown that 6 G (0,1).
Proof:
Prom the proof of lemma 5 we know that
d N C c( l - u L,6) , a  6 . Ndz*(0)
 dt =  1 "  2  ~  T ^ 5 ( 1  "
Since dNC =  1 — f  > 0 , BNC =  —oo, and
d2N C H \ - u L,8) 1 ,, Ndi*(0) „ f c ,
 d m  =  " ( 1  “  Ul)~ d T  K 0  f o r  “ y  6  €  [ 0 ’ x ) >
there must be a unique <5 G (0,1) that solves
d N C c( l - u L,6) 
dt
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Lemma 7 Consider
max N C c(t,8).
te[ 0,1—u*]
It can be shown that this maximisation problem has a unique solution Ac(<5). 
This solution has the following properties:
i. For 8 G [0 ,7 ), Ac(8) =  1 -  uL and Xc/(8) =  0. 
i i  AC(8C) =  1 - u L, X'ffi)  =  0, and X%(7) < 0.
Hi For 8 G (? , 1), Ac(8) G (0 ,1 -  uL) and Xc,{8) <  0.
Proof:
Note that > 0. Thus, Ac(<5) > 0, for any 8 G [0,1).
It follows from the proof of lemma 6  that
> 0  if 8 G [0 ,?)
= 0 ii 8 = T  
< 0  if 8 e  (<T,1 ).
d N C c( l - u L,8)
dt
Since N C c(t , 8) is concave in t (see lemma 5) this implies that Ac(<5) =  1 — uL 
for 8 G [0, <5]. Also, for 8 G ( 8  ,1), this implies that Ac(<5) < 1 — ul is implicitly 
defined by
, x d N C c(Xc, 8) n
(1 2 )  ^ - i  =  0-
Suppose 8 6  ( 8  ,1). Totally differentiating BNC^ 't'e  ^ =  0 gives
d2N C ‘(t,S) d2NC°(t,8)
OP d t +  dtdS dS =  0-
We know from lemma 5 that d <  0 for 8 6  (0 ,1 ). Also,
d*NC'(t,8)  1 d i ' ( i - u L - t )
dtdS =  ( T ^ (l ( 1  - UL ~  l) ~  4 Wr--------
Since, for <5 G (8 ,1),
i*(t „ W Xc^ *(l -  «L -  Ac) l - « 5 n , n I ( 1  -  uL -  A ) -  A  ^ --------- = ------— (1 -  - )  <  0,
this implies that 8 N < 0. Thus, for 8 e  ( 8  ,1),
d2N C ‘( \ c,6) d*NC‘( \ c,6) j
A (5) = --------m a ^ {— w — } < °-
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Suppose now <5 £ [0,<5 ). Since Ac(<5) =  1 — tt£ for any 5 € [0,5 ), it follows 
that \ a (6) =  0.
—C
Finally, consider 8 = 8 . Then,
T  d2N C % l - u L, T ) ( d2N C % l - u L,T )  ,
A+(5) =  m  ( w  } < 0
and
A^(5C) =  0 . ■
P roof o f proposition 4:
We first verify that the strategies , crcE(dc), and crE(dc) are best re­
sponses for each other, and that the beliefs bc are consistent with Bayes’ rule 
‘where possible’, if and only if the RCC, NCC, and ICC constraints are satisfied.
<7cMm (d,c), for m =  1 , 2 : Since the mafias are symmetric we only need to 
consider the best response by one mafia. Consider any stage game. If, prior to
C Cthis stage game, it never happened that d\ ^  d or g?2 7^  d , then Mi  expects a 
return of y (^ (rc) \ )  by playing ?  and |t /(  1 +  \ )  by playing dj. Hence,
d° is a best response if and only if the NCC constraint is satisfied. If, prior to
—C —Cthis stage game, it ever happened that di ^  d or d2 7  ^d , then playing d\ is a 
best response for Mi since doing so gives a return of f  ?/ while playing ?  gives
j f y  < f 2/'
cTcE{(f): Consider any stage game. If, prior to this stage game, it never
—C —c
happened that di 7  ^d or d2 7  ^d , then E expects a return of r c if her investment 
is successful and zero otherwise. Thus, i*(rc) is a best response. If, prior to 
this stage game, it was ever the case that d\ 7  ^d° or d2 7^  d°, then E does not 
expect any investment returns and i = 0 is a best response. Note that it can 
never be optimal for E to play Ie  = 1 since, first, it is costly for her to do so 
(she incurs a disutility of ue) and, second, given the other strategies, the payoff 
she realises at S4 is independent of Ie - Thus Ie = 0 is always a best response.
acL(dc): Consider any successful stage game. If, prior to this stage game, it 
was never the case that di 7  ^d° or d2 7^  d°, then II = 1 gives an expected return 
of wc — u l  and II =  0 gives zero. Hence, Il =  1 is a best response if and only if
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the ICC constraint is satisfied. If, prior to this stage game, it was ever the case
■ ■ ^  ■ i ■ ^
that di 7  ^ d or d2 7  ^ d , then =  1 gives a return of — and II = 0  gives a 
zero return, so that II = 0  is a best response. Clearly, in any unsuccessful stage 
game II = 0  is a best response since it gives a zero return while II = 1 gives 
- u L.
bc(dc): Given these strategies, E invests i*(rc) if and only if it was never the 
case that d\ 7  ^d° or d2 7  ^dc. Thus, the beliefs bMm{i*{rc),z) = bL(i*(rc), z) = 1 , 
Vz, m, are consistent with Bayes’ rule, given the equilibrium strategies. A
■ •  — c ““Cstage game, prior to which it was ever the case that d\ 7  ^ d or d2 7  ^ d , is 
off the equilibrium path and Mi, M2, and L can have any beliefs that satisfy 
Jo bMm{h z )di =  / q bL(i,z)di = 1 , Vz,m. Note that, independent of their 
beliefs, it is always optimal for Mi, M2, and L to play eg, d%, and II =  0 in such 
a stage game.
We now prove that the RCC, NCC, and ICC constraints can be satisfied si­
multaneously if and only if 8 > 6C, where Sc € [0 , 1) is a parameter that will 
be defined below. For this purpose we need to investigate the NCC constraint 
when the RCC and ICC constraints axe satisfied with equality. From lemma 7 it 
follows that ATCc(Ac(0), 0) =  —uL, lim$_i N C C( \C(6),6) =  0 0 , and
d N C c( \ c, 6) _ j  0 if [0 , 6C]
96 ~  I ( r V * a  -  -  Ac(<5))AC(<5) > 0  if S € ( 7 , 1).
Thus, there exists a unique 8 E (8  ,1) such that N CC(AC(8 ) ,8 ) =  0. Let 
this critical 8 be denoted by 8C. Thus, for 8 E [0, £c), there does not exist a 
t E [0,1 — ul] for which N C c(t, <5) > 0 . As a result, in this parameter range, the 
RCC, NCC, and ICC constraints cannot be satisfied simultaneously. In contrast, 
for 8 E [£c, 1), the RCC, NCC, and ICC can be satisfied simultaneously. ■
P ro o f of proposition  5:
Note that l im ^ i N C C(T, 8) = 00  and that
d N ° d f ' 6) =  ( r b )^*(1 -  UL ~  T ) T  -  °>for ^ s  6 [0’1}-
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Suppose N C C(T, 0) <  0. Then there exists a unique 8 £ [0,1) that solves 
N C C(T, 8) =  0. Let 8°(a) be implicitly defined by N C C(T, 8c) =  0 if N C C(T, 0) <  
0 and let 8°(a) =  0 otherwise. Then T  satisfies the NCC constraint if and only if 
8 £ [<T(a:), 1 ). Since it was shown above that T  also satisfies the RCC constraint 
it follows that t°* =  T  for any 8 E [<5° (ck), 1 ).
We proceed to describe tc* for <5 E [0 , 8°). To do so we first show that
8C <  8°. For this purpose note that dNC*(T>6) =  \  _  |  and N C c(Xc(8c),8c) >
NC{T,8°)  =  0. It was shown in the proof of proposition 4 that, for 8 E [6 C, 1), 
bnc-w w  >  q. Thus, 8° <8°.
We know from the proof of proposition 4 that, for 8 £ [0,5°), there does not
exist a t (E [0,1 — ul] that satisfies N C c(t , 8) >  0. Thus, in this parameter
region, the maximisation problem (7) does not have a solution.
Consider, then, t°* for 8 E Note that, for 8 G [6 c(o;), 5c(a)),
N C C(T, 6) <  0 and N C C{XC(S), 6) >  0. Recall that BNC^ T-S> >  0 and <
0. It follows that for any t  that satisfies N C c(t, S) >  0 it must be that T > T. 
Hence, in the given parameter region the optimal extortion rate must be larger 
than T  to satisfy the constraint N C c(t , 8) >  0. Note also that <  o
for any t  > T .  It follows that, for 8 G [£c(a:), 8°(a)), tc* =  T°(8), where T c{8) is 
the smallest value of t  that satisfies N C c(t, 8) =  0 .
Since N C C(0,8) — —a >  0 it must be that, for 8 G [£c, 1), Tc(8) >  0. 
Also, since, for 8 E [£c, 1 ), 9 NQti t>6^ <  0 and 9NC ^ UL'6^  <  0 , it must be that 
T c(8) <  1 — ul. Moreover, since, for 8° >  0, N C c(T,8c) =  0, >  0, and
d2N^ 6l  <  o, that T C(8C) =  T  if T  >  0 .
Finally, consider for 8 G ( c^, 1). Totally differentiating N C c(t, 8) =  0 
gives
at 08
Since, for 8 G (8C, 1),
dNCc(T°, 8)
dt
> 0
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and _
dNC°(Tc, 8) _ 
68
it follows that
fc[
d8 do at
P roposition  13 In the mafia cartel regime there exist perfect Bayesian equi­
libria of the stage game in which the entrepreneur invests i >  0  if and only if
3—ul
Proof:
Suppose Mi plays d\ =  d =  (t, 1 — t — r  — ul , r, ul) when y =  1 . It is a best 
response for M2 to play d2 =  d if and only if
(13) 1 - t - r - u L > - ^ — .v y 2  — a
Now suppose y  =  1 and M2 plays d2 =  d. It is a best response for Mi to play d 
if and only if
<14> ^ 2 ^ '
Conditions (13) and (14) can be satisfied simultaneously if and only if a <  
2 a ^  this condition is not satisfied, then the mafias always engage in 
complete extortion so that in equilibrium it cannot be optimal for E to make 
non-zero investments. If this condition is satisfied, then it can be a best response 
for L to play II =  1 if a machine has been developed (and II =  0 otherwise). 
At s2 it is then optimal for E to invest i*(r) >  0 if and only if r >  0. Thus, for 
a <  2(31J ^  there exist perfect Bayesian equilibria for which i >  0. ■
P roof o f lem m a 1:
i. Note that N C C{T, 0) =  T  >  0 for a  =  0. It follows from the definition of 
T{a)  that 6C{0 ) =  0 .
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ii. Let a  =  1 . Then N C C(T, 0) <  0, so that <5C(1) is implicitly defined by 
N C C(T, T )  =  0 and ? (1 ) > 0.
Note that, for a  =  1, NC(t,8) =  N C c(t,8) +  f. Thus, N C C(T,8) =  - f .  
Since aNCggT’^  >  0, it follows that £c(l) >  S.
Also, since N C (t ,8 ) =  N C c(t,8) +  f ,  NC(X,8) > N C C(XC,8) for any 8 e  
[0,1). In particular, NC(X,8°) >  N C C(XC,8C) =  0. Since, for 8 > 8 ,  >
0 , it follows that 8 < 8C( 1 ). Also, for 8 > 8C, N C (T C{8),8) >  N C C(TC(8),8) =  0 . 
Since dNC(^ h ^  >  0 it must be that, for 8 e  [<f (1 ), 1 ), T{8) <  T c(8).
iii. Recall the definition of 8°: if N C C(T, 0) <  0, then 8° is implicitly defined 
by N C C(T,8°) =  0. If N C C(T, 0) > 0, then 8° =  0 .
Note now that
dNC'(T,0) T
da ( 2 h
Totally differentiating N C C(T, 8) =  0 gives
^  =  ( 1  -  5)2(1 +  | ) ( i* ( l  -  uL -  T)T ) _1  >  0 .
—C
Hence, 8 is weakly increasing in a.
Next recall the definition of 8C: if NC°(Ac(0),0) < 0, then 8C is implicitly 
defined by N C C( \ C(8C),8C) =  0. If N C C(Ac(0), 0) >  0, then 8C =  0.
Note that
aivc*(A c(o),o ) =  ,  n
da  V 2  '
Totally differentiating N C C( \ C(8), 8) =  0 gives
^  =  (1 -  5)2(1 +  £ ) ( i* ( l  - u L -  AC)AT 1 >  0.
Hence, 8C is weakly increasing in a.
Finally, recall that, for <5 G [6 C, 1), T c is defined as the smallest t  for which 
N C c(t,8) =  0. Totally differentiating N C c(t, 8) =  0 gives
ot da
Thus, _  _
f = < 1 + .
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P roof o f proposition 8 :
We first verify that the strategies cr£, avE, crj, and avR are best responses for 
each other.
avL: Consider any successful stage game. If condition A is satisfied, then 
lL =  1 and II =  0  both give zero returns so that II =  1 is a weak best response. 
If condition A is not satisfied, then II =  1 gives a return of —ul and Il =  0 gives 
a zero return, so that II =  0  is a best response. Clearly, in any unsuccessful 
stage game II =  0  is a best response since it gives a zero return while II =  1 
gives - u L.
aE : Consider any stage game. If condition A is satisfied, then E expects 
a return of 1 — ul — T(8) if her investment is successful and zero otherwise. 
Hence, i*(l — ul — T(8)) is a best response. If condition A is not satisfied, then 
E expects no returns from investing so that i =  0 is a best response. Note that 
it can never be optimal for E to play Ie =  1 since, first, it is costly for her to 
do so (she incurs a disutility of ue) and, second, given the other strategies, the 
payoff she realises at S4 is independent of Ie - Thus Ie =  0 is always a best 
response.
<7vj : Consider any stage game. If condition A is satisfied, then dv* and the 
best alternative, playing d, both give an expected return of y, so that d°* is a 
best response. If condition A is not satisfied, then playing d°* gives a return of 
T(S)y < y while playing d gives a return of y so that d is a best response.
aR : Consider any stage game. If condition A is satisfied, then re-electing 
an I  who always played dv* gives an expected return of ^ ( ^ ( l  — ul— T (8)) — 
c(iv)) >  0 while voting against her gives a zero return. Also, re-electing an I  
who ever played any d 7  ^ dv* gives a zero return while voting against her gives 
Y^(zw(l — ul— T(8)) — c(iv)) >  0. Thus, if condition A is satisfied, it is optimal 
to re-elect I  if and only if she never played any d ^  dv*. Finally, note that if 
condition A is not satisfied, then the private agents are indifferent between all 
voting strategies since they all lead to a zero return.
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bv : Given these strategies, E invests iv in any stage game in which condition 
A is satisfied. Thus, bi(iv, z) =  bL(iv , z) =  bR(iv, z) =  1, Vz, are consistent with 
Bayes’ rule, given the equilibrium strategies. A stage game in which condition 
A is not satisfied is off the equilibrium path and I, L, and R can have any beliefs 
that satisfy / q bM(i,z)di  =  ^ b L{i1z)di =  f^bR(i:z)di =  1, Vz. Note that, 
independent of their beliefs, it is always optimal for I and L to play d and II =  0 
and for R to vote against I in such a stage game.
The claim that the given strategies do not form a perfect Bayesian equilib­
rium if 8 G [0,6 ) follows immediately from proposition 1 where we have shown 
that the RC, NC, and IC constraints can be satisfied simultaneously if and only 
if<5e [£,!). ■
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n v=aaQ) Dv=(f,\-uL-T,uL) Dv =(f,\-uL-T,uL)
o ” =aQQ) i r= ( f , \ -u L-f,uL) IT = (T ,]-ul-T ,ul )
I---------------------1-------------------------------------------------  1-►
0  $  1
Figure 1: Distribution implemented by a democratic ruler and a monopoly mafia.
DV=(1,Q0) | Z)v=(7;i Dv =(f,\-uL -T, uL)
rf=(T,l-uL-T,uL) I If=(T,l-uL-T,uL)
I t 7  1-------------- ►
0  8  1 8
Figure 2: Distribution implemented by a democratic ruler and a mafia cartel 
when a  =  0 .
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Conclusion
In this thesis we studied the efficient organisation of economic institutions. 
Chapter 1 applied the well established property rights framework to foreign 
direct investment projects. The recent developments in the theory of the firm 
provide very useful tools which can be used to improve our understanding of 
foreign direct investment projects and multinational corporations. So far this 
application of the property rights approach has received surprisingly little at­
tention and seems to provide a promising area for future research.
In chapter 2 we developed a new property rights theory of the firm that 
focuses exclusively on the role of bargaining inefficiencies in determining the 
boundaries of firms. This theory has clear empirical implications which are, at 
least in principle, testable. We intend to investigate the empirical evidence in 
future work. Also, the role of bargaining inefficiencies in corporate finance is an 
interesting and somewhat neglected research area. We are currently working on 
a model of debt and equity financing that uses the general framework introduced 
in chapter 2 .
Finally, in chapter 3 we analysed the private and public provision of contract 
enforcement services. An understanding of these issues is not only of histor­
ical interest but also relevant for current policy discussions in some transition 
countries. The limited amount of work that has been done in this area so far 
does not do justice to the importance of the subject and much interesting work 
remains to be done.
On the whole, we hope that this thesis makes a modest contribution to our 
understanding of economic institutions and also offers some ideas for future 
work.
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